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[ABSTRACT]
Traditionally, industrial relations have been studied with relation to 
three fundamental theories: pluralism, unitarism and marxism. However, 
over the past decade there has been an increasing contribution to industrial 
relations emanating from the boundaries of other disciplines: principally 
economics, organizational behaviour and business strategy. Among 
economists, and to a lesser extent, business strategists, there has been a 
growing concern about the relationship between macro-economic 
performance across several countries and labour market institutions. This 
has manifested itself in discussion of how specific wage bargaining 
structures influence unemployment and inflation. In these discussions 
industrial relations specialists appear to lag behind their economist 
colleagues, tending to favour analysis of the intrinsic relations between 
employers and employees.
An important advantage, however, of these studies in employee 
relations has been in their ability to explain the conduct of an industrial 
relations system. This has not led to any consensus and few of the studies 
conducted in the past decade have investigated the strategic behaviour of 
both employers and employees. None have attempted to examine the 
macroeconomic implications of behaviourial changes and wage bargaining.
This thesis builds on work already in train in a number of disciplines: 
principally industrial relations, business strategy, organizational behaviour 
and labour economics. Cognisant of the work in these areas, the study 
develops a theory which explains how perceived and actual increases in 
international competition influence the choice which employers and 
employees make and which eventually shape their institutions.
By departing from the traditional theoretical constructs used in 
industrial relations, our "new" theory provides a basis for cross-country 
comparisons of macro-economic effects of labour relations behaviour. From 
our theory we devise testable propositions and draw a wide variety of time 
series data over a period of some twenty years, from seventeen O.E.C.D. 
economies to test these. These data, which lend themselves to 
econometric analysis, are augmented by qualitative evidence from case 
studies. Findings support our theory.
The thesis makes three distinct contributions. Firstly, it suggests a
"new" theoretical approach to the study of industrial relations which 
combines work from several disciplines. In this regard, it contributes a 
theory which explains labour market changes by recourse to macro- 
economic performance. Secondly, it makes a contribution, albeit modest, to 
policy, suggesting that some current Western policies for labour relations are 
inadequate since they do not clearly show employers and employees the 
actual implications of macro-economic performance. Thirdly, the thesis 
highlights some of the shortcomings of econometric studies which focus on 
a relatively narrow set of variables at the exclusion of qualitative data which 
is difficult to quantify.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
1. THE STRUCTURE OF LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND
MACRO-ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Wage-setting institutions have increasingly been viewed as important in 
explaining cross-country variations in economic performance such as 
unemployment, inflation and growth rates. Discussions tend to focus on 
national differences in the structure of labour market institutions - for 
example, the degree of centralization in the level of collective bargaining and 
the extent of corporatism in wage-setting. Academic work in this area can 
be grouped around four established hypotheses: the liberal-pluralist 
hypothesis (see e.g., Lindbeck 1978), the corporatist hypothesis (see e.g., 
Bruno and Sachs 1985; Cameron 1984; Crouch 1985; McCallum 1983), the 
U-curve hypothesis (see e.g., Calmfors and Driffill 1988; Freeman 1988), 
and the interactive hypothesis (see e.g., Paloheimo 1990).
The liberal-pluralist hypothesis argues that economies with limited 
trade union and government involvement in industrial relations display better 
economic performance than similar economies with extensive trade union 
and government involvement in industrial affairs. The liberal-pluralist position 
contrasts sharply with that of the corporatist. The corporatist hypothesis 
suggests that consensus-prone interplay between interest groups and 
government is crucial to improved economic outcomes. These two 
competing arguments have contrasting views of economic mechanism. The 
former argues that competitive forces are essential to restrain wage 
increases, while the latter suggests that there are political gains from 
internalizing the external effects of wage increases within large 
encompassing organizations (see e.g., Calmfors and Driffill, 1988).
Falling somewhere between the liberal-pluralist and corporatist 
positions are the U-curve and the interactive hypotheses. The former 
suggests that nations with either highly centralized or decentralized 
structures exhibit improvement in terms of lower unemployment and 
inflation. The latter explains the economic benefit of interactive and 
conditional relations in collective action between different strategic actors, 
such as unions, employers and the government.
Empirical studies tend to favour these latter two hypotheses1. 
Empirical support for the corporatist hypothesis is open to some doubt. For 
example, the vagueness of the concept of "corporatism" makes it unclear 
what the studies actually capture. Moreover, studies of corporatism lack 
adequate theoretical underpinning, and therefore give little guidance for the 
empirical work2.
In the 1980s wage-setting theory developed, as a micro-foundation 
of these macro-studies, and proliferated, (see e.g., Calmfors, 1990). This 
micro-foundation attempted to explain the occurrence of involuntary 
unemployment and addressed such questions as: why are real and/or 
nominal wages rigid? Why are prevailing market wages higher than 
competitive equilibrium wages? Why are there significant mismatches 
between job vacancies and job-seekers? Why does the duration of 
unemployment become longer or shorter over business cycles? (see e.g., 
Laidler and Estrin, 1989) Economic theorizing about unemployment tends to 
focus on relatively short-term unemployment fluctuations and eschews the 
broader issue of unemployment fluctuations across countries.
In addition to economics, other disciplines have contributed to the 
debate of labour management relations and economic performance. These 
include: industrial relations, business strategy and organizational behaviour, 
which tend to be more concerned than economics with micro-level 
aspects3. However, studies in these disciplines lack the robustness of 
economics since the association between employee relations and economic 
performance, at the firm or industry level, is too complex to formulate as a 
straightforward theoretical model. Nevertheless, since wage bargaining in
1 Studies concerning the role of corporatism largely estimated two types of equations 
(see e.g., Calmfors and Driffill, 1988). Bruno and Sachs (1985), and McCallum (1983) have 
used cross-country Phillips-type price equations introducing a measure of corporatism as one 
explanatory variable. Bean, Layard, and Nickell (1986), and Newell and Symons (1987) 
employed wage equations, based on union wage setting and bargaining models, on time 
series data for individual countries.
2 For instance, no guidance is given as to whether money wages should be influenced by 
consumer prices or by output prices. Furthermore, these studies do not provide guidance on 
the kind of variables which should be included (and in which forms), in the equations to be 
estimated.
3 For example, they study why the specialists in industrial relations and personnel 
management respond in the way they do.
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the labour market may be significantly influenced by changes in product 
market conditions, these studies appear sufficient to fill the gap between 
labour market models and specific realities.
It has now become typical to preface research in business strategy 
and industrial relations with a chapter outlining, amongst other things, the 
competitive pressures faced by specific companies, industries or economies. 
It is often suggested that increased competition has influenced the recent 
changing nature of labour management relations.
From the late 1970s, employee relations have changed from being 
adversarial by nature, with a rigid and narrow formula of collective 
bargaining based on uniformity and consistency, to cooperative, based on 
flexibility and versatility in response to changes in product market conditions 
mainly arising from deregulation and increased international competition. 
This is especially the case in the U.S. (see e.g., Kochan, Katz and McKersie 
1986). Other studies support this rapid and fundamental change in 
employee relations due to increased international competition, world 
recession and technological change. Indeed, Ray (1988) argues that 
successful labour management initiatives have frequently resulted from 
special and changing circumstances. He points particularly to when 
economic difficulties have threatened the survival of both trade unions and 
employers and when international tension has necessitated cooperation in 
the interest of national security. The catalyst in the latter situation is 
usually international competition where the issue is survival versus 
extinction, not union versus management conflicts.
These changes in product market environments and consequent 
labour management relations place the management of employee relations 
firmly within the corporate context. Control over the labour process is not 
the sole concern of employers, but is subsidiary to the achievement of 
broader company goals.
Over the last twenty years or so, management has been repeatedly 
encouraged to adopt a more proactive and strategic stance in relation to 
labour, and to integrate this with general business strategies wherever 
possible. This makes sense particularly since strategic decisions appear to 
be increasingly influenced by the interests and bargaining power of a 
unionized work-force. Academic studies which document these changes in
19
management strategy do not provide a systematic framework for the 
relationship between changes in product market conditions, labour relations 
strategies, and the conduct of industrial relations. However, they provide 
important insights for such a framework which we can enhance using the 
work of organizational adaptation theorists.
2. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
A major purpose of this study is to provide such a framework by examining 
the influence of international product market competition on the relationship 
between labour market institutions and macro-economic performance 
across-countries4. Theoretically, an attempt will be made to construct a 
micro-foundation for increased product market competition and labour 
market institutional change by linking changes in product market conditions 
with the structure and conduct of labour market institutions. This will 
provide researchers with an alternative model of industrial relations.
An important reason for attempting this is the inability of existing 
studies to explain the relationship between labour relations and economic 
performance. To achieve our objective we will need to "borrow" 
appropriately from different disciplines. Several disciplines have something 
to contribute to our position but on their own fail to construct the holistic 
framework we are attempting. Labour economics, for instance, tends to 
focus attention on the relationship between a few structural variables of 
labour market institutions and macro-economic variables. Economists stress 
structure at the expense of conduct. Industrial organizational theorists, 
unlike labour economists, emphasize conduct. However, organizational 
specialists frequently view the conduct of labour market agents as a direct 
outcome of the structure of wage-setting institutions. Thus, it is argued 
structure influences performance. While this is helpful it falls short of 
providing a framework which explicitly considers the strategic and 
interactive nature of decision-making in the labour process.
4 This study was initiated by Bradley (1986; revised in 1991). He suggested an "intuitive 
theory" about the determinants and nature of institutional change as a component of long- 
run labour market adjustment. In particular, this study examines the possible links between 
changes in product market conditions and labour market institutions.
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It is our contention that it is important to examine the relationship 
between labour relations and economic performance more dynamically. To 
achieve this, we need to construct a framework to examine explicitly 
relationships between product and labour market institutions5.
Our alternative theoretical framework will be pursued in three parts 
and will "borrow" from business strategy, organizational behaviour and 
industrial relations, in addition to economics. Firstly, we will construct a 
theory to explain and predict employees' and employers' strategic responses 
to changes in competitive pressure arising mainly from changes in product 
market conditions. In our theory perceptions of competitive pressure will 
have an important role. Secondly, we will derive a typology for the conduct 
of labour management relations from strategic interactions between workers 
and managers. This will be a crucial factor in explaining differences in 
performance between firms. Thirdly, we will develop a transmission 
mechanism which will allow us to make an important bridge from the 
conduct of employee relations to economic performance.
From our alternative theory we will develop the competitive pressure 
hypothesis. This contends that employees and employers in a company 
facing relatively high competitive pressure from international markets will 
modify their chosen strategies to become more flexible and consensus-prone 
in collective bargaining rounds. The changes in employees' and employers' 
conduct will improve economic performance.
Our thesis does not stand or fall on the robustness of this theory 
alone. Indeed, the model which we develop can be regarded as a new 
attempt to study the conduct of industrial relations systems by explicitly 
introducing competitive pressure from international product markets into the 
collective bargaining framework. In addition our theoretical framework 
provides a micro-foundation for the cross-country comparative study of the 
effects of competitive pressure on labour market institutions and economic 
performance. The competitive pressure hypothesis will be empirically tested
5 For example, firms can be considered to be on a continuum between 'Responsible 
Autonomy' and 'Direct Control' strategies and will be influenced by competitive conditions 
in product and labour markets and employee reactions to them (see e.g., Friedman 1984). 
Firms will not remain at the same point on the continuum forever. As competitive conditions 
change, pressures on managers to change their strategies will intensify, and these will also 
alter employee reactions to specific management intervention.
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at an economy level for the seventeen O.E.C.D. economies. This adds a 
further contribution to the debate on the role of labour market institutions 
in explaining cross-country differences in macro-economic performance. 
Quantitative analysis will be augmented by qualitative data from case 
studies and these will be used to shed further light on our competitive 
pressure hypothesis.
3. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
A fundamental question addressed by this thesis is: what is the influence of 
competitive pressure on the relationship between labour market institutions 
and economic performance? This quest is motivated by the debate on the 
relationship between labour market institutions and macroeconomic 
performance6. A crucial question of this debate asks whether it is the 
structure (centralization) and/or the nature (corporatism) of labour market 
institutions that matter for cross-country differences in economic 
performance.
This thesis addresses these questions. It is organized as follows (see 
figure 1.1). Firstly, we examine the four established hypotheses outlined 
above on the relationship between the structure of labour market institutions 
and economic performance. Secondly, as a micro-foundation for the study, 
theoretical efforts are made to fill the missing connection between structure 
and performance. Finally, our theory concerning the effects of competitive 
pressure on the conduct of labour market institutions and economic 
performance is tested.
Chapter two is devoted to a critical survey of the existing four 
hypotheses on the relationships between indicators of labour market 
institutions (e.g., degree of centralization in the level of collective 
bargaining) and those of macroeconomic performance (e.g., changes in 
unemployment, inflation, and growth rates).
Chapter three investigates behaviourial aspects of labour market 
institutions. It introduces various fields of studies: international trade,
6 This debate began in the mid-1970s and has become more active since the early 1980s. 
This is mainly due to persistently high unemployment in most major European countries in 
contrast to the experience of the Nordic economies.
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Figure 1,1 Organization of the Study
COMPETITIVE PRESSURE HYPOTHESIS
POLICY IMPLICATIONS [Chapter 8]
A critical survey of the four existing 
hypotheses [Chapter 2]
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE COMPETITIVE PRESSURE 
HYPOTHESIS FOR 17 O.E.C.D. COUNTRIES
THE STRUCTURE OF LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND 
MACRO-ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
The effects of competitive pressure on 
croaa-country variations of economic 
performance [Chapter 6]
The effects of competitive pressure on 
time-aeriea variations of economic 
performance within an economy [Chapter 5]
QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPETITIVE PRESSURE 
HYPOTHESIS FROM CASE STUDY MATERIALS
A MISSING CONNECTION BETWEEN THE STRUCTURE AND 
PERFORMANCE: POTENTIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE CONDUCT 
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEMS
A theoretical framework for the effects of 
competitive pressure on labour market 
institutions and economic performance: 
a micro-foundation for a cross-country 
comparative study [Chapter 4]
A synthesis of existing theories: 
international trade and employment, 
industrial relations, business strategies 
strategic choices and organizational 
adaptations [Chapter 3]
♦Changes in industrial relations systems 
across countries
♦Competitive pressure and collective 
bargaining processes/outcomes across 
industries for the U.S and the U.K. 
[Chapter 7]
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employment and labour relations; changes in environmental conditions, 
strategic behaviour and organizational adaptation. Here, a synthesis of 
these diverse theories is attempted to construct a micro-foundation of labour 
relations and economic performance. As a first step, competitive pressure 
from international markets is suggested to be one of the most important 
environmental conditions influencing the strategic choices of workers and 
employers7.
Chapter four constructs a theoretical framework of competitive 
pressure, labour market institutions, and economic performance by 
synthesising neglected and diverse theories. A concept of competitive 
pressure is defined from studies of international trade, employment and 
labour relations. This concept of competitive pressure is viewed as a crucial 
environmental influence on the strategic behaviour of employers and 
workers in collective bargaining.
Chapters five and six test our theory using data from seventeen
O.E.C.D. countries. This focuses upon the relationship between labour 
market institutions and macroeconomic performance. Chapter five 
concentrates on the time-series variations in economic performance within 
a national economy, and chapter six on cross-country variations. Chapter 
seven supplements our quantitative study with findings from qualitative 
case studies at country and industry-specific levels. Conclusion follows in 
chapter eight.
7 This is in line with traditional industrial relations research: that the influence exerted by 
product market competition on collective bargaining is structured by and may be mitigated 
by the existing arrangements for setting labour costs (see e.g., John R. Commons 1909; 
cited in Cappelli 1985; p.316). It is also motivated by the belief that over the past two or 
three decades the globalization of markets and the internationalization of national economies 
have greatly altered the context within which employment relations and policies must 
operate (see e.g., Marshall 1989; Burton 1989; Kruse 1988; Abowd and Lemieux 1990; 
Mills and Lovell 1985).
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CHAPTER TWO
LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
; A Critical Survey of Four Established Hypotheses
1. INTRODUCTION
The origins of high unemployment in the mid-1980s in many industrialized 
countries go back a long time. Tight labour markets in the 1960s and 
increased industrial conflict culminated in a wave of strikes and disputes 
which hit several European countries between 1968 and 1971. Largely 
because of the concern over wider social and political repercussions of 
industrial conflict, macroeconomic policy in many countries failed to resist, 
and in some cases actually worsened, inflationary pressure. At the same 
time, microeconomic policies increased structural rigidities in the labour 
market1. The overall result was that, in the late 1960s and 1970s, real 
wage costs grew faster than productivity2.
There is no simple explanation why unemployment rose so far since 
the early 1970s, why it remained so high in many countries, and why there 
are sharp differences in individual country experiences. However, wage 
setting became increasingly important for macroeconomic performance3.
1 'While there is much we do not know about the details, the broad outlines of the origins 
of high European unemployment are familiar enough. Intransigent trade unions and well- 
intentioned but unintelligent governments have erected a web of microeconomic barriers to 
full employment that both make labour more expensive and transform wages from variable 
into fixed costs. These include (with different weights in different countries) high minimum 
wages, excessive severance pay, heavy fixed costs of employment, restrictions on hiring and 
firing, support for the closed union shop, meaningless licensing requirements, heavy-handed 
workplace rules, and impediments to geographic mobility. ... But there is also an important 
macro component to the slack we see in Europe today. And in the U.S., which has avoided 
the horror stories of European labour markets, restrictive policy is virtually the whole story 
behind the Great Recession of the 1980s. Put plainly, governments here and abroad have 
used high unemployment to exorcise the inflationary demon.' Blinder (1989; p. 141).
2 O.E.C.D. (1989; p.24).
3 Some early answers to why unemployment rose so far placed particular stress on the 
deficiency of aggregate demand. After the first oil shock, the transfer of spending power to 
OPEC countries with only limited absorptive capacity was widely regarded as deflationary
(so-called Keynesian Unemployment). But as unemployment persisted - and as wages in 
many countries showed no sign of moderation - attention shifted to other explanations. The 
simplest alternative was that wages were too high (so-called Classical Unemployment). 
These are regarded as focusing on a somewhat narrower question; the relative importance 
of demand and real wages in explaining unemployment, (see e.g., O.E.C.D. 1989; chapter 
2).
Since the diverse nature of unemployment did not appear to be temporary, 
many researchers turned their attention to labour market institutions4. 
However, the relationship between wage setting institutions and economic 
performance still remained elusive in economics.
To-date economists have proposed four hypotheses which connect 
indicators of labour market institutions and macroeconomic performance, 
such as unemployment and inflation rates. These are, (i) the liberal-pluralist 
hypothesis which posits a negative monotonic relationship, (ii) the 
corporatist hypothesis which argues the reverse and suggests that there is 
a positive relationship between labour market institutions and macro- 
economic performance, (iii) the hump-shaped hypothesis which contends a 
U-curve relationship, and (iv) the interactive hypothesis. We refer to these 
throughout this thesis as the established hypotheses. Empirical works which 
emanate from these four hypotheses confirm that competitive forces 
restrain wages, and that there are potential gains from the internalization of 
the external effects of wage increases within large encompassing 
organizations.
This chapter critically examines cross-country studies of labour 
market institutions and economic performance. In the next section, we 
analyse the four established hypotheses developed in the economic 
literature. Their theoretical underpinnings are examined in the third section. 
In the fourth section, each of the four hypotheses is re-evaluated with a 
special focus on their underlying mechanisms. The final section will 
introduce the principal issues we will pursue in this study.
2. FOUR ESTABLISHED HYPOTHESES
The liberal-pluralist hypothesis5 based on liberal economic theories of 
competitive markets emphasize the linear negative effect of organized 
interests. It suggests that economic performance is better in countries
4 This research approach had its genesis with Bruno and Sachs (1985). Since then it has 
become a new tradition in economics to incorporate wage-bargaining institutions in theories. 
See e.g., studies of the Centre for Labour Economics (now, the Centre for Economic 
Performance), London School of Economics.
5 This section borrows from Paloheimo (1990).
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where the scope of trade unions and governments are limited. In 
competitive markets, where interest groups are weak, the price of labour 
and products fluctuate according to market conditions.
In organized markets, on the other hand, where employers and 
employees are members of interest groups, both wages and prices become 
rigid downwards. It is further argued that decision-making in organized 
markets is slow since groups cannot make decisions as fast as individuals. 
Thus the organized interests can restrain or prevent modernization of 
contemporary technologies. To the extent that over-extensive and intensive 
regulation disturbs the proper functioning of markets, large and over-active 
governments are also viewed as a source of contemporary economic 
maladies. Powerful government draws resources away from the market 
system and creates an overdeveloped welfare state which make people 
passive.
In contrast, the liberal political economy achieves order through the 
existence of a mass of atomized actors, each of which plays too small an 
individual part for its own autonomous decisions to have a general effect6. 
Here, flexibility and speedy adjustment are deemed important for economic 
performance. Under such circumstances there is little room for government 
to intervene in economic life. In modern industrial societies, however, 
economic and social relations are generally conducted through organizations 
which cannot be reduced to atomic market interactions alone. This tends to 
constrain the application of the liberal-pluralist hypothesis in the real world.
The corporatist hypothesis is derived from the idea that consensual 
decision-making guarantees that the interests of every collaborating group 
will be respected. The hypothesis claims that in organized economies, 
economic performance is better in countries with centralized organizational 
structures and mechanisms to promote consensual interplay between 
interest groups. Corporatist theories analyse the role of interest groups. The 
size of interest groups is significant in determining the style of group 
activity. Social interest groups organized on a small and localized scale 
receive gains they achieve from influencing market processes and bear only 
a minute proportion of the general costs. The position of encompassing
6 See e.g., Crouch (chapter 5, pp. 105-139) in Lindberg and Maier (eds) (1985).
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interest groups, organized at a national or near-national level, is completely 
different. These directly experience the negative effects of their 
disruptions7.
Both liberal-pluralism and corporatism compete with each other. The 
former emphasizes flexibility through a decentralized and free market 
mechanism, whereas the latter emphasizes cooperative solutions through 
centralized and consensus-type mechanisms. The U-curve hypothesis and 
the interactive hypothesis are somewhere on a continuum between these 
two competing hypotheses.
According to the U-curve hypothesis, see e.g., Calmfors and Driffill 
(1988), both intense centralization and far-reaching decentralization are 
conducive to real wage restraint. Intermediate degrees of centralization are 
harmful: hence the U or the hump8. If this hypothesis holds true, the most 
appropriate wage policy is either complete centralization with wages 
determined at the national level or extreme decentralization with wage 
bargaining at the level of the individual firm or plant. Calmfors and Driffill 
(1988) test the U-curve hypothesis by rank correlations between indices of 
centralization of the level of bargaining and economic performance. Eight 
indicators of economic performance are introduced. These include the 
average levels and changes of unemployment and employment; the Okun 
index and their own performance index. At first they examine the 
conventional wisdom of corporatism by rank correlations between country 
rankings of their own centralization index and those of eight measures of 
macroeconomic performance. Only one significant correlation is found. 
Thus, evidence is clearly against the hypothesis which suggests a
7 See e.g., Crouch (1985), op cit, pp. 107-108. A similar argument has been developed 
by Olson (1982), to account for variations in national economic growth rates. Olson's thesis 
has its roots in the liberal-pluralist tradition, but there are some theorems which converge on 
corporatist ideas. His general thesis rests on the assumption that common-interest 
organizations, of which trade unions are an important example, will use their strength to 
inhibit changes hostile to their interests. However, he also points out that this will be less 
true to the extent that the organizations concerned are large in scope and small in number. 
As encompassing organizations of this kind will embody rigidities of decision-making, his 
preferred solution seems to be a reduction in the capacity of economic interests to organize 
at all.
8 The hump-shaped pattern is related to Olson's (1982) idea that organized interests may 
be most harmful when they are strong enough to cause major disruptions but not sufficiently 
encompassing to bear any significant fraction of the costs for society of their actions in their 
own interests (see e.g., Calmfors and Driffill 1988; p. 15).
28
monotonic relation.
Calmfors and Driffill directly test the hump-shaped hypothesis by 
developing a set of institutional rankings such that both centralized and 
decentralized economies rank above the intermediate ones. Their study 
displays strong statistical significance with respect to all measures of 
change in performance. With respect to the level of macroeconomic 
performance between 1974-85 however, only two correlations of 
unemployment and employment are significant. This prompts Calmfors and 
Driffill to rearrange their rankings of centralization, allowing for the 
possibility that although intermediate economies perform the worse, 
centralized countries may outperform the decentralized ones9. In most 
cases the corresponding correlations turn out higher than before. They are 
statistically significant for all measures of the level and change in 
performance.
The fourth hypothesis - the interactive hypothesis - attributed to 
Paloheimo (1990), also suggests that there are conditional relationships 
between the rate of unionization and the level of wage bargaining as well 
as between government's political complexion and the level of wage 
bargaining. Thus, it is argued there are interactive, collective action between 
different strategic actors, such as unions, employers and the government.
At first, Paloheimo presents four different types of interactive 
relationships between the level of wage bargaining and the level of 
unionization (see table 2.1). These are: (i) A highly unionised economy with 
centralised wage bargaining; (ii) A highly unionised economy with 
decentralised wage bargaining; (iii) A low unionised economy with 
centralised wage bargaining; and (iv) A low unionised economy with 
decentralised wage bargaining. In (i) pay rises are not the only goal of union 
wage policy since unions also keep price developments and unemployment 
in mind. There are favourable conditions to limit negative externalities,
9 For this, they ranked the three most centralized economies first, followed by the three 
most decentralized ones, the three second most centralized ones, etc, (see e.g., Calmfors 
and Driffill 1988; pp,21-23, in particular, Table 3 of p.22 and Table 4 of p.23). For 
sensitivity analysis, they also used Cameron's ranking (refer to column 'C' of table 6.2 in 
p, |4. | ) and obtained almost the same results. And considering an erroneous measure of 
unemployment in Switzerland, the case of Switzerland was used in another sensitivity 
analysis. By ranking Switzerland differently in the performance measure of unemployment, 
they found no serious change in results.
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Table 2.1 Interactions between the Level of Wage Bargaining and the
Level of Unionization
High Unionization Low Unionization
(I) (III)
Centralized
Economic strategy Growth-oriented Pure redistributive
Negative effects Limiting High
Economic adjustment Fair Poor
(II) (IV)
Decentralized
Economic strategy Profit-seeking Market-oriented
Negative effects Externalizing
Economic adjustment (Sectoral interests) (Market mechanism)
Source: A compiled table based on Paloheimo (1990).
which increases the possibility of fair economic adjustment. In (ii) there are 
a number of small groups looking mainly for their sectional interests. The 
lack of coordination in decision-making enables the different small groups 
to externalize the negative side effects of their redistributive policies. In (iii) 
it is easier to choose redistributive strategies which externalize negative side 
effects. Thus, there are favourable conditions for high negative externalities, 
pure redistributive strategies and poor economic adjustment. In (iv) trade 
unions with little power have a smaller effect on the functioning of the 
market system. This resembles the neo-classical model of perfect 
competition. In this instance, we can expect market-oriented economic 
strategies and economic adjustment by market mechanism.
In addition, there are also interactive relationships between the level 
of wage bargaining and the political complexion of the government. 
Strategies of Left-Wing governments are different in highly-organized 
economies compared to those with a low level of organization. Similarly, 
strategies of Right-Wing governments are different in highly organized 
economies than in those with poor organization.
Paloheimo (1990) tests these interactions using data from eighteen
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Table 2.2 Testable Propositions in Paloheimo's study: Expected Signs of
Simple Correlations
(1) Liberal-pluralist 
hypothesis
Economic
Growth
Inflation Unemployment
Unionization -/- +  /+ + /+
Centralization -/- + /+ + / +
Left-wing office + /+ + / +
(2) Corporatist hypothesis
Economic
Growth
Inflation Unemployment
Unionization + / + -/- -/-
Centralization + /+ -/- -/-
Left-wing office ■ • .
(3) U-curve hypothesis
Economic Inflation Unemployment
Growth
Unionization
Centralization + /- -/+ -/ +
Left-wing office . • .
(4) Interactive hypothesis
Economic Inflation Unemployment
Growth
Unionization + /- -/ + -/ +
Centralization + /- -/ + -/ +
Left-wing office + /- -/ + -/ +
Source: A compiled table based on Paloheimo (1990; pp.121-133).
Note: Left-hand signs of each cell are for the group of centralized or intermediate
economies, whereas the right-hand signs are those for decentralized countries.
Table 2.3 Actual Signs of Correlations in Paloheimo's Study
Economic Inflation Unemployment
Growth
Unionization + /- + / + -/+
Centralization + /- -/- -/-
Left-wing office + /- -/ + -/-
Source: A compiled table based on Paloheimo (1990; pp. 121-133).
Note: Left-hand signs of each cell are for the group of centralized or intermediate
economies, whereas the right-hand signs are those for decentralized countries.
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countries10. Paloheimo uses both simple correlations and multiple 
regression techniques to analyze economic policy11. Further, he reorganizes 
countries into two groups using the Calmfors and Driffill index of 
centralization of bargaining12. Paloheimo suggests a set of testable 
propositions for the above-mentioned four established hypotheses: the 
liberal-pluralist, the corporatist, the U-curve, and his own interactive 
hypotheses (see table 2.2). Their related empirical results are reported in 
table 2.3. Data are mainly in favour of the interactive and U-curve 
hypotheses. However since unionization, centralization, and government 
complexion are highly correlated, it is not altogether clear whether it is the 
U-curve or the conditional relations hypothesis which is mainly supported by 
empirical analyses.
Paloheimo's conclusions approximate those of Calmfors and Driffill 
(1988) and suggest that there is no short-cut from highly centralized to 
highly decentralized industrial relations, or vice versa. Countries with 
moderate industrial relations systems should consider either decentralizing
10 Countries in his analysis were the same as the ones in Calmfors and Driffill (1988) 
with the exception of Ireland. Paloheimo studied the interactions over the two time periods 
of 1974-79 and 1980-85.
11 As independent variables he employed: (i) union membership, (ii) centralization of wage 
bargaining, and (iii) political complexion of the government. These three independent 
variables are, in fact, highly correlated. [ Paloheimo (1990) p.1211
Correlation coefficients between variables
UM WBL PC
Union membership (UM) 1.00 0.74 0.43
Wage bargaining level (WBL) 0.74 1.00 0.69
Political complexion (PC) 0.43 0.69 1.00
Paloheima used the centralization index of Calmfors and Driffill (1988), although 
included Ireland as a decentralized country with some centralist tendencies, political 
complexion of the government is measured in average terms, with Left-Wing cabinet seats 
as a percentage of total cabinet seats in the two time periods. If political complexion of the 
cabinet has changed during the period under consideration, weighted averages are calculated 
using periods of office as weights. As dependent variables Paloheimo used data on economic 
growth and its components: consumer price inflation, unemployment as a percentage of the 
labour force, growth of employment and participation rate. In addition, Paloheima employed 
economic policy variables: fiscal policy measured with public sector borrowing requirement 
(PSBR) as a percentage of GDP; monetary policy, with the growth of money supply; wage 
policy with average increases in hourly earnings in manufacturing; and currency policy with 
changes in the effective exchange rate from 1973 to 1979 and from 1979 to 1985.
12 Paloheimo regrouped countries with centralized or intermediate wage bargaining 
systems into one group. Hence, in his analysis, there are effectively only two groups of 
countries: (i) those with decentralized bargaining structures and (ii) those with centralized or 
intermediate structures.
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or centralizing their labour relations and either liberalizing or corporatizing 
their economic policies, see e.g., Paloheimo (1990; pp. 134-135).
In addition to these empirical efforts, there have also been related 
theoretical developments which we will now consider.
3. A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF SOME THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Most empirical studies concerning the relations between labour market 
institutions and economic performance have tested their hypotheses by 
using Phillips-curve type multiple regressions or rank correlation techniques. 
One crucial question is: Do inter-country variations really reflect fundamental 
differences in behaviour or are they due to spurious correlations or 
specification differences?
Traditional Phillips curve relations examine how various independent 
variables influence money wage increases, which, in turn, are assumed to 
have an important effect on unemployment. As for independent variables 
the following indicators have been used: unemployment, actual and/or 
expected price increases, vacancies, the differences between vacancy and 
unemployment rates, duration of vacancies, tax rate changes, productivity 
increases, and profit levels.
The main drawback of traditional analysis has been the lack of 
adequate theory, see e.g., Calmfors (1990; p.35). The underlying idea is 
usually that the rate of wage change should be related to the level of excess 
demand (supply) in the labour market. This is analogous to traditional 
assumptions in competitive markets where price adjustments are sluggish. 
Sometimes the Phillips curve has been interpreted to reflect bargaining 
behaviour, where the demand situation in the labour market is taken as an 
indicator of the relative bargaining strength of unions and employers. The 
absence of a theoretical basis gives little guidance as to whether money 
wages should be influenced by consumer prices (which matter to the 
purchasing power of wages) or by output prices (which influence employers' 
ability to pay). Further it provide neither guidance as to which other 
variables should be included and in which form.
The 1980s, however, have seen developments in wage-setting
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theory in several directions: the proliferation of models of union and 
bargaining behaviour; the efficiency-wage models; and the insider-outsider 
theory13. There are two groups of insider-outsider theories: one is an 
extension of the union bargaining framework, according to which all wages 
are set by and in the interests of insiders; and the second focuses on 
explaining how labour turnover costs give insiders a market power which 
rules out wage underbidding by outsiders, see e.g., Blanchard and Summers 
(1986).
Blinder (1989) notes that too much traditional theoretical debate has 
taken place within the confined structures of homogeneous labour, where 
the question is reduced to whether and why 'the wage rate' is sticky. This 
is a reasonable question, but not the only one. Once we focus on the 
heterogeneity of labour, the concept of wage rigidity loses precision. Is it 
the average level of wages or the structure of relative wages which are 
sticky? According to Blinder it would be more fruitful to concentrate on 
such things as the relative status and the coordination failures.
The theories of unemployment based on imperfect information 
assume heterogeneity to be an essential part of the story. However, these 
new models have so far contributed little to an explanation of the changes 
in unemployment that we observe in time series data14. Indeed, these shed 
little light on why nominal shocks have strong real effects since each shock 
is fundamentally a story about relative prices or real wages. One way to 
transform a real rigidity into a nominal rigidity is to add the costs of 
changing nominal prices or wages15.
In the following two sections, we will revisit the established four
13 Calmfors (1990) describes some of the developments in wage setting. For union 
bargaining models, see e.g., Oswald's paper in Calmfors and Horn (1986). The efficiency 
wage models are when employers are assumed to set wages by trading off the conventional 
negative profit effects of higher wages against positive productivity effects due to such 
factors as greater labour effort, low turnover, etc. For example, see e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1984); Akerlof and Yellen (1986). The insider-outsider theory stresses the different impact 
of employed insiders and unemployed outsiders on wage-setting.
14 Hysteresis models may be the most promising however.
15 Akerlof and Yellen (1985) do this by adding the fixed costs of changing prices to a 
model with efficiency wages. They assume 'near rationality' which is equivalent to rationality 
in the presence of fixed costs. Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), building on the insights of 
Mankiew (1985), do the same in an monopolistic competition model.
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hypotheses in order to understand their underlying mechanisms and, thus, 
introduce the principal issue of our study.
4. THE FOUR HYPOTHESES REVISITED: Understanding their Underlying
Mechanisms
Liberal-pluralism and corporatism are based on two fundamentally different 
mechanisms, see e.g. Calmfors and Driffill (1988). Pluralists contend that 
wage increases are restrained by market forces and wage flexibility results 
from decentralized wage bargaining. Decentralization is expected to act like 
competitive forces in a neo-classical market equilibrium. Corporatists, on the 
other hand, suggest that in a centralized bargaining system wage setters 
recognize broader, social interests. Calmfors and Driffill (1988) find that 
both extreme centralization and decentralization are conducive to real wage 
restraint, whereas intermediate degrees of centralization are harmful. Their 
hump-shaped pattern is related to Mancur Olson's idea that organized 
interests may be most harmful when they are strong enough to cause major 
disruptions but not sufficiently encompassing to bear any significant fraction 
of the costs for society incurred by their actions in their own interests. 
Further, Paloheimo (1990) contends that disagreements between liberal- 
pluralist and corporatist writers are partly due to a lack of understanding on 
the conditional relations in collective action. He suggests an interactive 
hypothesis as an alternative and attempts to capture how different 
institutional factors may interact with each other to influence economic 
performance. For this purpose, he studies three institutional factors: (i) The 
degree of unionization; (ii) The level of wage bargaining; and (iii) The party 
complexion of governments.
These two hypotheses of Calmfors & Driffill (1988) and Paloheimo 
(1990) seem to be based on more complicated mechanisms than the earlier 
two monotonic hypotheses of the liberal-pluralist and the corporatist. The 
hump-shaped U-curve hypothesis of Calmfors and Driffill mix the two 
arguments of flexibility and corporatism, depending on the degree of 
centralization of the level of bargaining (see figure 2.1). Calmfors and Driffill 
place greater emphasis on determining which of the two mechanisms
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Figure 2.1 Flexibility and Corporatism Underlying the U-curve Hypothesis
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(flexibility and corporatism) is dominant according to the degree of 
centralization in collective bargaining. There are four possibilities, A, B, C, 
or D which we represent the four quadrants in figure 2.1:
(i) When the level of bargaining is extremely decentralized, flexibility 
overrules corporatism resulting in better adaptability to changes in 
market conditions (C in figure 2.1);
(ii) When highly centralized corporatism supersedes flexibility giving 
society-wide consensus to restrain wages when needed (A in figure 
2.1);
(iii) When intermediately centralized, those two competing 
mechanisms are in operation at the same time to produce the worst 
results in performance (B in figure 2.1);
(iv) Comparing two groups of economies at the extreme ends of 
centralization, Calmfors and Driffill assume that a corporatist regime 
outperforms a flexible one.
Taking into account interactions between the levels of unionization 
and centralization, Paloheimo (1990) mixes flexibility and corporatism, but 
in a more complicated way than Calmfors and Driffill, see table 2.4. 
Paloheimo introduces the possibility that not only positive but also negative 
effects may operate behind each of the two mechanisms.
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Table 2.4 Interactions between Flexibility and Corporatism in the 
Interactive Hypothesis of Paloheimo (1990)
High Unionization Low Unionization
(I) (II)
Centralized
Flexibility High -Hive/Low -ive Low -Five/High -ive
Corporatism High -Five/Low -ive Low -l-ive/High -ive
Expected order* 1 4
(III) (IV)
Decentralized
Flexibility Low -Hive/High -ive High -Five/Low -ive
Corporatism Low +ive/Low -ive Low -Five/Low -ive
Expected order* 3 2
EXPECTED ORDER means expected order of economic performance from those 
hypothetical interactions. See the text for the exact meanings of negative and 
positive effects. The effects are based on Paloheimo (1990).
In highly-unionized economies with centralized bargaining structures, see 
table 2.4, (I) - social consensus almost nullifies the negative effect of 
flexibility. But in highly-unionized countries with decentralized bargaining 
structures, see table 2.4 (III), the negative effects of flexibility are 
predominant. In highly-unionized countries, unions may wield their 
negotiating powers for their sectoral interests only, but produce flexibility 
in wage negotiations as a whole. Some sectors will suffer from lower 
wages, resulting from the oversupply of unemployed from high-wage 
sectors. Further, in low-unionized economies with centralized structures, see 
table 2.4 (II), the negative effects of consensus will prevail. A few unions 
with centralized bargaining structures may obtain a consensus among 
themselves but without considering enough social effects. This will produce 
more severe segmentation of labour markets and therefore, negative 
flexibility with negative consensus. In low-unionized countries with 
decentralized structures, see table 2.4 (IV), which are most similar to 
competitive markets, flexibility repudiates the negative side-effects of 
consensus. Using this logic behind the table 2.4, Paloheimo (1990) orders 
the possible interactions between the levels of centralization and 
unionization, in terms of economic performance: in a descending order,
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countries with (i) Highly-unionized and Centralized; (ii) Lowly-unionized and 
Decentralized; (iii) Lowly-unionized and Centralized; (iv) Highly-unionized and 
Decentralized collective bargaining structures.
In a nutshell, Paloheimo, unlike any other, may have realized that 
there might be negative as well as positive effects in both mechanisms of 
flexibility and corporatism. The effects depend on the interactions of the 
levels of unionization and centralization. Others focused their attentions only 
on the implicitly assumed positive effects of those mechanisms and 
therefore regarded flexibility and corporatism as competing. In fact 
mechanisms do not compete but act simultaneously to produce inter-country 
differences in economic performance. Despite recent developments in 
economic theory, causality remains a problem since there is no systematic 
explanation for these potential interactions16. Understanding these 
interactions requires more in-depth study of bargaining behaviour at a more 
disaggregated level.
5. A BROADER PERSPECTIVE: the Missing connection between 
structure and performance
Disagreements about the role of labour market institutions in explaining 
economic performance seem to arise largely from the different views of the 
underlying mechanisms. It would be a significant contribution to the debate 
if we can clarify the driving force between them. We have suggested that 
both flexibility and consensus operate simultaneously and should not be 
viewed as competing. Thus, the liberal-pluralist and corporatist hypotheses 
are unsatisfactory since they put too much emphasis on either flexibility or 
consensus. The U-curve hypothesis considers both flexibility and consensus 
at the same time, but fails to explicitly recognize their negative effects. 
Meanwhile, Paloheimo (1990) suggests a conditional relationship in 
collective bargaining; i.e., interactive relations between the levels of 
unionization and centralization of wage bargainings as well as between party 
complexion of governments and the level of wage bargainings. The
16 The next two chapters will attempt to redress this imbalance by attempting to develop 
a systematic and coherent explanation.
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Figure 2.2 A Summary View of the Underlying Mechanisms Behind Four
Established Hypotheses
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Note: F-C = Flexibile-Consensus;
F-F = Flexible-Friction;
R-C = Rigid-Consensus; 
R-F = Rigid-Friction.
interactive hypothesis attempts to incorporate both the positive and 
negative effects of the two mechanisms. Examination of the interactive 
relationships is still in its infancy and, as yet, does not have a coherent and 
systematic logic behind the suggested propositions.
Each quadrant in figure 2.2 can be labelled as follows: (i) Flexible- 
Consensus (F-C); (ii) Rigid-Consensus (R-C); (iii) Rigid-Friction (R-F); and (iv) 
Flexible-Friction (F-F). Figure 2.2 positions the four established hypotheses 
we have discussed according to how each considers the effects of flexibility 
and consensus. Three of the hypotheses - Corporatist, Pluralist andthe U- 
Curve Hypothesis - fall in the Flexible-Consensus quadrant. However, one 
of them - Paloheimo's Interactive Hypothesis - cannot be positioned in any 
specific quadrant. This is because the interactive hypothesis explicitly 
considers negative effects of corporatism and flexibility. Hence, Paloheimo's 
interactive hypothesis is the most satisfactory to the extent that it covers 
all the possible effects. In figure 2.2, this is represented by a smaller box 
straddling all four quadarants.
This study aims to add our own hypothesis. This will be achieved 
after a more in-depth consideration of flexibility and consensus. Indeed, we 
will endeavour to derive a typology for the conduct of labour relations which
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displays both positive and negative effects of flexibility and consensus. We 
will achieve this by an in-depth study of the missing connections between 
labour market structures and economic performance. This will come closer 
to Friedman's (1984) call for a "framework that explicitly takes into account 
the strategic interactive nature of decision-making in the labour process".
The conduct of labour relations might be effectively uncovered by 
investigating how labour market agents respond to changing product market 
conditions. For example, in analyzing management strategies Friedman 
(1984) rightly notes that 'the point any firm is on the continuum between 
Responsible Autonomy and Direct Control strategies will be influenced by 
competitive conditions in product and labour markets, and worker reactions 
to them'. As competitive conditions change, pressure on managers to 
change their strategies will intensify, and pressure will also be exerted to 
alter worker reactions.
Economic performance such as unemployment, inflation, and growth, 
is, in fact, a result of the interrelationships of sub-markets in the economy. 
Also important are the potential relationships between structure and 
economic performance. However, the structure of labour market institutions 
is only one aspect of labour relations in an economy. Furthermore, structure 
might be regarded as influencing the behaviour of labour market agents. It 
should be noted that cross-country divergences in economic performance 
seems wider than expected from the established hypotheses which focus 
on structural differences in labour market institutions. For example, table 2.5 
shows unemployment experience in specific economies according to the 
degree of centralization in collective bargaining. Our data show that cross­
country variations are much wider in the group of decentralized economies. 
Over the period, standard deviations are increased significantly which cast 
more doubts on the established hypotheses. This alone suggests that further 
investigation is required.
In sum, from this brief review of the four established hypotheses we 
have suggested an a priori reason to examine the conduct of labour market 
institutions. Flexibility and consensus of labour market institutions have to 
be studied, explicitly considering their positive and negative effects at the 
same time. Evidence also suggests that their structural difference is not
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enough to explain divergence in unemployment experience within the same 
group of economies. Having seen a need to go beyond the existing studies, 
the question arises, how can we analyse the behaviour of labour market 
agents? The next chapter will explore this question of conduct.
Table 2.5 Cross-country Differences in Average Standardized 
________________ Unemployment Rates_________________
1960-9 1969-73 1973-9 1979-89 1960-89
Centralized
economies
Austria 1.61 1.20 1.40 3.02 2.02
Norway 2.00 1.73 1.77 2.68 2.16
Sweden 1.32 1.80 1.60 2.09 1.71
Denmark 1.98 1.48 4.83 8.65 4.89
Finland 1.84 2.58 4.13 4.95 3.45
MEAN 1.75 1.76 2.75 4.28 2.85
SD 0.29 0.52 1.61 2.67 1.32
Intermediate
economies
Germany 0.71 0.95 2.86 5.76 3.00
Netherlands 1.16 2.02 4.74 9.34 4.94
Belgium 2.34 2.50 5.80 10.53 5.95
New Zealand 0.18 0.35 0.74 4.17 1.73
Australia 2.17 2.00 4.63 7.39 4.50
MEAN 1.31 1.56 3.75 7.43 4.02
SD 0.93 0.88 2.00 2.57 1.67
Decentralized
economies
France 1.69 2.60 4.27 8.74 4.85
U.K. 2.63 3.35 4.77 9.49 5.68
Italy 3.82 4.17 4.53 6.80 5.07
Japan 1.36 1.22 1.84 2.45 1.83
Switzerland 0.11 0.00 0.81 1.72 0.82
U.S. 4.74 4.63 6.41 7.04 5.96
Canada 4.73 5.37 6.93 9.11 6.87
MEAN 2.73 3.05 4.22 6.48 4.44
SD 1.78 1.92 2.23 3.17 2.25
All 17 
economies
MEAN 2.02 2.23 3.65 6.11 3.85
SD 1.35 1.46 1.98 2.98 1.87
Source: Calculated from Layard, Nickel), and Jackman (1991), Annex table A4 without 
country weights. Country groups are based on Calmfors and Driffill (1988).
Note: SD stands for standard deviations.
41
PART TWO - THEORY
Three. COMPETITIVE PRESSURE AND THE CONDUCT OF LABOUR
RELATIONS: A Synthesis of Theories
1. Introduction
2. International trade, employment and competitive pressure
3. Competitive pressure and strategic choices
4. Competitive pressure and the conduct of labour relations: a
synthesis of theories
Four. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF PRODUCT MARKETS,
LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE
1. Introduction
2. Competitive pressure and strategic responses
3. Strategic interactions and the conduct of labour relations
4. Hypotheses and an empirical framework
CHAPTER THREE 
COMPETITIVE PRESSURE AND THE CONDUCT OF LABOUR 
RELATIONS: A Synthesis of Theories
1. INTRODUCTION
Existing studies on the role of labour market institutions in economic 
performance have emphasized the structure of collective bargaining. They 
assume away the behaviourial dimension as something which exists within 
a black box and therefore unquantifiable. The two competing liberal-pluralist 
and corporatist hypotheses seem to be rejected in favour of the U-curve and 
the interactive hypotheses.
Our work argues that there are complex interactions between flexible 
and consensus-type policies and that there exists a wide variance in 
economic performance across countries with similar collective bargaining 
structures. These differences can be explained by the conduct of employees 
and employers. These behaviourial variables are not represented in the four 
established hypotheses discussed in chapter 2.
Flexible and consensus-type policies have both positive and negative 
influences on an economy regardless of the structure of wage bargaining. 
Disagreements may occur as to how interactions behind structural 
differences can be analyzed. In this chapter we argue that these interactions 
might be more readily understood by examining both changes in product 
market conditions and in the structure of labour market institutions. 
Flexibility and consensus will increase in importance when changes in wage- 
setting behaviour are required in response to changes in competitive 
pressure from product and labour markets.
A t least since the pioneering work by John R. Commons in 1909, 
industrial relations research has shown that the influence exerted by product 
market competition on collective bargaining is structured by existing 
arrangements for setting labour costs. The key pressure which changes 
industrial relations practice stems from the interaction between competitive 
market pressures and the structure of collective bargaining, (see e.g., 
Cappelli 1975; p.317). Indeed, there is much research - notably, Tyson and 
Zysman (1988) - which focuses on the relationship between international
trade and employment, and the implications of internationalization for labour 
market institutions and industrial relations systems - see eg, Abowd and 
Lemieux (1990), Kruse (1988) and Burton (1989). At a more micro-level, 
there is a variety of related work. This however is widely dispersed across 
various academic disciplines which include industrial relations, business 
strategy and organizational behaviour (see e.g., Marchington 1990; 
Marchington and Parker 1990; Cooke and Meyer 1990; Child 1972; 
Hrebiniak and Joyce 1985; and Whittington 1988).
These studies share an important denominator: the globalization of 
markets. They all highlight the increasing internationalization and the 
interpenetration of markets over the past two decades. They further suggest 
that this has greatly altered the context within which employment relations 
and policies operate1. The integration of global labour markets has 
significantly influenced industrial relations systems and management 
practice at the enterprise level, (see e.g., Marshall 1989: p.205). Studies 
which relate to these changes are still in their infancy and lack consistent 
theoretical frameworks and empirical investigation. This thesis goes some 
way to fill this gap. In the next two sections we review two groups of 
studies: (i) those concerned with the effects of international competition on 
employment and employee relations; and (ii) those detailing strategic 
behaviour and organizational adaptations in response to changes in product 
market conditions. The final section of this chapter will synthesize these 
studies and present a systematic explanation of labour relations and 
economic performance.
2. INTERNATIONAL TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND COMPETITIVE
PRESSURES
Since the Second World War economies have become much more 
interdependent with respect to their product, financial and labour markets, 
see e.g., Marshall (1989). Indeed since the Bretton Woods agreement began
1 Although academic work supports this, these tend to be outside the realm of industrial 
relations. Studies on employment policies and labour relations are either rare or in their 
infancy: see e.g., Marshall (1988); Burton (1989); Mills and Lovell (1985); Abowd and 
Lemieux (1990); and Kruse (1988).
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to undergo severe changes, uncertainties dramatically increased2. Changes 
in financial3 and labour markets4, as well as product markets, contributed 
to increased uncertainties. Here we focus on product markets5.
The internationalization of markets has a number of important 
implications for employment policy. On the positive side, the increased 
efficiency and expanding knowledge that accompanies international 
economic integration has promoted higher standards of living for many of 
the world's people. On the negative side, such internationalization has 
brought many destabilizing influences. The nature of many economies has 
changed to such an extent that international economic rules effective in the 
1950s and 1960s are no longer applicable. One important aspect is the 
enormous fungibility of world markets which causes a ballooning effect for 
countries that are relatively open to imports. Today countries are unable to
2 The Bretton Woods included, most importantly, GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trades), IMF (International Monetary Fund), IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development), OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), and 
aid programmes for the reconstruction of Europe and Japan.
The Bretton Woods system facilitated the growth of the international economy 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, until events began to erode its basic institutions. The first 
such event was the U.S. decision, in 1971, to suspend the convertibility of U.S. dollars to 
gold, followed by the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate system in favour of floating 
exchange rates in 1973. Internationalization of markets and currencies have made it possible 
for speculators to play a larger role in a global economy with floating exchange rates, much 
larger supplies of money than needed for goods and services transactions, and stop-go 
national economic policies. All these combine to create considerable uncertainty; in 
particular, wide fluctuations in currency values. For more details, see Marshall (1979).
3 Mitchell and Zaid (1990) duly noted the importance of wide fluctuations in currency 
value on human resource management and industrial relations:
'Especially in the eighties, wild swings in currency values created pressures in 
product markets which inevitably spilled over into labour markets. Internal human 
resource management policies aimed at raising productivity and cutting labour costs 
can easily be overwhelmed by a sharp change in exchange rates. Thus, employer 
pressures for flexibility may have originated in part from the financial side of the 
international economy rather than simply from the broadening of markets through 
the trade side.'
4 The national labour market has been substantially affected by internationalization. 
Between 1965-85 there were large-scale international movements of workers, some legal, 
some illegal. For example, it has been argued that the postwar economic miracle in West 
Germany was partly due to labour market flexibility made possible by the importation of 
'guest workers' from eastern and southern Europe.
5 Even if international mobility of labour force has been increased, the importation of 
workers seems still far from being one of normal business decision-makings. Uncertainties 
from international financial markets appear to be alleviated by firms' financial activities. 
Therefore, so long as we are concerned with the strategic behaviour of workers and 
employers in response to changes in competitive pressures from international markets, we 
may not sacrifice too much if we only consider international product markets.
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Figure 3.1 Importance of Competitive Pressure from International 
Trade on the Processes and Outcomes of Labour 
Relations
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT
Tyson and Zysman (1988):
* import competition -* a tradeoff between jobs and wages
to workers
* wages responding differently in different industries
* importance of employers' perception of pressures
Heywood (1986):
* higher imports -» lower wages
* strong effects in imperfectly competitive markets
* importance of new unexpected imports
Kruse (1988):
* higher import share -» longer average duration of 
joblessness for displaced manufacturing workers
Abowd and Lemieux (1990):
* both expected and unexpected increases in import 
penetrations exerting negative impacts on wages and 
employment in the U.S.
* expected increases in import penetrations giving positive 
influence on wages in Canada, while other effects same as 
those in the U.S. except their extent being smaller
COMPETITIVE PRESSURE FROM INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
Pearson and Ellyne (1985):
* competitive pressures from surge of imports
Bellman and Wagner (1989):
FOUR TYPES OF ADJUSTMENT STRATEGIES 
wage cuts or a moderate increase of wages 
process innovations 
product innovations
innovations on the locations of production
COMPETITIVE PRESSURE AND STRATEGIC CHOICES
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direct their international policy making as effectively as they did in the past. 
Perhaps more importantly, countries are unable to ensure the effectiveness 
of their domestic economic policies6.
With hindsight, it is possible to examine how international 
competition has influenced the conduct of labour market institutions. Figure
3.1 provides an overview of a number of studies on the effects of 
international trade on employment, especially for the U.S. economy (see 
e.g., Tyson and Zysman 1988; Heywood 1986; Kruse 1988; Abowd and 
Lemieux 1990). These all agree that import penetration engenders 
competitive pressure on both employers and workers.
There is no consensus about the employment effects on 
manufacturing7. Although, it is possible to distinguish whether trade 
pressures on job opportunities have increased or decreased8. Import 
competition seems to give employees a choice between jobs and wages. 
According to Tyson and Zysman (1988), wages have responded differently 
in different industries with varying degrees of trade pressure. How 
employers perceive import competition (whether temporary or permanent) 
is more important in their choice of strategies. If they think competition is 
temporary, employers might reasonably retain employees and sacrifice a 
short-term decrease in profits, see table 3.1. Heywood (1986) for the U.S. 
found that higher imports tended to lower wages especially in imperfectly
6 Similar argument can also be found in Seitz (1992).
7 The dwindling share of manufacturing employment in the advanced countries suggests 
to some observers (like Abowd and Freeman for the U.S.) that fewer and fewer jobs are 
exposed to international competition. According to Tyson and Zysman (1988), this 
conclusion is misleading because at least one-quarter of U.S. GNP consists of services that 
are tightly linked to manufactured goods production. Therefore to the extent that the demand 
for domestic manufacturing is reduced by trade, the demand for such services and for the 
workers who provide them will also be curtailed.
8 It might seem that a change in demand affected by imports or exports would directly 
affect output and employment levels. However, the relationships are not direct and their 
long-term consequences are not obvious and depend on the resulting changes in product 
price, wages, employer expectations, and production technology. See, e.g., Tyson and 
Zysman (1988)
This simple consensus about trade pressures might be sufficient to examine the 
strategic bargaining behaviour of employers and workers.
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Table 3.1 Trade and Employment: Possible Effects from Different 
Responses of Managers and Employees
Factors Responses Effects
Product Price * If falls in 
response to 
foreign 
competition
* Smaller than the 
case of constant 
price
e.g. Semiconductor Industry
A drop in semiconductor prices caused by growing imports from U.S.- 
owned offshore plants in the 1970s actually increased the total 
demand for semiconductors in the U.S., with positive net effects on 
the employment levels of non-assembly jobs and with moderating 
effects on the number of assembly jobs lost as a results of imports.
Wages * If fall or fail to * Smaller than the
rise quickly other cases
e.g. Apparel Industry
Subject to strong import competition for many years, hourly wages 
relative to the manufacturing average between 1972 and 1984 have 
declined from 68 per cent to 60 per cent, which has probably 
moderated the pace of employment decline.
e.g. Auto and Steel Industry
Relative wages actually increased between 1972 and 1984, despite 
growing import competition in the 1970s, most of which in autos 
occurred before the major thrust of import competition that began in 
1978._______________________________
Employer * If expects a
Expectations demand reduction
caused by 
imports as 
temporary
e.g. Auto versus Apparel Industries 
Between 1976 and 1978, when imports of small cars from Japan 
dramatically increased (partly in response to higher energy prices), U.S. 
producers might reasonably have expected the import surge to be 
temporary, which might be changed after five years of rapid increase 
by 1980. In the apparel industry, where substantial import pressure 
has been a long-term problem and where many of the jobs threatened 
by import competition are low-skill jobs that require little investment in 
training, it is reasonable to assume that employers view a reduction in 
output demand caused by rising imports as permanent.
Source: A compiled table based on Tyson and Zysman (1988)
Smaller than the 
other cases 
(labour-hoarding 
with short-run 
decline in profits)
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competitive markets9. According to Kruse (1988) the average duration of 
joblessness in the U.S. varied directly with the rise in their primary 
industry's import share with about an 8-year lag. Based on the comparative 
study of U.S. and Canada, Abowd and Lemieux (1990) uncover consistent 
relationships between international trade and collective bargaining outcomes 
(see table 3.2). Most of all, employment growth is slowed more severely by 
import penetration than a comparable change in real shipments. For the 
U.S., unexpected change in import penetration is more sensitive to 
employment. The effects of expected changes in international competition 
on real wage rates show opposite signs between the two countries. Import 
penetration decreased real wages in the U.S. while increasing them in 
Canada10.
These studies confirm that changes in international manufacturing 
trades influence employment and wages in a consistent manner, but their 
actual effects differ between countries. There is no systematic explanation 
for this11. The underlying logic between international competition and 
collective bargaining behaviour is as follows:
'During the negotiations that accompany the expiration of an existing 
collective bargaining agreement, management and union use current 
information to form an estimate of the total value of the productive 
enterprise for which they represent competing interests. A collective
9 While studying the influence of the degree of competition on the internal allocation of 
corporate resources, Heywood, (1986), found the association of higher imports with lower 
wages, using both aggregate (industry level) and micro (individual level) data for the U.S.
10 Abowd and Lemieux (1990) measure the expected effects of increased foreign 
competition on the future value of the firm using the relationship between future revenues 
of organized employers and current information on domestic shipments, apparent domestic 
consumption, exports and imports in the employer's product market. The quasi-rents are 
measured as the difference between net revenue and the cost of employment, giving the 
present value by discounting. In order to specify relationships connecting the exogenous 
economic factors, such as industry output, value-based trade measures, import prices and 
export prices, to the total quasi-rent, employment, and wage rate outcomes, Abowd and 
Lemieux estimate the models using vector autoregressions which link the annualized rates 
of change in the dependent and exogenous variables. It is worth noting that they 
distinguished between the effects of expected and unexpected changes in the exogenous 
variables. The latter is captured by including the forecast error among the explanatory 
variables.
11 A few theoretical studies explain how international trade may affect wages and 
employment in an open economy. See e.g., Kemp and Shimomura (1985 and 1990); Brecher 
and van Long (1989); Hill (1984); Brander and Spencer (1988); Staiger (1988); Grossman 
(1984) and Alogoskofuis (1990).
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Table 3.2 The Effects of International Competition on Collective
Bargaining Outcomes
Effects on
U.S.
Wages Employment
Canada
Wages Employment
Expected
log,. IS + + - < +
log ADC + + < - < +
log exports + + < - < +
IPR - - > + > -
Unexpected
lOQ IS + + + +
log ADC - + < - < +
log exports + + + < +
IPR - - > - > -
log employment + - < + < -
log real wages + + - > +
Source: A compiled table based on Abowd and Lemieux (1990).
Notes: (1) IS and ADC respectively mean real industry shipments and real apparent
domestic consumption. Exports are also in real terms.
(2) IPR stands for import penetration ratio.
(3) Log employment and real wages are in fact based on changes in 
each factor during previous contract.
(4) For Canada, the effects are compared with those of the U.S. and 
the differences in their absolute magnitude are expressed as <  or 
> , while no such sign means almost comparable magnitude.
bargaining outcome consists of explicit and implicit rules concerning 
the allocation of resources (employment) and the division of the 
resulting quasi-rent (wage rates) between union members and 
shareholders that is expected to remain in force for some fixed term. 
If international competition is expected to have an adverse effect on 
the firm's future profitability, then the current collective bargaining 
agreement will reflect that expectation. If the expected effects of 
international competition are too severe, the bargaining unit may 
disappear so that the evidence on surviving bargaining unit 
settlements will not reflect a complete analysis of either employment 
or wage effects. If the international competition is expected to 
improve the firm's future profitability, current bargaining units should 
be favourably affected.' (Abowd and Lemieux 1990; p.5)
Before tackling a more detailed study on how competitive pressure 
is generated from international markets and how such pressure may affect 
the behaviour of employees as well as employers, we need to clarify the 
concept of competitive pressure. Studies mentioned above implicitly assume
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that competitive pressure is generated largely from the effects of import and 
export competition on employment and profitability. The most frequently 
used indicators for empirical studies are import and export shares and/or 
import penetration ratios. Competitive pressure, however, might be more 
effectively captured by the surge of imports - a rapid increase in the import 
of a narrowly defined product range relative to domestic production or 
consumption of the same or similar product range in the market in 
question12. Pearson and Ellyne (1985) highlighted five characteristics of 
import surges: frequency, intensity, sector, source and nature
(temporary/permanent)13. They arbitrarily chose an increase in the import 
penetration ratio of at least five percentage points in a period of one, two, 
or three years as the criteria for a surge of imports14. Pearson and Ellyne 
also define the intensity of import surges as the numerical value by which 
the increase in the import penetration ratio exceeds five percentage points. 
While two measures of import penetration are used in the literature - imports 
relative to total supply and imports relative to domestic consumption - 
Pearson and Ellyne chose the first measure on theoretical and practical
12 According to Pearson and Ellyne (1985), "the economic policy problem posed by 
surges of imports arises from the need for adjustment in the allocation of domestic resources 
and the desire to minimize the costs of adjustment."
13 Originally, Pearson and Ellyne (1985; p.300) studied the effects of manufactured 
import surges for eleven O.E.C.D. countries during the period 1970-1980 with disaggregation 
of 129 four-digit and five-digit ISIC (International Standard Industry Classification) product 
groups. Their objectives were as follows:
(i) to determine whether surges of imports are becoming more frequent and intense (which 
would suggest that the pace of change in comparative advantage is accelerating and 
adjustment problems are becoming more acute);
(ii) to find which manufacturing industries are most vulnerable to surges of imports and 
which manufacturing industries are responsible for surges; and
(iii) to determine whether surges of imports result in a permanent or temporary increase in 
import penetration.
They also examined long-term changes in trade patterns in manufactures. Those chosen 
eleven countries accounted for 85 percent of trade in manufacturing of O.E.C.D.
14 Pearson and Ellyne (1985; p.303): "To be operational as a measure of surges of 
imports, an increase in the import penetration ratio requires a minimum value and a time 
criterion. Ideally, these would be determined by the capacity of the industry to adjust without 
involuntary unemployment of capital and labour, but the capacity to adjust varies across 
industries and with the business cycle. Thus a single numerical criterion cannot be derived 
from information on adjustment capacity."
51
grounds15. Next, they classified import surges into three classes: A, B or 
C according to the apparent severity of the adjustment problem.
•  Class A pressure arises when domestic output declines and imports 
increase;
•  Class B pressure arises when domestic output declines more rapidly 
than import decline;
•  Class C pressure arises when domestic output increases less rapidly 
than imports increase.
Class A surges, with imports and domestic production moving in opposite 
directions, suggest that the surge is caused by a shift in relative supply 
schedules between domestic and foreign producers. Class B and C surges, 
with imports and domestic production moving in same direction, suggest 
that the surges arise from demand factors. A surge of imports is defined to 
be permanent if, in the three years following the surge, the import 
penetration ratio exceeds its pre-surge level by at least five percentage 
points.
15 See Pearson and Ellyne (1985), p. 303 and "endnote no. 10".
<?R, = <5(M/Q + M) and <5R2 = cftM/Q + M-X), where 
dR, = surge of imports based on total supply 
<JR2 = surge of imports based on domestic consumption 
M = imports 
Q = domestic production 
X = exports
<5R, is preferred to <5R2 on theoretical grounds
"if domestic production for the domestic market is reasonably interchangeable with 
domestic production for exports. The reason is that <5R2 can be positive with 
constant imports and constant domestic production (that is, no need for adjustment) 
if products are merely shifted to the export market and can be zero if exports 
decline paripassus with domestic production, again with imports constant. Thus <fR2 
can indicate an adjustment problem when none exists and can fail to capture all 
instances where adjustment is required. As a practical matter, <5R2 does not have 
an upper-bound value of one, making comparisons among surges difficult."
Pearson and Ellyne conducted their analysis for both <JR, and £R2 and found an extensive 
overlap in their results.
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Table 3.3 Characteristics of Import Surges
Total
Frequency
Class Total
Intensity
Class
A B C A B C
Sweden 188 70 14 104 7.8 8.8 10.3 6.8
Germany 146 36 0 110 6.5 7.2 na 6.3
Netherlandsl 70 53 2 115 6.9 7.9 6.4 6.5
Belgium 231 91 1 139 7.4 8.9 5.7 6.4
Australia 193 62 2 129 8.1 8.8 8.3 7.8
France 47 9 2 36 6.6 7.5 5.7 6.4
U.K. 187 49 3 135 7.0 8.5 8.9 6.4
Italy 211 93 1 117 8.6 10.4 16.7 6.6
Japan 63 20 2 115 9.1 13.1 9.0 7.2
U.S. 83 27 0 56 7.3 9.0 na 6.4
Canada 143 39 0 104 7.7 9.8 na 6.9
Total 1662 549 27 1086
Average 1151.1 49.9 2.5 98.7 7.6 9.2 9.4 6.7
Source: Pearson and Ellyne (1985; p.309; table 3). 
Notes: (1) "na" denotes "not defined" (no surges).
(2) See text for definitions of Class A, B, and C.
Using regression analysis, Pearson and Ellyne examine time trends in 
surge frequency by class and country. They find that Class A surges show 
a statistically significant increasing time trend. Table 3.3 suggests that there 
are significant differences in the experience of import competitions across 
countries. For example, Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium, Australia, and Italy 
have been faced with higher frequency of Class A import surges which 
required more acute structural adjustment. This, in turn, may have 
generated significant competitive pressure on the conduct of labour market 
institutions.
These three classes of import surges can be interpreted as 
differentially affecting the strategic behaviour of workers and managers. 
Indeed, there might be four types of adjustment strategies in response to 
these import surges, e.g. see Bellman and Wagner (1989):
(i) When domestic outputs decline and imports increase - Class A
pressure - wages might either be cut or moderately increased.
(ii) When domestic output declines more rapidly than the decline of
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imports - Class B pressure - or when domestic output increases less 
rapidly than the increase in imports - Class C pressure - the following 
might result: Process innovation; Product innovation; and Innovation 
in location of production.
3. COMPETITIVE PRESSURE AND STRATEGIC CHOICE
What importance has been given to the relationship between these 
competitive pressure and the conduct of labour market institutions? During 
the past few years, studies of employee relations have made increasing 
reference to product markets in order to explain changes in management 
style. It is now relatively common practice to preface a research report or 
textbook with a chapter outlining the competitive pressure faced by 
companies, industries, or economies16. However, these discussions have 
not produced an adequate theory which links product markets and the 
management of employee relations. Thus, there is no framework which 
allows researchers to compare market pressure between different industries 
or companies and evaluate the degree of choice which appears to be 
available to senior managers when devising employee relations policies. 
Equally, little consideration has been given to the way in which employees 
may influence the markets within which their companies compete. 
Furthermore few studies explicitly notice the strategic behaviour of 
employees.
What is needed, therefore, is a model which enables us to compare 
different product market circumstances and to analyze the links between 
product markets and the management of employee relations in a more 
systematic and comprehensive manner. The rest of this section will 
synthesize diverse research which shed light on these relationships. Figure
3.2 gives a brief but comprehensive view of studies on possible 
relationships between competitive pressure, strategic choice and economic
16 See e.g., Marchington (1990). Examples of textbooks which include early reference 
to competitive pressures include: Edwards (1987); Marginson, Edwards, Martin, Purcell, and 
Sisson (1988); Marchington and Parker (1990).
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Figure 3.2 Competitive Pressure, Strategic Choice, and Economic 
Performance
COMPETITIVE PRESSURE AND STRATEGIC CHOICE
COMPETITIVE PRESSURE AND LABOUR RELATIONS STRATEGY
STRATEGIC CHOICE, ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION, AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Hrebiniak and Joyce (1985):
a typology of organizational adaptation 
considering strategic choice and environmental 
determinism as interacting each other
Cooke and Meyer (1990):
* two single-approach strategies (union avoidance or 
union-management collaboration) and a mixed strategy
* mixed strategies regarded as the least aggressive and 
risky among three
* the greater the import penetration in the company's 
primary industry, the more likely chosen one of 
single-approach strategies
THEORETICAL EFFORTS APPLYING GAME THEORIES 
Soskice (1990):
* labour and management having three alternative 
strategies
* finding Nash equilibrium strategies from interactions 
of these strategies
Brunetta and Carraro (1990):
* incomes policy shown as a way of achieving cooperation 
among conflicting social groups
Marchington (1990):
competitive and customer pressures from product 
markets -» the nature of employee relations 
(resource-based or aggressive styles) 
the degree of choice available to management being 
a matter of empirical investigation, rather than a 
generalized phenomenon
Leibenstein (1987, 1989):
the nature of decisions depending on the degree of 
pressure
the greater the environmental pressure, the greater 
the X-efficiency of the firm, other things being equal
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performance. Very recently some researchers have started to examine ways 
of applying such strategic theories to labour relations (notably, see Cooke 
and Meyer 1990; Marchington 1990).
Although there are few explicit links between product market 
conditions and collective bargaining, Marchington (1990) suggests a 
tentative framework, (see figure 3.3). Marchington collapses the range of 
the different aspects of the product market into two separate components: 
(i) competitive pressure (or the degree of monopoly); and (ii) customer 
pressure (or the degree of monopsony). Both types of pressure are viewed 
to contribute to the overall power of the market. Marchington also notes 
that the product markets within which companies compete, directly 
influences the nature of enterprise employee relations and influences them 
indirectly through the responses of managers.
Figure 3.3 Management, Employee Relations and Market Power
Market power
Product
character
Employee
behaviour
Management
style
Trade union 
activity
Source:Marchington (1990)
Employee relations do not develop in isolation away from the influence of 
trade unions. Further the willingness of management to make concessions 
to employees is also dependent upon the actual, potential, or anticipated 
power of trade unions. From Marchington's case studies of four U.K. 
companies, when competition is intense, management is likely to feel under 
considerable pressure from the market and might see little option but to 
adopt a more aggressive approach to employee relations. However, it is also
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feasible that employers may choose to adopt a similar approach in a more 
favourable market situation, although none of the companies in 
Marchington's study did. Thus, he concluded that the degree of choice 
available to management is itself a matter for empirical investigation, rather 
than a generalized phenomenon.
In this regard, it is worth mentioning Leibenstein's study on X- 
inefficiency, (see e.g., Leibenstein 1989). The essence of his model can be 
seen in terms of the following five variable causative scheme:
\  -  CH, - T . - C ,
E, = environment
PRi = pressures
CH, = choice of effort
T, = a specific technique or translation of inputs into outputs
c, = cost per unit of output
A given environment implies a certain amount of pressure, which, in turn, 
implies a specific choice, especially choice of effort, which in its turn implies 
a specific translation of inputs to outputs. This, in turn, implies a certain 
cost per unit. The theory of X-inefficiency argues that there is a tendency 
for costs to rise and pressure is required to keep costs down. We would 
expect, ceteris paribus, that the greater the environmental pressure, the 
greater the X-efficiency of a firm. Although the primary purpose of 
Leibenstein's X-inefficiency theory is different to what we are aiming for, his 
structure and arguments provide us with the idea of putting competitive 
pressure into the context of strategic choice. Indeed it would be feasible to 
employ similar decision functions which link competitive pressure to the 
degree of procedural rationality17.
17 "The nature of the decision depends on the degree of pressure. At low pressure levels 
decisions fall far short of the effectiveness of the completely calculated decision, while at 
some fairly high level the result approximates maximization. Also, there is a possibility that 
at exceptionally high pressures individuals are no longer capable of carrying out completely 
calculated decisions and the degree of effectiveness falls thereafter. Of course, every 
individual will have a different type of decision-response function. In any event, if we knew 
the response function and the degree of pressure in a particular situation, we would be able 
to assess the degree of calculatedness of decision." (Leibenstein 1989) Later we will use
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During the past 25 years the concept of business strategy has gained 
wide currency and attracted a veritable legion of researchers. The 
fascination with strategy has attracted scholars with many different 
perspectives, (see e.g., Lewin 1987). According to Lewin it appears that 
industrial relations researchers are also jumping on the strategy bandwagon. 
But the most recent development in this regard is the application of strategic 
planning notions applied to union-management relations and collective 
bargaining. Some researchers, such as Kochan et a/ {1986), have gone so 
far as to claim that we now have a new theory of industrial relations: one 
that is grounded in the concept of strategic choice. It is not altogether clear 
however to what extent the concept of strategic choice can or does provide 
the linchpin for the theoretical development of industrial relations.
In a similar vein, Cooke and Meyer (1990) have provided what seems 
to be the first systematic attempt to apply a strategic choice framework to 
corporate labour relations strategy. They suggest three industrial relations 
strategies: (i) union avoidance; (ii) union-management collaboration; and (iii) 
a mixed strategy of (i) and (ii) as the least aggressive and the least risky. 
Cooke and Meyer presume: (i) the greater/lesser market pressure to improve 
performance is associated with greater/lesser need to choose an aggressive 
labour relations strategy; (ii) Corporate executives prefer a non-union 
environment. Thus executives will tend to choose union avoidance 
strategies; (iii) Managers have either experienced or perceived sufficient 
market pressure to engender a re-evaluation of labour relations strategies.
Cooke and Meyer employ the multinominal logit maximum likelihood 
estimation technique to test these hypotheses18. Table 3.4 summarizes
this logic to analyze relations between actual and perceived competitive pressure.
18 For the statistical properties of MNL, (multinominal logit) maximum likelihood 
estimation technique, see Hensher and Johnson (1981). Basically this technique is used for 
testing discrete unordered alternatives. For example, in the case of Cooke and Meyer (1990), 
one of their three labour relations strategies cannot be chosen over the other two in a strict 
sense. In other words, whereas some of the exogenous factors determining strategy choice 
can be expected to affect employers' choice between emphasizing collaboration and 
emphasizing union avoidance, other factors can be expected to affect their choice between 
adopting one of the more aggressive single-approach strategies, on the one hand, and 
adopting the less aggressive mixed strategy, on the other, but with no greater probability of 
choosing one of the single-approaches over the other. So they cannot order three alternatives 
in a strict sense, but they can only test either the relative probability of choosing the union 
avoidance strategy to that of selecting the mixed strategy, or the relative probability of 
choosing the collaborative strategy. Further they can test the relative probability of choosing
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their findings. When the markets worsen (measured by changes in import 
penetration and industry employment) companies become more inclined to 
choose one of the more aggressive single-approach strategies (union 
avoidance or collaboration) and less inclined to choose the mixed strategy, 
which combines elements of union avoidance and collaboration. Companies 
appear particularly likely to choose union avoidance (see table 3.4 I).
With respect to collective bargaining structure, the higher the 
proportion of plants which are unionized, the more likely company managers 
will choose collaboration rather than union avoidance or a mixed strategy 
(see table 3.4 III). Higher labour intensity and higher average investment in 
plants are both associated with an increased probability of choosing a mixed 
strategy. Where lower levels of labour intensity prevail and there exist only 
average plant investment, the more likely companies will choose one of the 
single-approach strategies (with a somewhat greater likelihood of choosing 
union avoidance than collaboration) (see table 3.4 IV-VI). Furthermore, the 
greater the number of plants in a company, the more likely it is for that 
company to choose the mixed strategy, especially in preference to the 
collaboration strategy (see table 3.4 VII). Finally, the higher the ratio of the 
cost of goods to sales, the more likely companies will choose collaboration. 
Specifically, as the cost-to-sales ratio rises, companies move away from the 
mixed strategy toward collaboration (see table 3.4 VIII).
Cooke and Meyer overcome most of the shortcomings commonly 
noticed from other similar studies, see e.g., Lewin (1987: p.33). They 
identify three major labour relations strategies and specify testable 
hypotheses linking corporate structural and market predictors with strategic 
choices related to labour relations19. Cooke and Meyer set up a robust 
research design to operationalize data and employ suitable econometric 
techniques. They conclude that their basic hypotheses, about the effects of 
company attributes and market conditions on executive strategic choice, is
the collaborative strategy over the union avoidance strategy. These three relative 
probabilities are represented as A, B, and C in Table 3.4.
19 For a taxonomy of managerial strategies and industrial relations approach, see also 
Nuttal (1989). As discussed earlier, Marchington (1990) also attempted to theorize the links 
between product markets and labour market institutions. He notes that there have been two 
separate attempts to theorize about these links: Thurley and Wood (1983) and Thomason 
(1984).
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Table 3.4 Structural and Market Predictors and Corporate Labour 
___________________Relations Strategies___________________
Measured variables and hypotheses
A
Results
B C
1 Changes in Import Penetration Ratio (1978 - ( + ) ( + )
1981) + + -
The greater the import penetration in the 
company's primary industry, the more 
likely it is that company executives will 
choose either union avoidance or 
collaboration strategy. We cannot, 
however, predict a priori which of two 
single approach strategies will be chosen.
* * * * *
II Changes in Employment (1978 - 1981) (-) (-)
The healthier the industry employment - - +
trends, the less likely it is that a company 
will choose the mixed strategy over either 
the collaboration or union avoidance.
# # # # #
Ill Unionization Ratio at 1975 (-) ( + ) ( + )
The greater the proportion of facilities + + +
unionized, the less likely it is that a 
company will choose the union avoidance 
strategy over either the collaboration or 
mixed strategy, and also the more likely 
the collaboration over the mixed.
* * # *
IV Ratio of Labour Cost to the Total Value of (-) (-)
Shipments at 1981 - - +
The more labour-intensive the production 
process, the less likely companies will 
choose either of the single-approach 
strategies.
* * » * *
V Average Value-Added per Employee at 1981 ( + ) ( + )
(for capital-intensity) + # * « + * *
VI Average Employment per Plant and Average 
Sales Volume per Plant (for the extent of capital
(-)
EM:
(-)
investments)
The greater the capital investments in a SA:
•
plant, the greater the potential loss from - - +
failed strategies, and, hence, the greater 
the risk in applying either of the more 
aggressive single-approach strategies.
* * * *
Source: A compiled table based on Cooke and Meyer (1990)
Note: (1) Indicated signs are based on Multinominal logit maximum likelihood estimation.
Those in () are expected signs from the hypotheses.
(2) A = Union avoidance over mixed strategy 
B = Collaboration over mixed strategy
C = Collaboration over union avoidance strategy
(3) * = statistically significant at 10% level
* *  =  statistically significant at 5% level
* * * = statistically significant at 1 % level
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Table 3.4 Cont'd
Measured variables and hypotheses
A
Results
B C
VII Number of Plants (-) (-)
Holding percentage unionized constant, - - -
the choice of the mixed strategy will 
become more likely the greater the 
number of plants company wide.
# * « *
VIII Cost-of-Goods/Sales Ratio (1981) ( + ) ( + )
The larger the cost of goods relative to + + +
sales, the more like the collaboration 
strategy will be chosen.
* # * * *
Source: A compiled table based on Cooke and Meyer (1990)
Note: (1) Indicated signs are based on Multinominal logit maximum likelihood estimation.
Those in () are expected signs from the hypotheses.
(2) A = Union avoidance over mixed strategy 
B = Collaboration over mixed strategy
C = Collaboration over union avoidance strategy
(3) * = statistically significant at 10% level
* *  = statistically significant at 5% level
* * * = statistically significant at 1 % level
generally valid. Although a significant contribution to industrial relations, 
Cooke and Meyer's study does not consider explicitly the strategic 
behaviour of employees and trade unions and their theoretical framework 
and implicit model seem to be ad hoc20. In these respects their study is 
wanting.
Definitions and taxonomies of industrial relations strategies are
dependent upon how we treat strategic choices in the context of labour
relations. For example, Streeck (1987) relates strategic choice to decisions
promoted by crisis:
'A crisis, according to the original Greek meaning of the word, is a 
time of decision - a time in which past decisions that are sedimented 
in present structures are reviewed and new decisions can no longer 
be avoided that may result in fundamental structural change. 
Decisions of this kind are referred to as 'strategic choices' that differ 
from routine decisions in that they are directly concerned with the
20 Strategic choice theory in industrial relations is still unsatisfactory. Recently however, 
Soskice (1990) and Brunetta and Carraro (1990) have developed formal and more robust 
theoretical frameworks, mainly by applying a game theoretic approach. See e.g., Appendix 
I.
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identities, the structures of, and the institutionalized relations 
between, social actors. Where strategic decisions are at stake, 
internal lines of differentiation within social aggregates may become 
potential points of departures for a re-formation of interest structures 
and identities, and holistic concepts that disregard such 
differentiations become outdated and misleading/ (Streeck 1987; 
p.283)
Earlier, Child (1972) argued that 'strategic choice' should extend to the 
context within which the organization is operating, to the standards of 
performance against which the pressure of economic constraints has to be 
evaluated, and to the design of the organization's structure itself. From 
these exemplary definitions of strategic choice, we can better understand 
the relationships between manager's decisions and strategies, day-to-day 
business operation and external constraints. We need to refine these 
relationships.
The most important area to be refined is the relationship between 
environmental structures and strategic choice. The prevailing assumption is 
that strategic choice and environmental determinism represent mutually 
exclusive, competing explanations of organizational adaptation21. In 
contrast, Hrebiniak and Joyce (1985) argue that choice and determinism are 
independent variables that can be positioned on two separate continua to 
develop a typology of organizational adaptation. The interactions of these 
variables result in four principal types:
(i) Natural selection, with minimum choice and adaptation;
(ii) Differentiation, which constitutes strategic choice, environmental 
determinism and adaptation with constraints;
(iii) Strategic choice, with maximum choice and adaptation by 
design;
(iv) Undifferentiated choice, with incremental choice and adaptation 
by chance.
21 The term adaptation in the current literature is employed in a number of ways, ranging 
simply from change - including both proactive and reactive behaviour - to a more specific 
denotation of reaction to environmental forces or demands. In their paper, Hrebiniak and 
Joyce (1985) use the term consistent with the former meaning, indicating change that is 
aligning organizational capabilities with environmental contingencies. This view allows for 
proactive or reactive organizational behaviour in anticipation of, or reaction to, exogenous 
variables.
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Figure 3.4 Strategic Choices and Environmental Determinism 
in Organizational Adaptation
High Strategic Choice
Low
Environmental
Determinism
(III)
* Strategic choice
* Maximum choice
* Adaptation by design
( I I )
* Differentiation or 
focus
* Differentiated choice
* Adaptation within 
constraints
(IV)
* Undifferentiated 
Choice
* Incremental choice
* Adaptation by chance
( I )
* Natural selection
* Minimum choice
* Adaptation or selection 
out
High
ED
Low Strategic Choice
Source: Hrebiniak and Joyce (1985; p.339; figure 1).
These four types are represented diagrammatically in figure 3.3: the horizontal axis 
represents the degree of environmental determinism, and the vertical axis, 
strategic choice. Most of the literature on adaptation focuses on Quadrants I and 
III. Examples in Quadrant I (Natural Selection) include organizations under perfect 
competitive conditions and also organizations in imperfect competitive niches. In 
Quadrant III (Strategic Choice) organizations confront a pluralistic environment in 
which movement within and between niches or market segments is not severely 
constrained by exit or entry barriers.
In addition to these there are two additional but relatively neglected sets 
of conditions that can expand our understanding of decision making and the 
organizational adaptation process; Quadrants II and IV. Perhaps the clearest 
examples of organizations in Quadrant II are large firms in highly regulated 
industries in which individual choice of strategy is paradoxically high due to factors 
such as size, highly-concentrated market structure, multiple means of achieving 
desired outcomes and low resource dependency on external sources. It also 
includes organizations involving multiple niches, with each characterized by a 
different set of constraints, opportunities, and competing organizations; i.e., a 
multi-product or multi-divisional organization. The parts or subsystems of the
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whole organization may be placed in different quadrants in figure 3.4, w it 
h the net effect that strategic choice and environmental factors determine 
the placement of the whole organization or system of which the subsystem 
is part. The essential point is that external constraints and high 
environmental determinism need not necessarily prevent individual choice 
which impacts on strategic adaptation.
Quadrant IV is a relatively placid situation characterized by low 
strategic choice and low environmental determinism, which is essentially 
unstable, forcing the organization to seek movement to another domain. It 
is likely that organizations in Quadrant IV may have an array of internal 
strengths and competencies that are inappropriate to external opportunities 
and conditions22. In this case, the task of an organization may be to 
develop the capabilities or distinctive competencies needed to take 
advantage of environmental conditions and thereby alter or escape from the 
conditions of Quadrant IV.
From a systematic analysis of organizational adaptation, Hrebiniak 
and Joyce (1985) suggest that the adaptation process is dynamic. Over 
time, an organization's position may shift as a result of strategic choices or 
changes in the external environment. Here, control over scarce resources is 
central to the relationship between choice and determinism. Strategic choice 
is possible in all quadrants of figure 3.4, although the qualitative nature and 
impact of the decision process varies with the environmental context of an 
organization.
This kind of analysis for organizational adaptation in response to 
internal resource constraints and environmental conditions seems to have 
significant explanatory power for labour relations as a strategic business 
strategy. In particular, we can apply the logic developed by Hrebiniak and 
Joyce to the strategic behaviour of workers and managers in response to 
changes in competitive pressure and organizational conditions. At least, it 
can provide us with criteria to distinguish the strategic behaviour of 
employees and managers which will help us understand their interactions. 
However, setting strategic choice and organizational adaptation in the
22 When organizations have no apparent strategic thrust, it is possible to dismiss 
rationality as a guiding principle of organizational behaviour and to replace it with irrationality 
and even capriciousness to explain action over time (see Hrebiniak and Joyce 1985; p.342).
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context of labour relations remains less than straightforward:
'In sum the structure is inescapably involved in how agents both 
construct their strategic goals and then realize them in their strategic 
choices. Environmental structures, then, are not necessarily 
antagonistic to strategic choice; rather they both form its 
precondition and inform its content. Indeed, the greater threat to 
strategic choice is a neglect of social structure that, motivated by an 
exclusive preoccupation with environmental determinism, mistakenly 
denudes actors of the inner complexity and the external resources 
upon which their agency depends/ (Whittington 1988)
So far we have seen how existing studies which we have abstracted 
from various academic disciplines can help us to set the strategic choices 
of employees and managers into the labour relations framework. Even with 
Whittington's caveat above, it would be interesting to see if we can employ 
strategic choice theories to provide a meaningful framework to analyze the 
links between product markets and the management of labour relations. As 
a pre-requisite of attempting this in chapter 4, the concluding section of this 
chapter synthesizes existing studies referred to above.
4. COMPETITIVE PRESSURE AND THE CONDUCT OF LABOUR 
RELATIONS: A synthesis of theories
The previous two sections examined two groups of studies as a preliminary 
step for our attempt to provide a new theoretical approach to industrial 
relations which we will undertake in the next chapter. One group focuses 
on trade, employment and labour relations; the other is concerned with 
strategic choice, organizational behaviour, and industrial relations strategies. 
Figure 3.5 provides an outline of how these studies can be combined to give 
a consistent framework for the relationship between competitive pressures, 
labour market institutions and economic performance.
As shown in the first half of figure 3.5, studies on trade and 
employment imply that import surges tend to generate pressure on 
employees as well as employers in collective bargaining. Import competition 
would give workers a conflicting choice between jobs and wages. Employers 
also may face a tradeoff between short-run and long-run profitability, 
depending on how they perceive competitive pressures. If they perceive it
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as temporary with little significance, employers will be more willing to 
concede terms in collective bargaining for future profitability. Tyson and 
Zysman (1988) show that wages respond differently across industries. 
Studies in the first half of figure 3.5 address the potential importance of 
international competition in explaining the conduct of labour market 
institutions. In these, perceptions of competitive pressure matter more than 
the actual pressure. Perceptions of competitive pressure may depend on 
various structural conditions of labour market institutions such as union 
density and the degree of centralization.
On the other hand, studies of strategic choice and organizational 
behaviour provide a clue of how to link changes in product market 
conditions with the conduct of labour market institutions. According to 
Cooke and Meyer (1990), when the product market worsens through 
intensified import penetration, companies become more inclined to use an 
aggressive single-approach strategy (union avoidance or collaboration) and 
less inclined to use a mixed strategy of the two. Even if they have not 
investigated underlying mechanisms, environmental pressure would change 
the conduct of employees as well as employers. In the next chapter we will 
establish our own theoretical framework which will allow us to explicitly 
investigate the conduct dimension.
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Figure 3.5 A Schematic View o f Synthesis
COMPETITIVE PRESSURE (Actual) 
from import surges
* step-wise decision functions
MANAGERS' AND WORKERS' STRATEGIES
* A typology of managerial strategies
- labour relations strategies; 
union avoidance, collaboration, 
mixed strategy
* A typology of workers' and unions' strategies
- cooperation, non-cooperation, acquiescence
INTERACTIONS OF STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR
Leibenstein's X-inefficiency theory
Trade, employment and labour relations
Game theoretic approach to strategic interactions
Industrial relations strategies, strategic choice 
and organizational adaptation theories
CONDUCT OF LABOUR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
* rigidity and flexibility
* conflict and consensus
Perceived Competitive Pressure constrained 
by structures of labour market institutions
- union density
- degree of centralization
- industrial relations laws (government)
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CHAPTER FOUR
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF PRODUCT MARKETS, LABOUR 
MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
1. INTRODUCTION
The four established hypotheses discussed in the preceding chapters focus 
on the structural differences of labour market institutions - e.g., the extent 
of centralization in collective bargaining and/or the degree of corporatism. 
Our discussion showed the potential importance of the behaviourial 
dimension between the structure of labour market institutions and macro- 
economic performance. In this chapter we will construct a theoretical 
framework and generate an hypothesis by examining the behaviour of labour 
market agents in a simulated world. Propositions from our hypothesis will 
be empirically tested in later chapters.
Our objectives in this chapter are threefold. Firstly we will showcase 
a new construct for competitive pressure. Secondly, we will develop a 
systematic theoretical framework which will generate an hypothesis to be 
tested in later chapters. Our theoretical framework is informed by a number 
of disciplines, examined in chapter 3, and include: international trade, 
employment and labour relations; business strategy; strategic choice and 
organizational behaviour; and game theoretic approaches to wage 
bargaining. This establishes a setting for our third objective: to provide a 
catalyst for dispersed studies in this area.
A brief overview of our theoretical framework is provided in figure
4.1. A concept of competitive pressure is derived from studies in 
international trade, employment, and labour relations. Changes in 
competitive conditions are viewed as a crucial environmental pressure in 
collective bargaining which influences the strategic choices of employers 
and employees. The rest of this chapter comprises three sections: the next 
two will construct the micro-framework, and the last will develop a 
framework for cross-country empirical studies. In section two, competitive 
pressure will be defined as a crucial environmental pressure which 
influences the strategic behaviour of economic agents. The strategic choices 
of employees as well as employers can be examined through the perception
Figure 4.1 The Theoretical Framework: An Overview
CHANGES IN PRODUCT MARKET CONDITIONS
COMPETITIVE PRESSURE
constrained by
structural
conditions
[Step 2]
[Step 3] interactions of 
strategic choices
strategic response 
functions
COMPETITIVE 
PRESSURE 
HYPOTHESIS'
CONDUCT OF LABOUR RELATIONS
CHANGES IN STRATEGIC BEHAVIOURS
PERCEPTIONS OF 
COMPETITIVE PRESSURE
flexibility and consensus
[Step 5]
[ b]
organizational
adaptations
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
and response functions. Section three will investigate interactions of 
managers' and workers' strategic choices. In the final section, we provide 
a framework for cross-country empirical examination.
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2. COMPETITIVE PRESSURES AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES
2.1 Competitive pressure from international competition: a formal
definition
From studies pf trade, employment and collective bargaining1, we have 
noted that competitive pressure from international trade might have an 
important impact on the strategic behaviour of employees as well as their 
employers. Import competition seems to give workers a choice of tradeoffs 
between jobs and wages. Further, once employees are laid off, the average 
duration of unemployment varies directly with the rise in their primary 
industry's import share (see e.g., Kruse 1986). Employers' perceptions of 
import competition (e.g., is it temporary or permanent?) influences their 
choice of strategies. Believing competitive pressure to be temporary, 
employers might sacrifice a short-term decrease in profits by retaining 
employees even if this means an increase in wages (see e.g., Tyson and 
Zysman 1988). However, wages respond differently in different industries 
with varying degrees of trade pressure. Higher import penetration tends to 
lower wages, especially in imperfectly competitive markets (see e.g., 
Heywood 1986). Abowd and Lemieux (1990) find that employment growth 
is slowed more severely by import penetration than a comparable change in 
real shipments like domestic production and exports. Moreover, unexpected 
changes in import penetration seem to be more sensitive to employment.
These findings suggest that competitive pressure from international 
trade may be one of the most crucial factors in influencing the strategic 
choices of economic agents in collective bargaining. Related studies, 
however, have employed different definitions of international competition for 
different analytical purposes. Thus our first objective is to carefully 
conceptualize competitive pressure in order to facilitate its 
operationalization.
The most frequently used indices for trade pressure are the level of
1 For details, see section 2 of chapter 3.
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and changes in the import penetration ratio and/or simply import share2. 
Those industries or economies facing the same level of and/or changes in 
import penetration may experience different degrees of competitive pressure 
according to their export competitiveness. Those with high and increasing 
export shares and/or trade surpluses may be said to face less competitive 
pressure than otherwise. Hence, in general, actual competitive pressure 
(ACP) depends on the level of and changes in import penetration, export 
share and trade balances. In formal terms, this can be expressed as follows:
AC Pi = f(tflPRj, IPRj, <5SEXj, SEXj, 6BOPt, BOP■ ) ................................... (1)
where
ACP = Actual Competitive Pressure
IPR = Import Penetration Ratio
SEX = Export Share in Total Domestic Production
BOP = Trade Balance
i = Industries or economies
6 = Percentage changes, otherwise meaning levels of each
variable.
In practice, we could have several indices for competitive pressure, 
depending on how many factors we consider. For example:
ACP\ = f1((JIPRj) = 6\PR,  (2)
ACP2 = f2(<5IPRi, SSEX)  (3)
= Wmi*JIPRi - WytfSEXj
where W™ + W* = 1 in which
2 There are two different ways to define import penetration ratios: (i) Imports as a 
proportion to total supply (i.e., domestic production plus imports), (ii) Imports in relation to 
domestic consumption which is equal to domestic production plus imports minus exports (the 
so-called apparent consumption). On theoretical grounds the former definition is preferred 
to the latter if domestic production for the domestic market is reasonably interchangeable 
with domestic production for exports. The reason is that the latter definition can be positive 
with constant imports and constant domestic production if products are merely shifted to the 
export market and can be zero if exports decline pari passu with domestic production, again 
with imports constant. See e.g., Pearson and Ellyne (1985; p.303).
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Wmj = imports/(imports + exports)
Wxj = exports/(imports + exports).
ACP3; = f3(<flPR;, 6SEXt, 6BOP)  (4)
= aydiPR; - q y s s e x, - qv^boP;
where Qm; + Qx; + Q® = 1 in which 
Qm; = imports/(2 "exports)
Qx = exports/(2 "exports)
Q°; = (exports - imports)/(2"exports).
Among equations 2, 3, and 4, equation 2 seems to be the most widely 
used, presuming changes in import penetration reflect competitive pressure 
proportionately, see e.g., Pearson and Ellyne, (1985). The other two indices 
incorporate those opposing forces to import penetration by a simple, linear 
weighting scheme (W's and Q's in equations (3) and (4))3.
In addition to the intensity as defined above, we have to consider 
characteristics such as the permanency and unexpectedness of competitive 
pressure. These qualitative characteristics seem to have significant 
influence, in particular, on employers' strategic choices (see e.g., Tyson and 
Zysman 1988; Heywood 1986; and Abowd and Lemieux 1990). However, 
these characteristics are much harder to define and operationalize4.
2.2. Perceptions of competitive pressure
Over the past two to three decades, behaviourial and social sciences have 
become more cognitive5. Interest in organizational choice is part of a much
3 It is worth noting here that we have made actual competitive pressure operational only 
by explicitly including percentage changes of those variables to be considered in equation (1), 
and that those levels are just implicitly taken in as weights.
4 For example, competitive pressure can be defined as permanent if two sub-periods (e.g., 
each of five years) show the same signs as that of the overall period (e.g., ten years), 
otherwise being temporary. We regard as expected if the first sub-period shows the same 
sign not only as those of the last sub-periods but also as that for the overall period in 
question, otherwise being unexpected.
5 New disciplines have emerged while others have decreased in importance. An example 
of an important emerging area is artificial intelligence which is an amalgam of philosophy and 
information systems. An example of a declining discipline is social philosophy.
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broader intellectual movement concerning how individuals and institutions 
interpret information and act wilfully in an uncertain world, see e.g., March 
(1981). Often, in actual disputes, differences in perceptions among 
participants drastically affects the decision-making process and sometimes 
leads to unexpected results, see e.g., Wang et at. (1988).
It is important, therefore, to construct how competitive pressure is 
perceived by employers and employees. Perceptions of competitive pressure 
might be different from the actual pressure. This could result from specific 
structural conditions of the different groups. Borrowing from Leibenstein 
(1989), perception functions can be established, with three basic 
assumptions:
(i) Imperfect information and bounded rationality with a short 
memory;
(ii) Constrained by structural conditions (implicitly assuming no 
significant difference in perceptions due to individual agent's 
characteristics and subjectivities);
(iii) Asymmetric information implying informational advantage of 
employers and managers over workers and unions;
Following assumption (iii), employers and managers might reasonably 
perceive the permanency and expectedness of competitive pressure 
differently to workers and unions. This might simply follow from the fact 
that competitive pressure manifests itself largely through the profitability of 
the organization. Thus, market power - understood by fluctuations in trade 
and profits - would be the most important structural condition influencing 
managers' perceptions. In addition, the degree of market openness and 
centralization of collective bargaining levels are supposed to influence 
managers' perceptions. Thus, we might reasonably conclude that 
employers' perceptions are dependent on: (i) The intensity; (ii) The 
permanency; and (iii) The expectedness of competitive pressure. These 
product market conditions are constrained by the other three structural 
conditions: (i) The market power; (ii) The market-openness of the economy; 
and (iii) The level of centralization in collective bargaining. Formally this can 
be expressed as:
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PCPm = fm(IACPj, PACPj, UACPj I MPj ; MOP;, CEN;) . . . .  (5)
where
IACP = Intensity of Actual Competitive Pressure 
PACP = Permanency of Actual Competitive Pressure 
UACP = Unexpectedness of Actual Competitive Pressure 
MP = Market Power
CEN = Level of Centralization in Collective Bargaining 
MOP = Degree of Openness in the Industry or the Economy
Here, each structural condition6 can be operationally defined as follows:
(i) Market power7 can be categorized into three: like High, Medium 
and Low, which are determined by the number of employees8. This 
assumes that large firms have more market power.
(ii) Market-openness: (exports + imports) /production9.
6 For the common national structural conditions, we could add as many variables as we 
want if they can be appropriately operationalized. In particular, there are two additional 
factors we should take into account; namely, labour market healthiness of an economy or 
a sector in question and the government's stance towards labour relations as a whole. The 
former could be captured by the level of and changes in aggregate unemployment rates or 
percentages of long-term unemployment. But one of the dependent variables to be explained 
is unemployment experience itself. So we could be faced with an econometric problem if we 
use aggregate unemployment rate as one of the independent variables. Therefore, as long 
as we can get a series of data for long-term unemployment across countries, it would be 
better to employ it as an index for the labour market healthiness. For the government's 
stance, we may consider labour legislation or party complexion, again as long as we can 
obtain internationally comparable time-series data for these variables.
7 For cross-country studies, market power could be represented by manufacturing export 
share of an economy in total world exports, assuming market share can give some 
approximation for price-control in international markets. This implies that we assume that 
large firms are more export-oriented.
8 For example, Low for less than 300, Medium for between 301 -999, High for more than 
1000 employees.
9 The definition of market-openness corresponds to the so-called 'trade-income ratio' to 
measure 'real openness' of an economy where production means GNP. However, there is a 
problem with this index, as noted by Beenstock and Warburton (1986), to the extent that 
it moves with both trade volumes and price changes. By devising an alternative index which 
abstracts entirely from the effects of price movements, Beenstock and Warburton found a 
positive trend rather than a negative trend as argued by Grassman (1980), for the period of
1870 to 1979 in the U.K. This cautions against using the trade-income ratio as an index for 
market-openness. Also there might be another problem if we intend to classify it into discrete 
degrees such as High, Medium, and Low for comparability with other structural conditions, 
since we could be trapped into another arbitrariness. However, for cross-country 
comparisons, these problems would be averaged out so that we could set 20 per cent and
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(iii) Centralization: the level at which collective bargaining is 
formed10.
Among these three structural conditions, market power is presumed to be 
the most important determinant of employers' perceptions. For unexpected 
changes, employers with the less market power are assumed to have less 
ability to distinguish permanent from temporary pressures, implying more 
risk-averse behaviour. For example, employers with medium market-power 
might reasonably perceive actual temporary competitive pressure to be 
permanent pressure with less intensity (e.g., temporary high -* permanent 
medium; temporary medium -»> permanent low).
Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 are an attempt to represent figuratively 
employers' and employees' perception of market conditions for different 
sized and unionized companies. The horizontal axis refers simply to an 
interval for three different intensities of competitive pressure. For heuristic 
reasons these are presumed to be maintained for the same interval of five 
units: 0-5 corresponds to low; 5-10 medium; and 10-15 high competitive 
pressure. The vertical axis of each box represents degrees of intensity of 
actual and perceived competitive pressure. In order to distinguish permanent 
from temporary pressure, we make following conventions: 2 for temporary- 
low; 5 for permanent-low; 7 for temporary-medium; 10 for permanent- 
medium; 12 for temporary-high; and 15 for permanent-high competitive 
pressure11. The left-hand side column of three boxes in figures 4.2 and 4.3 
represents employers' perception functions in response to the actual 
permanent pressure, while the corresponding three boxes in the right-hand 
side column represent those in response to the actual temporary pressure. 
Each of three boxes reports differences in perceptions among employers
50 per cent as boundaries for the classification.
10 We will use indices made by Calmfors and Driffill (1988), classifying into three such 
as 'High, Medium, and Low-centralization'.
11 For workers' perception functions, we use only conventions of permanent pressure to 
indicate different degree of competitive pressure: 5 for low; 10 for medium; and 15 for high 
pressure. This is due to the assumption that workers do not respond to the expected 
pressure. More on this see the text on workers' perception function.
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Figure 4.2 Employers' Step-wise Perception Functions
for Unexpected Changes in Competitive Pressure
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N o te s :  ( 1 )  S t e p - w i s e  p e r c e p t io n  f u n c t io n s  in  t h e  f i r s t  c o lu m n  a r e  in  r e s p o n s e s  t o
Actual Permanent Competitive Pressure, w h i l e  th o s e  in  th e  s e c o n d  c o lu m n  
a r e  in  r e s p o n s e s  t o  Actual Temporary Competitive Pressure.
( 2 )  T h e  h o r iz o n ta l  a x is  c o n s is ts  o f  t h r e e  in t e r v a ls  r e p r e s e n t in g  t h e  p e r io d ,  
d u r in g  w h i c h  a  s p e c i f ic  c o m p e t i t i v e  p r e s s u r e  la s ts .  F o r  s im p l ic i t y ,  t h e  s a m e  
d u r a t io n s  a r e  a s s u m e d  f o r  t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  in t e n s i t ie s  o f  c o m p e t i t i v e  p r e s s u r e :  
i) 1 - 5  fo r  L o w  C o m p e t i t i v e  P r e s s u r e ;  ii) 6 - 1 0  fo r  M e d iu m  C o m p e t i t i v e  
P r e s s u r e ;  i i i)  1 1 - 1 5  f o r  H ig h  C o m p e t i t i v e  P r e s s u r e .  T h u s ,  n u m b e r s  in  t h e  
h o r iz o n ta l  a x is  s im p ly  r e f e r  t o  three distinct periods.
( 3 )  N u m b e r s  in  t h e  v e r t ic a l  a x is  in d ic a t e  d i f f e r e n t  d e g r e e s  o f  A c t u a l  a n d  
P e r c e iv e d  I n t e n s i t y  o f  C o m p e t i t i v e  P r e s s u r e .  V e r t i c a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  
A c t u a l  a n d  P e r c e iv e d  C o m p e t i t i v e  P r e s s u r e  ( in  a  s p e c i f ic  p e r io d )  im p l ie s  a  
"misperception of the Intensity and/or the Nature of Actual Competitive 
Pressure".
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Figure 4 .3  Employers' Step-wise Perception Functions
for Expected Changes in Competitive Pressure
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Actual Permanent Competitive Pressure, w h i l e  th o s e  in  t h e  s e c o n d  c o lu m n  
a r e  in  r e s p o n s e s  t o  Actual Temporary Competitive Pressure.
( 2 )  T h e  h o r iz o n ta l  a x is  c o n s is ts  o f  t h r e e  in t e r v a ls  r e p r e s e n t in g  t h e  p e r io d ,  
d u r in g  w h ic h  a  s p e c i f ic  c o m p e t i t i v e  p r e s s u r e  la s ts .  F o r  s im p l ic i t y ,  t h e  s a m e  
d u r a t io n s  a r e  a s s u m o d  fo r  th r e e  d i f f e r e n t  in t e n s i t ie s  o f  c o m p e t i t i v e  p r e s s u r e :  
i) 1 - 5  fo r  L o w  C o m p e t i t i v e  P r e s s u r e ;  ii) 6 - 1 0  fo r  M e d iu m  C o m p e t i t i v e  
P r e s s u r e ;  iii) 1 1 - 1 5  fo r  H ig h  C o m p e t i t i v e  P r e s s u r e .  T h u s ,  n u m b e r s  in  t h e  
h o r iz o n ta l  a x is  s im p ly  r e f e r  t o  three distinct periods.
( 3 )  N u m b e r s  in  t h e  v e r t ic a l  a x is  in d ic a t e  d i f f e r e n t  d e g r e e s  o f  A c t u a l  a n d  
P e r c e iv e d  I n t e n s i t y  o f  C o m p e t i t i v e  P r e s s u r e .  V e r t i c a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  
A c t u a l  a n d  P e r c e iv e d  C o m p e t i t i v e  P r e s s u r e  (in  a  s p e c i f ic  p e r io d )  im p l ie s  a 
"misperception of the Intensity and/or the Nature of Actual Competitive 
Pressure".
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who have low; medium; and high market powers12 (see also notes of each 
figure).
In figure 4.2 (see the right-hand box of the second row), the 
perception function - represented by the line ( ■ ■ ■ ) -  indicates 
misperceptions as vertical differences below the representation of the actual
pressure (-----). Managers with the least market power might reasonably
overestimate the intensity as permanent-high when actual competitive 
pressure is permanent-medium. In figure 4.2 (see the left-hand box of the 
first row), upward vertical difference between the perceived intensity (■  ■
■  ) and the actual (— ) indicates this misperception. Additionally, managers 
will tend to wrongly perceive temporary as permanent pressure [see vertical 
differences between the perceived (■ ■ ■) and the actual (— ) competitive 
pressure in the right-hand box of the first row in figure 4.2]. Employers with 
the highest market power are assumed to misjudge the intensity when 
pressure is temporary-medium [see downward vertical difference between 
the perceived (■ ■ ■) and the actual (— ) competitive pressure in the right- 
hand box of the third row in figure 4.2] , and also employers are expected 
to make the mistake of regarding permanent as temporary when the 
intensity is low [see upward vertical difference between the perceived (■
■  ■ ) and the actual (— ) competitive pressure in the left-hand box of the 
third row in figure 4.2]. In fact, we implicitly presume that the less market 
power, the greater the propensity to misjudge competitive pressure, with 
different degrees of error depending on the intensity and permanency of 
unexpected changes in actual competitive pressure.
Furthermore, the other two structural conditions might reasonably be 
treated as shifting variables13:
(i) The more open to international competition the industry 
(company) has been, the greater its employers' ability to accurately 
perceive competitive pressure. Market openness may affect the 
perception of the permanent/temporary nature of competitive 
pressure;
12 In figure 4.4, each of three boxes reports differences in perceptions among workers 
who belong to low; medium; and high unionized firms.
13 For the sake of convenience, they can be treated as ceteris paribus conditions.
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(ii) The more centralized the level of collective bargaining is in an 
economy, the more accurately managers' perceive the intensity of 
competitive pressure. High centralization is assumed to reduce inter­
firm variations in the intensity of perceived pressure by one step 
towards the actual pressure.
On the other hand, for the expected changes in competitive pressure (see 
figure 4.3), the intensity might reasonably be perceived correctly but its 
permanency misjudged14 (compare figure 4.2 and 4.3).
In a similar way, we can establish perception functions for workers 
and unions. However, employees' perceptions are assumed not to be 
dependent on the permanency of competitive pressure. This is due to the 
assumption of asymmetric information.
Employees' perceptions can, thus, be expressed as the following 
functional form:
PCPW = fw(IACPj, UACPj | UDj ; MOPj, C E N ;) ......................................... (6)
where:
UD = Union Density
IACP = Intensity of Actual Competitive Pressure
UACP = Unexpectedness of Actual Competitive Pressure 
CEN = Level of Centralization in Collective Bargaining
MOP = Degree of Openness in the Industry or the Economy
Union density is defined as three categories: High, Medium, and Low, based 
on the number of union members as a percentage of total employees15. 
Again, based on specific assumptions, we can operationalize step-wise 
perception functions for employees, see figure 4.4.
14 Although there might be some arbitrariness in these assumptions they tend to relate 
to basic common sense. One way to overcome this arbitrariness would be to see how 
sensitive deductive logic may be when we change some of these assumptions. Or one could 
make perception functions as continuous by assuming arbitrary functional forms.
15 For example, Low for less than 29 per cent, Medium for between 30 and 64 per cent 
and High for more than 65 per cent of union density.
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Figure 4 .4  W orkers' Step-wise Perception Function
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N o te s :  ( 1 )  T h e  h o r iz o n ta l  a x is  c o n s is ts  o f  t h r e e  in t e r v a ls  r e p r e s e n t in g  t h e  p e r io d ,
d u r in g  w h ic h  a  s p e c i f ic  c o m p e t i t i v e  p r e s s u r e  la s ts .  F o r  s im p l ic i t y ,  t h e  s a m e  
d u r a t io n s  a r e  a s s u m e d  fo r  t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  in t e n s i t ie s  o f  c o m p e t i t i v e  p r e s s u r e :  
i) 1 - 5  fo r  L o w  C o m p e t i t i v e  P r e s s u r e ;  ii) 6 - 1 0  fo r  M e d iu m  C o m p e t i t i v e  
P r e s s u r e ;  iii) 1 1 - 1 5  fo r  H ig h  C o m p e t i t i v e  P r e s s u r e .  T h u s ,  n u m b e r s  in  th e  
h o r iz o n ta l  a x is  s im p ly  r e f e r  t o  three distinct periods.
( 2 )  N u m b e r s  in  t h e  v e r t ic a l  a x is  in d ic a t e  d i f f e r e n t  d e g r e e s  o f  A c t u a l  a n d  
P e r c e iv e d  In t e n s i t y  o f  C o m p e t i t i v e  P r e s s u r e .  V e r t i c a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  
A c t u a l  a n d  P e r c e iv e d  C o m p e t i t i v e  P r e s s u r e  (in  a  s p e c i f ic  p e r io d )  im p l ie s  a  
"misperception of the Intensity and/or the Nature of Actual Competitive 
Pressure".
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Employees and unions may have less ability to gather and analyze 
information than employers and managers. Generally, permanency of 
competitive pressure does not matter for employees as it does for 
employers. Instead it is the intensity which concerns employees the most, 
especially when it threatens their job security. However, employees and 
unions are predisposed to underestimate the intensity of competitive 
pressure. Only unexpected changes are important to employees' 
perceptions. This is because employees regard reasonably expected changes 
to have already been considered by employers at a previous bargaining 
round (implicitly assuming no significant difference in perceiving the 
expectedness of competitive pressure between employees and employers). 
Here we assume union density to be the most important determinant of 
employees' perceptions. Thus, employees in less unionized companies might 
reasonably have less ability to correctly interpret the intensity of competitive 
pressure (see figure 4.4). The other conditions influencing workers' 
perceptions might be treated as shifting variables as in the case of 
managers' perception functions:
(i) The more open an industry (company) is to international 
competition, the greater employee abilities are to accurately perceive 
the intensity of competitive pressure. The higher market-openness 
the more accurate employees' perceptions of competitive pressure - 
their perceived intensity will increase by one step towards the actual 
pressure;
(ii) The more centralized the structure of trade unions, the greater are 
employees' abilities to accurately perceive the intensity of 
competitive pressure. Similar to market-openness, greater 
centralization is assumed to upgrade the perceived intensity by one 
step towards the actual pressure.
For the expected changes in competitive pressure, employees reasonably 
might not change their strategies except when they belong to a highly 
centralized bargaining system.
In sum, these perception functions imply that even if there is the 
same degree of competitive pressure in a sector, employers and employees 
perceive them differently. In turn, these differences in perceptions might
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reasonably influence strategic choices of the respective groups.
2.3 Strategic responses of employers and employees
For heuristic reasons we assume managers and workers to have three basic 
strategies in collective bargaining: (i) Non-cooperation (N); (ii) Acquiescence 
(A); and (iii) Cooperation (C). From (i) to (iii) aggressiveness decreases. 
These three strategies have specific implications for each group, see e.g., 
table 4.1. Cooperative strategies imply flexibility and consensus in the 
bargaining process and outcomes. Acquiescent strategies show consensus 
but less flexibility and Non-cooperative strategies engender less consensus 
and flexibility.
The strategic choices of one group is contingent upon other groups' 
chosen strategies which, in turn, depends on how each group perceives 
competitive pressure. Hence strategic decisions of employers and employees 
are interactive: each side's decisions will depend on the choices (or 
predicted choices) of the others.
In a general form, these strategic responses can be expressed as 
follows:
SRm[N,A,C | SRW(N,A,C), T]  (7)
= fm[PCPum or PCP6m | SRW(N,A,C), T]
SRW[N,A,C, | SRm(N,A,C), T]  (8)
= fw[PCPw | SRm(N,A,C,), T]
where:
N = Non-cooperative strategy 
A = Acquiescent strategy 
C = Cooperative strategy 
m = Managers 
w = Workers
T = Survival Threatening Point
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Table 4.1 Implications o f Alternative Strategies
Employers Employees
Non­ « Hierarchic with * Strike or other
cooperation specific rules for actions if
individual employees employers are
with different skills cooperative or
« Rules enforced by non-cooperative
sanctions on workers * Imposing job
control if
employers are
acquiescent in it
Acquie­ # Acquiescence in job * Following
scence control by the management
workforce instructions
Cooperation # Allowing a degree of # Accepting
employee autonomous
participation in responsibility as
decision-making on well as
work organization instructions
* Allowing workers # Engaging in team­
autonomous work with or
responsibility without
management
involvement
Source: A compiled table based on Soskice (1990; pp. 187-188).
Each group is assumed to change its strategic choice when it perceives 
sufficiently intense competitive pressure. A group's strategies may change 
as its perception of competitive pressure changes.
To operationalise step-wise strategic response functions, we must 
develop a specific set of assumptions for each group similar to those 
referred to in tables 4.2 and 4.3. We can establish step-wise strategic 
response functions, again based on Leibenstein (1989), for both managers 
and workers (see e.g., figures 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7). When employers perceive 
competitive pressure as permanent, they will choose more aggressive 
strategies unless they consider that workers might be cooperative [see 
figure 4.5, page 87 and compare the strategic response function (•  •  • )  for
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cooperative workers with the other two functions (for non-cooperative 
workers: a a a and for acquiescent workers: ■ ■ ■]. Once workers are 
presumed to be non-cooperative, employers' strategies tend to become less 
aggressive especially when they perceive the intensity of competition to be 
high [see the step-wise function represented by a a a of figure 4.5, page 
87]. If workers are regarded as acquiescent, employers will tend to exploit 
bargaining by choosing non-cooperative strategies. This employers will do 
until they perceive competitive pressure to be extremely intense [see the 
function represented by ■ ■ ■ of figure 4.5, page 87]. When managers 
perceive competitive pressure to threaten profits, they will react by non- 
cooperativeness (see strategic responses in the last column of figure 4.5, 
page 87).
As long as employers perceive competitive pressure as temporary, 
they will sacrifice short-term declines in profits regardless of workers' 
strategies. The exception to this is when employers' profitability is 
threatened by severe competition (compare figures 4.5 and 4.6, page 87).
Traditionally, workers and unions are assumed to be intrinsically 
prone to take aggressive stances and less flexible to external competitive 
pressure. Unless managers show some concessions, workers will choose 
non-cooperative strategies until their job security is threatened. Once 
employers are considered cooperative, employees' strategies will be more 
cooperative according to their perceived intensity of competitive pressure 
[see figure 4.7, page 87 and compare the strategic response function ( •  •  
• )  for cooperative employers with the other two functions (for non- 
cooperative managers: a a a and for acquiescent mangers: ■ ■ ■].
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Table 4.2 Assumptions for Employers' Strategic Response Functions
Workers' Chosen Strategy Assumed Strategic Response
Non-cooperation
Acquiescence
Cooperation
(1) With the perception of 
permanent competitive pressure, 
employers' strategy would be less 
aggressive in proportion to the 
intensity
Employer's choice would start 
from N
Employers' choice would change, 
if they perceive intensity as High, 
from N directly to C 
Employers' choice would start 
from C and only change to N if 
they perceive the intensity of 
pressure as threatening
Non-cooperation
Acquiescence
Cooperation
(2) With the perception of 
temporary competitive pressure, 
employers would choose less 
aggressive strategies than the 
case of permanent pressure
Employers' choice would start 
from A and change to C when the 
intensity is perceived as High 
Employers' choice would be C 
until the survival threatening point 
(T)
Employers' choice would remain C 
even after the survival threatening 
point (T)
(3) After the survival threatening 
point, employers will choose N, 
except when they regard workers 
as choosing C strategy
Note: N = Non-cooperative strategy
A = Acquiescent strategy 
C = Cooperative strategy 
T = Survival threat point
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Table 4 .3  Assumptions for Workers' Strategic Response Functions
Employers' Chosen Strategy
Non-cooperation
Acquiescence
Cooperation
Assumed Strategic Response
(1) Workers'strategic 
choices are more aggressive 
than their employers'
(2) Workers change their 
strategies less frequently in 
response to their perception 
of competitive pressure
Workers would change their 
choice only when their job 
security is threatened, from N 
to A
Workers would not change 
their strategy from N to A up 
to the threat point (T)
Workers would respond most 
frequently by changing from N 
to A and to C in accordance 
with their perceived intensity
Note: N = Non-cooperative strategy
A = Acquiescent strategy 
C = Cooperative strategy 
T = Survival threat point
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Figure 4 .5  Employers' Strategic Response 
Function in Response to Perceived Permanent 
Competitive Pressure
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Figure 4 .6  Employers' Strategic Response 
Function in Response to Perceived Temporary 
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Figure 4 . 7 Employees' Strategic Response 
Function
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N o te s :  ( 1 )  T h e  h o r iz o n ta l  a x is  c o n s is ts  o f  fo u r  d is t in c t  c a t e g o r ie s  o f  Perceived
Competitive Pressure: i) 1 - 5  fo r  L o w  P e r c e iv e d  C o m p e t i t i v e  P r e s s u r e ;  ii) 6 -  
1 0  fo r  M e d iu m  P e r c e iv e d  C o m p e t i t i v e  P r e s s u r e ;  iii) 1 1  - 1 5  fo r  H ig h  P e r c e iv e d  
C o m p e t i t i v e  P r e s s u r e ;  iv )  1 6 - 2 0  fo r  P e r c e iv e d  C o m p e t i t i v e  P r e s s u r e  a s  
S u r v iv a l - t h r e a t e n in g .
( 2 )  N u m b e r s  in  t h e  v e r t ic a l  a x is  in d ic a t e  d i f f e r e n t  S t r a t e g i c  A l t e r n a t iv e s  o f  
L a b o u r  R e la t io n s :  i) 5 - 8  f o r  N o n - c o o p e r a t iv e  S t r a t e g y ;  ii) 1 1 - 1 3  fo r  
A c q u ie s c e n t  S t r a t e g y ;  iii) 1 6 - 1 8  fo r  C o o p e r a t iv e  S t r a t e g y .
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3. STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS AND THE CONDUCT OF LABOUR 
RELATIONS
3.1 Interactions of strategic behaviours
We have now established a transmission mechanism from changes in 
product market conditions to changes in labour market behaviour. We have 
achieved this by way of step-wise perceptions and strategic response 
functions. The structure of labour market institutions16 is believed to 
distort perceptions of actual competitive pressure. And perceptions, rather 
than actual levels, determine the strategic choices of workers as well as 
managers. Thus, in addition to the actual competitive pressure (ACP in the 
equations), strategic responses are dependent upon four other structural 
conditions:
(i) Centralization in the level of collective bargaining (CEN);
(ii) The degree of market-openness, which distorts both employers' 
and employees' perceptions (MOP);
(iii) Market power of managers (MP);
(iv) Union density (UD).
In other words, we have derived five functional forms (equations 9 to 13) 
which are assumed to be unidirectionally causative, so that response 
functions, themselves shown in equations (12) and (13) can be represented 
by those in equations (9), (10) and (11).
AC Pi = f(IPRj, 6\PRlf SEX„ dSEXj, BOPj, dBOPj) . . . .  (9)
PCPm = fJIACPi, PACP„ UACPj | MPj ; MOPi, CENi) . . . (10)
PCPW = fw(IACPj, UACPj | UD;; MOPj, CENj) . . (11)
16 They used to be the most frequently employed indicators for explaining differences in 
macroeconomic performance across countries.
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SRm[N,A,C | SRW(N,A,C), T ] ............................................................ (12)
= fm[PCPm | SRW(N,A,C), T; UACP or EACP]
= fJACPj, MPj, UDj, MOPj, CENj | SRJ
SRW[N,A,C, | SRm(N,A,C), T ] ............................................................ (13)
= UPCPW I SRm(N,A,C,), T]
= fw(ACPj, MPj, UDj, MOPj, CENj | SRJ
In the functional forms of (12) and (13), SRm and SRW respectively mean 
equilibrium strategies of managers and workers.
However, it has to be noted that the strategic responses of workers 
are dependent on the equilibrium strategies of managers and vice versa. 
Therefore, equilibrium pairs of chosen strategies can be determined only if 
we consider interactions of each possible combination of strategic choices 
of the two groups17. For example, via the assumed step-wise strategic 
response functions in the previous section, let us suppose that those 
alternative strategies distorted by structural conditions are [Acquiescence 
(A), Non-cooperation (N), Cooperation (C)] for managers and [Non­
cooperation (N), Non-cooperation (N), Acquiescence (A)] for workers18. In 
this case, they may end up with an acquiescent strategy for managers and 
a Non-cooperative strategy for workers. Only the pair (A,N) is stable in the 
sense that each group will not deviate from the chosen equilibrium pair of 
strategies. The detailed logic behind this is explained in table 4.419.
17 In game-theoretic terms, this means that we are searching for the Nash-equilibrium 
strategic pair, which are Pareto-optimal in the sense that no other group can improve their 
rewards by changing their strategies from those equilibrium pairs, given the other group may 
choose their own equilibrium strategies. Recently, there have been a number of studies 
analyzing these interactive decision problems which involve conflict, uncertainty, and 
differences in perception, see e.g. Bennett et al. (1989).
18 (a,b,c), where a,b,c = N or A or C, stands for a set of corresponding strategic 
alternatives given that the other group chooses (N,A,C), respectively.
19 In this example, we implicitly assume that both employers and workers have perceived 
competitive pressure at 'Medium' level.
This kind of game can be more formally constructed as a first-level hypergame. In 
fact, hypergame analysis is a comprehensive method for systematically studying a conflict 
in which one or more players have misunderstandings about the dispute. When the 
participants are not fully informed about the situation, all the information about the game is 
perceived by each player in an individual manner. Unlike simple games, all the players are not
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Table 4.4 An Example of Strategic Interactions
when employers' and workers' sets of strategic alternatives are 
(A,N,C) and (N,N,A), respectively16
Employers' Strategic Choices
Acquie- Non-cooperation Cooperation 
scence
Workers' Strategic
Choices
Non-cooperation 1 (A,N) 2(N,N) 3(C,N)
Non-cooperation 4(A,N) 5(N,N) 6(C,N)
Acquiescence 7(A,A) 8(N,A) 9(C,A)
Notes: (1) (i,j), where i,j = A or N or Cf means a pair of chosen strategies, in which
'i' for managers and 'j' for workers.
(2) 'WU' and 'EM' stand for workers/unions and employers/managers
respectively.
First, if employers try to choose a cooperative strategy, C, assuming 
workers may have chosen C as well, then the equilibrium pair would be cell 
9 in table 4.4. This will be true so long as employees have actually chosen 
cooperative strategy, C. But workers, in fact, will choose to acquiesce 
instead of being cooperative, if they presume employers to have chosen to 
cooperate (e.g., see employees' strategic response functions described in 
figure 4.7, page 87). Accordingly, managers will change their choice to Non­
cooperation (N), presuming workers to acquiesce. This may lead to an 
equilibrium pair of cell 5 in table 4.4. But again workers will change their 
own strategy to Non-cooperation instead of Acquiescence, once they know 
employers have chosen Non-cooperation. This forces managers to change 
their strategy and acquiesce. Now the equilibrium pair may be cell 1 in table
4.4. However, the pair of strategies in cell 1 is also unstable because 
workers may have an incentive to change their strategic choice. It is more 
plausible for workers not to cooperate assuming employers have 
acquiesced, leading to a stable pair of cell 4 in table 4.4. [Acquiescence (A), 
Non-cooperation (N)l is the only stable pair since no group has any incentive
seeing the same game. Each player constructs his perceptual game according to what he 
believes the other players' viewpoints to be, see e.g., Wang et a!. (1988; pp.207-223). 
Nevertheless, we will not attempt to employ the hypergame analysis here.
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to modify their choice.
Using similar logic, we can establish a pattern reported in table 4.5 
which provides us with potential equilibrium pairs of specific strategies. 
There could be other possible specific combinations of alternative strategies. 
Those reported in table 4.5 are based on the potential influences of 
environmental conditions such as actual competitive pressure, degree of 
market-openness and centralization of bargaining20.
Table 4.5 Equilibrium Pair of Strategies Derived from the Assumed
Strategic Interactions
Employers'
Choices
Workers'
Choices
Equilibrium
Pairs
(A,N,C) (N,N,A) (A,N)
(A,N,C) (A,N,C) ?(C,C)or(A,N)or(N,A)
(A,N,C) (N,N,N) (A,N)
(A,N,C) (C,A,C) (C,C)
(A,C,C) (N,N,A) ?(A,N,)or(C,A)
(A,C,C) (A,N,C) (C,C)or(A,N)
(A,C,C) (C,A,C) (C,C)
(A,C,C) (N,N,N) (A,N)
(C,C,C) (A,N,C) (C,C)
(C,C,C) (N,A,C) (C,C)
(C,C,C) (C,A,C) (C,C)
(C,C,C) (N,N,A) (C,A)
(C,C,C) (N,N,N) (C,N)
(N,N,C) (N,N,A) (N,N)
(N,N,C) (A,N,C) ?(N,A)or(C,C)
(N,N,C) (N,N,N) (N,N)
Notes: (1) (a,b,c), where a,b,c = N or A or C, in columns 1 and 2 stands for the
actual alternative strategies, ordered by the presumed strategies of other 
group (N,A,C).
(2) (d,e), where d,e = N or A or C, in column 3 is an equilibrium pair of 
strategies by managers and workers respectively.
(3) ? stands for the indeterminacy of equilibrium due to multiple possibilities.
20 There are 108 cases to be considered according to changes in environmental 
conditions, [i.e., 12 different combinations of actual competitive pressure, depending on their 
unexpectedness (expected or unexpected), permanency (permanent or temporary) and 
intensity (high, medium or low) times 9 different combinations of market-openness (high, 
medium or low) and centralization (high, medium or low) = 108.] For each of these 108 
cases, as a first step, we derive perceived competitive pressure via the assumed perception 
functions. Then we determine the possible alternative strategies of each group via the 
assumed strategic response functions. Finally, we can get what would be equilibrium pairs 
of strategies by the logic we describe. For example, see table 4.7 in page 97 (These will be 
provided by application in a separate form).
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3.2. Equilibrium strategic pairs and a typology of labour relations 
behaviour
According to our theory, there could be nine possible pairs of equilibrium 
strategies21, see table 4.5. With our suggested environmental conditions, 
however, there are only six equilibrium pairs. The other three [(A,A); (A,C); 
(N,C)] are not found. Which pair of strategies would improve economic 
performance? In general, macro-economic performance such as growth, 
unemployment and inflation can be supposed to be dependent on two 
underlying characteristics of collective bargaining: (i) The extent of flexibility 
in collective bargaining with respect to changes in environmental conditions; 
and (ii) the degree of consensus in bargaining processes. We assume that 
more flexible and less conflictual collective bargaining outcomes enhance 
economic performance.
Four assumptions underlie these characteristics of bargaining 
behaviour. These are:
(i) If the chosen strategy is non-cooperation, the implied conduct of 
labour relations would be rigid and friction, with more weight on the 
latter, see figure 4.8, N;
(ii) If the chosen strategy is acquiescence, the implied conduct would 
be rigid and consensus, with more weight on consensus, see figure 
4.8, A;
(iii) If the chosen strategy is cooperation, the implied nature would 
be flexible and consensus, carrying more weight on flexible, see 
figure 4.8, C;
(iv) The implied nature of an acquiescent strategy can be overruled 
by a cooperative one, but can overrule that of a non-cooperative 
strategy.
Figure 4.8 shows the three labour relations strategies. The different arrow 
lengths represent the extent of each underlying characteristic of flexibility
21 Assuming that both employers and workers have three alternative strategies of non­
cooperation, acquiescence, and cooperation, we would have the following nine pairs: (C,C), 
(C,A), (C,N), (A,N), (A,A), (A,C), (N,N), (N,A), and (N,C).
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Figure 4.8 Industrial Relations Strategies and their Implied Characteristics 
: Cooperation (C), Acquiescence (A), and Non-cooperation (N)
Negative
Flexibility
Positive
Cooperation
Flexibility
Negative
Non-Cooperation
and consensus22. In particular, assumption (iv) above can be clarified using 
figure 4.8. Suppose strategic interaction terminates w ith a pair of 
cooperative and acquiescent strategies. Then the conduct of that particular 
equilibrium strategy can be defined as f/exib/e-consensus.
Based on these assumptions, we can interpret the equilibrium pairs 
of chosen strategies as implying a certain kind of conduct in their labour 
relations. We propose following functional relationships:
CONDUCT(F-C, F-F, R-C, R-F | SRm, SRJ . . . .  (14)
= f(SRm, SRJ
= f(ACP„ MP„ UD,, MOPj, CEN,)
22 We will assume relative difference  in the length of arrows as follows: (i) Cooperative 
strategy having three units of positive flexibility and tw o units of positive consensus, (ii) 
Acquiescence having tw o units of rigidity and four units of consensus, (iii) Non-cooperative 
having one unit of rigidity and three units of conflict. Absolute values do not have any
significant meaning.
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Table 4.6 Typologies for the Conduct of Labour Relations 
Derived from the Equilibrium Strategy Pairs
Equilibrium Pairs 
(SRm, SRJ
Derived Typologies 
(F-C, F-F, R-C, R-F)
C-C F-C
C-A F-C
C-N F-F
A-C F-C
A-A R-C
A-N R-C
N-C F-F
N-A R-C
N-N R-F
Note: F-C = Flexible-Consensus
F-F = Flexible-Friction 
R-C = Rigid-Consensus 
R-F = Rigid-Friction
Table 4.6 gives the assumed relationship between the equilibrium pairs of 
strategies and their implied typologies for the conduct of labour relations23.
23 Each type of labour relations conduct can be also represented by arrows with different 
length, using those assumptions in Footnote 20: (i) Flexible-Consensus having six units of 
positive flexibility and four units of positive consensus, (ii) Flexible-Friction having two units 
of positive flexibility and one unit of negative consensus, (iii) Rigid-Consensus having four 
units of negative flexibility and eight units of positive consensus, (iv) Rigid-Friction having 
two units of negative flexibility and four units of negative consensus. Only relative 
differences in these lengths are meaningful. Each of these labour relations conduct can be 
shown in the following graph:
[+ive Consensus]
[-ive ------
Flexibility]
*
R-C
8
7
6* F-C
5 
4 
3 
2
R-C * 1
 4 3 2 101 2 3 4 5 6
1 
2
3
4
5
R-F * 6
I
[-ive Consensus]
* F-C
is
F-F
-------- [+ive
Flexibility]
94
There remains one more question: How do these typologies of the labour 
relations conduct relate to differences in economic performance? We need 
one more ad hoc assumption for the definitive ordering24. Assuming that 
positive effects of flexibility have a stronger influence in wage bargaining, 
we can rank the conduct of labour relations in terms of economic 
performance in descending order as follows:
(i) Flexible-Consensus;
(ii) Flexible-Friction',
(iii) Rigid-Consensus;
(iv) Rigid-Friction.
Let us now move on to an example of how we can analyze, in 
practice, the relationship between changes in environmental conditions and 
strategic interactions leading to labour management relations behaviour in 
an organization. Suppose an abrupt, sustained and substantial increase in 
import penetration (high competitive pressure) during a specific period, say, 
1971-80, in a specific industry, say, automobiles, in an economy. For 
heuristic reasons, imagine two firms in the same industry: Firm X (large and 
highly unionized) and firm Y (small with relatively low levels of unionization). 
Both firms are assumed to have been fairly open to international 
competition, and are operating in the economy with a medium level of 
centralization in their bargaining structure. Our previous discussion allows 
us to predict how these two firms will end up with different equilibrium pairs 
of labour relations strategies, and in turn, with different labour relations 
behaviours.
Based on perception functions described above, employers and 
managers in both firms might reasonably perceive competitive pressure with
24 As assumed in the previous footnote, each type of labour relations conduct has certain 
units of both positive and negative effects. As far as the ordering in terms of economic 
performance is concerned, we need to compare these units. For certain, we have the 
following ordering: (i) F-C > F-F >  R-F. (ii) R-C > R-F. But we cannot tell which effects are 
greater between F-C and R-C, or between F-F and R-C. We need to add one more ad hoc 
assumption for a definitive chain-like ordering. Common sense suggests that positive effects 
of flexibility may bear greater influence on economic outcomes than those of consensus. 
With this assumption, the rank-ordering of our labour relations conduct in terms of the 
influences on economic performance is as follows: F-C > F-F >  R-C > R-F. However, as we 
will see, neither the ad hoc assumption nor the rank-ordering makes a crucial difference in 
deriving hypotheses from our theoretical framework.
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which they are faced as permanent high (e.g, see figure 4.2, page 76). 
Workers and unions, however, in the same company will perceive these 
pressures differently. Employees in firm X will perceive the intensity of 
competitive pressure as high, while those in firm Y will perceive the 
pressure to be medium or low (e.g, see figure 4.4 in page 80). According to 
our assumed strategic response functions (defined as Equations 12 and 13), 
employers in both firms will choose a cooperative strategy (e.g., see figure 
4.5 in page 87). Due to differences in perceptions, however, employees will 
respond differently. For workers in firm X, there are three plausible 
strategies. Those in firm Y may decide either not to cooperate or to 
acquiesce, but the former is dominant (e.g., see figure 4.7 in page 87).
The interactions of strategic responses of employees as well as 
employers in each firm will be as follows. In firm X, even if workers have 
three available strategies, given that employers choose to cooperate, 
employees will also choose C (cooperative). This will lead to the strategic 
pairing (C,C): f/exib/e-consensus. In firm Y, given that managers choose a 
cooperative strategy, the employees' dominant strategy will be non­
cooperation. Firm Y will end up with the strategic pairing (C,N): rigid- 
consensus. Thus, even if the actual competitive pressure experienced by 
both firms is the same, the conduct of labour relations in the same firm or 
economy, with an identical bargaining structure, can be different.
4. HYPOTHESES AND AN EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
Having set up the theoretical framework, we can now investigate the 
potential role of competitive pressure as well as the structural conditions 
distorting the strategic choices of workers and employers. For this we need 
to analyze all the different combinations of environmental conditions. Even 
if we set aside the role of the government's stance towards labour relations 
and labour market healthiness, we have to examine 108 cases with only five 
environmental conditions: (i) Actual competitive pressure; (ii) Market- 
openness; (iii) Centralization of collective bargaining; (iv) Market power; and
(v) union density.
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Table 4.7 The Effects of Competitive Pressure on Labour 
Market Institutions and Economic Performance: An Example
[For the case of a company facing unexpected permanent high increase in 
competitive pressure, in an economy with medium-centralized bargaining 
structure and with medium market-openness to international competition]
(1) Perceptions of competitive pressure
High
Market Power
Medium Low
Managers'
Perceptions
Workers'
Perceptions
Managers'
Perceptions
Workers'
Perceptions
Managers'
Perceptions
Workers'
Perceptions
Union
Density
High PH H PH H PH H
Medium PH M PH M PH M
Low PH M.L PH M.L PH M.L
(2) Strategic responses and derived conduct of labour relations
Market Power
High Medium Low
Union Density 1 C / A.N.C 2 C / A.N.C 3 C / A.N.C
High C/C C/C C/C
Medium F-C F-C F-C
Low 4 C /N .N .A 5 C / N.N.A 6 C / N.N.A
C/A or C/N C/A or C/N C/A or C/N
F-C or F-F F-C or F-F F-C or F-F
7 C / N(A) 8 C / N(A) 9 C / N(A)
C/N C/N C/N
F-F F-F F-F
Note: The left-hand of each cell in the first rows is for managers' strategic responses and
the right-hand for workers'. The second rows are equilibrium pairs of strategies. And 
the third rows are the typology of labour relations conduct, implied by the 
equilibrium pairs of strategies.
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We could examine perceptions of competitive pressure, strategic 
responses and their interactions leading to a specific kind of labour relations 
conduct using the same logic as in table 4.7. The example mentioned in the 
final part of the previous section can be represented by the first and ninth 
cells in table 4.7 (2). In the case of an unexpected permanent high increase 
in actual competitive pressure, union density tends to determine the conduct 
of labour relations regardless of the employers' market power: the higher 
unionization, the better economic performance [e.g., compare three rows in 
table 4.7 (2)]. With the same kind of logic for the rest of cases, we 
construct a data set, from the simulated world, see e.g., Appendix II25.
Simple correlations between environmental conditions, equilibrium 
strategies, and labour relations conduct are shown in table 4.8. There may 
be no large difference in signs and sizes of correlations either by using the 
ad hoc economic performance ranking or by using equilibrium pairs of 
strategies, except, that is, for the case of permanency. If marginal, we could 
obtain the following contributions for each environmental condition in 
determining the conduct of labour relations:
(i) Higher intensity of actual competitive pressure and higher market- 
openness tend to produce more flexible and consensus-prone 
strategic interactions;
(ii) Higher centralization and lower union density marginally improves 
the harmony of labour relations;
(iii) Higher market power is also helpful for f/exib/e-consensus labour 
relations. Butin some cases, market power shows no significant role 
at all26;
(iv) If competitive pressure is unexpectedlabour relations tend to be 
more flexible and consensus-prone;
(v) Permanent competitive pressure produces more flexible- 
consensus labour relations, but worse economic performance.
25 Those 108 cases analyzed in the form of the table 4.6 will be supplied by application.
28 We gave value 4 when union density or market power has no significant role in 
explaining labour relations conduct (see Note of table 4.7). Hence, negative correlation 
coefficients can be interpreted in both ways as in the text.
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Multiple regression results are shown in table 4.9 for the conduct of labour 
relations and the equilibrium pair of strategies. Marginal effects for each 
environmental condition are not very different from those of simple 
correlations except in the case of union density. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, higher union density contributes to more cooperative and flexible 
labour relations. Or, as in the case of the market power, difference in union 
density has no significant role at all. However, union density, permanency 
of competitive pressure, and market-openness tends not to be statistically 
significant.
From these contributions, we can see the relative importance of 
competitive pressure, especially its intensity and unexpectedness, in 
explaining differences in economic performance. As can 
be seen in table 4.9, the intensity of competitive pressure seems to have 
the most significant effect on labour relations behaviours. Import penetration
Table 4.8 Simple Correlation Coefficients between Environmental 
Conditions, Equilibrium Strategies, and the Conduct of Labour Relations
Conduct Strategies
Centralization -0.143 -0.145
Union Density 0.253 0.122
Actual Competitive
Pressure
Intensity -0.576 -0.478
Unexpectedness 0.210 0.173
Permanency -0.007 0.014
Market-openness -0.119 -0.180
Market power -0.308 -0.328
Notes: (1) Each variable has the following values and for convenience all variables are
transformed by natural logs: Centralization, Market-openness and 
Intensity of Actual Competitive Pressures have 1 (low), 2 
(medium), and 3 (high); Union density and Market power have 1 (low), 
2 (medium), 3 (high), 4 (no significant role); Permanency have 1 
(permanent) and 2 (temporary); Unexpectedness have 1 (unexpected) 
and 2 (expected); Strategies have 1 I(C,C)], 2 [(C,A) & (A,C)], 3 [(C,N) 
& (N,C)], 4 [(A,A)], 5 [(A,N) & (N,A)], and 6 [(N,N)]; Conduct have 1 (F- 
C), 2 (F-F), 3 (R-C), and 4 (R-F).
(2) Correlation coefficient between the conduct and equilibrium strategies is
0.933.
(3) In total, there are 242 cases for each variable.
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itself might have a negative impact on domestic economic growth and 
unemployment. This influences the conduct of managers and workers in 
collective bargaining to the extent that companies faced with high import 
penetration may end up with less increase or even a decrease in wages. 
Furthermore, they might also be forced to introduce more flexible production 
processes (see figure 4.9). From these simulations, therefore, we can 
suggest the following hypothesis:
"if the intensity of competitive pressure is high, strategic choices of 
employees and employers will be more cooperative. "
The same hypothesis holds true for the conduct of labour relations, and 
hence for differences in economic performance. Hereafter, we refer to this 
theoretical construct as the 'Competitive Pressure Hypothesis'.
Table 4.9 Multiple Regression Coefficients between Environmental 
Conditions, Equilibrium Strategies, and the Conduct of Labour Relations
Dependent Conduct Strategies
Centralization -0.164 -0.199
(-2.929) (-2.848)
Union Density -0.036 -0.214
(-0.553) (-2.645)
Actual Competitive 
Pressure
Intensity -0.558 -0.612
(-8.681) (-7.606)
Unexpectedness 0.229 0.325
(2.680) (3.039)
Permanency -0.031 -0.019
(-0.426) (-0.205)
Market-openness -0.107 -0.243
(-1.804) (-3.264)
Market power -0.193 -0.238
(-3.668) (-3.601)
Notes: (1) For the variables, see table 4.8.
(2) Numbers in () mean t-values for the coefficient.
(3) Adjusted R2 and standard error of regressions are 0 .40 and 0.38 for the
equation with the conduct as dependent variable, while 0 .34  and 0.48 for
that with equilibrium strategies as dependent variable.
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Figure 4.9 Hypotheses Derived from the Theoretical Framework: 
A Comparison of Simple and Multiple Correlations21
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27 For Figure 4.9 followings should be noted: (i) H or L means 'the higher' or 'the lower', respectively, (ii) U, P or T stand for 'unexpected',
'permanent' or 'temporary' competitive pressures, (iii) [ ] for correlations from multiple regressions, otherwise from simple correlations. For example, 
top left hand corner of the diagram should be read: "the higher centralization in labour market structure is related with the more cooperative strategic 
interactions in collective bargaining”.
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One of the major purposes of this thesis is to examine the role of 
labour market institutions and how these might explain cross-country 
differences in economic performance. Thus it would be meaningful only if 
the theoretical framework became an established micro-foundation of these 
macro-studies. However, there are several problems in devising a macro 
from an established micro-framework. For example, there is the problem of 
aggregation and unobservable variables at an aggregated level. However, 
our theory is deliberately constructed so that we can avoid direct 
measurement of such qualitative variables as perceived competitive 
pressure, equilibrium pairs of strategies, and the conduct of labour relations, 
see e.g., figure 4.1. Indeed, if sufficient evidence is found, the behaviourial 
dimension can be explained by the relationships between competitive 
pressure and differences in economic performance28.
In the next two chapters, we will carry out empirical tests for the 
hypothesis we derived from our theoretical analyses. Particular emphasis 
will be given to the potential relations between competitive pressure and 
economic performance. The theory has shown that the intensity of 
competitive pressure is the most important factor in changing the strategic 
behaviour of employees as well as employers. Thus it is the most important 
determinant of differences in macro-economic performance.
As an example, figure 4.10 gives an idea of the relationships 
between annual percentage changes in import penetration ratios and annual 
changes in unemployment rates across O.E.C.D. countries. All seventeen 
economies, which will be examined in detail later, show negative relations 
between the two variables29. These seemingly spurious correlations have 
a sound theoretical underpinning from our competitive pressure hypothesis. 
Also the relationship is modestly consistent across all advanced countries.
28 To properly validate our theory developed in this chapter, we may need more detailed 
case studies, directly asking questions relevant to the behaviourial dimension. This thesis 
depends on other existing literature from various disciplines (see chapter 3) to give the 
theoretical framework a partial validity.
29 Plots were drawn over the period from 1961 to 1989 in each country. Except for New 
Zealand and Switzerland, negative relations are statistically meaningful at more than 10 per 
cent significance levels (for details, see Appendix IV).
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For the more detailed macro-economic effects of labour relations conduct, 
in the next chapter, four propositions will be set up based on our 
competitive pressure hypothesis.
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Figure 4.10 Competitive Pressure and Changes in Unemployment 
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THE EFFECTS OF COMPETITIVE PRESSURE ON LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
; A Comparative Study on Time-Series Variations
1. INTRODUCTION
Our competitive pressure hypothesis places a greater emphasis on external 
pressure from international competition. Our theory considers five 
environmental conditions (see figure 4.8): (i) The degree of centralization in 
collective bargaining; (ii) The extent of market-openness to international 
competition; (iii) Union density; (iv) Market power as a principal influence of 
workers' and employers' strategic choices; (v) The intensity, permanency, 
and expectedness of competitive pressure. Through step-wise perception 
and strategic response functions, each groups' strategic choices are 
examined. Their interactions result in a pair of equilibrium strategies. Four 
types of industrial relations behaviours are derived from these strategic 
interactions. Finally, we devise an ad hoc mechanism to interpret these 
behaviourial types in terms of economic performance.
After a simulated study, our theoretical framework is reduced to a 
set of potential relationships between environmental conditions and labour 
relations conduct. Our hypothesis, derived from these, provides us with a 
rationale to examine the role of environmental conditions concerning the 
differences in economic performance. Our theory is developed to avoid 
having to directly quantify behaviour and thereby we are able to avoid the 
pitfalls that this might raise. It should be stressed that without our theory, 
there would be insufficient grounds to investigate the potential effects of 
competitive pressure from international competition on economic 
performance.
Figure 5.1 shows how the suggested theoretical framework can 
constitute a micro-foundation for a cross-country comparative study at an 
economy level. More intense pressure from international competition will 
induce workers and employers to choose more cooperative strategies. This 
is the case only when competitive pressure is correctly perceived by each 
group.
Figure 5.1 Suggested Logic of the Empirical Framework 
for the Competitive Pressure Hypothesis
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Even if various structural conditions may have their special influences, the 
marginal effects of competitive pressure are found to be the most influential. 
Interactions of strategic choices, in response to perceived competitive 
pressure, will lead to more flexible and consensus-prone industrial relations 
behaviour. Thus, more intense competitive pressure may result in less 
conflict and greater flexibility in bargaining processes and outcomes. Our 
hypothesis presumes that these characteristics of labour relations will 
produce the following outcomes: (i) Less restrictive working practices; (ii) 
Wage flexibility; (iii) Employment security; (iv) Productivity improvements. 
There might be a few sectors showing more conflict and less flexibility. On 
average, however, macro-economic performance tends to reflect 
cooperative labour relations.
The rest of this thesis will test our competitive pressure hypothesis. 
This will be achieved in three steps. Firstly, we will test for significant 
relationships between changes in competitive pressure and economic 
performance over time at the economy level. To the extent that there are 
differences we will then examine whether there is any difference in those 
relationships between country groups with different degrees of centralization 
in levels of collective bargaining. Secondly, we will assess whether these 
findings could survive with more explicit cross-country studies; and thirdly, 
we will assemble qualitative evidence for the competitive pressure 
hypothesis from case studies.
This chapter will concentrate on the effects of competitive pressure 
on the variances of economic performance over time within an economy. 
The following section will give a brief description of competitive pressure 
and economic performance for seventeen O.E.C.D. countries. In section 
three, four propositions will be set up, based on our competitive pressure 
hypothesis. Our data and our methodology will be also explained. Section 
four reports empirical results of these propositions. And the last section will 
summarize relevant arguments.
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2. IMPORT PENETRATION AND MACRO-ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE:
A Wider Within-Group Variations than Expected from Existing
Hypotheses
Since the 1960s, the levels of import penetration in the O.E.C.D. economies 
have been steadily increasing (see appendix tables). Even if the levels of 
import penetration ratios1 exhibit no large differences, their percentage 
changes show remarkable variations over time. Indeed, average levels of 
import penetration might be more closely related to the size of the economy 
and specific trade policies. In smaller open economies, import penetration 
levels are generally higher than in other economies. Standard deviations of 
import penetration levels over time are only of second-order degree and are 
very similar between countries. However, there appears to be a larger 
fluctuation in their percentage changes viz a viz the previous years' levels 
(see figure 5.2). Those countries such as the U.S. and Japan, facing less 
severe import penetration levels, show larger fluctuations in their percentage 
changes. Figure 5.2 also demonstrates that there are also significant 
differences in the fluctuations in percentage changes of import penetration 
within the same country grouping which has similar collective bargaining 
structures.
On the other hand, average macroeconomic performance reported in 
figure 5.3 also shows notable differences not only across countries but also 
across economy groups. Experience of unemployment and inflation rates 
tend to show little consistency specifically across different country 
groupings2. If we compare figures 5.2 with 5.3, changes in import 
penetration seem to have better correlations not only with cross-country 
variances but also with cross-group differences in economic performance.
1 There are, in general, two ways of measuring import penetration ratios (see e.g., 
chapter 2). Here, we employ the definition: imports relative to total supply, i.e. imports / 
(imports + GDP).
2 Besides, if we use average data, a fluctuation is easy to be blurred over time. Each 
average period would also exhibit different patterns across countries, depending on how we 
divide those periods. So we should be careful to use average data and also need cautions for 
their interpretation.
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Figure 5 .2  Cross-country Comparisons o f Import Penetration Over Time
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A m e r ic a  ( U S ) ,  C a n a d a  ( C A ) .  __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A principal purpose of this chapter is to see if we can find any significant 
relationships between competitive pressure and economic performance over 
time at the economy level. Our competitive pressure hypothesis suggests 
the following three propositions:
Proposition 1
The intensity of competitive pressure is negatively related to 
unemployment and inflation.
Proposition 2
Competitive pressure is positively related to gross domestic 
production and productivity growth.
Proposition 3
Intense competitive pressure will show positive correlations with 
employment, real value-added and labour productivity in the 
manufacturing sector.
In addition to these propositions, we will test to see if there exists any 
significant role of cross-country structural differences in labour market 
institutions; the relationships between the degree of centralization in 
collective bargaining levels and economic performance. Our hypothesis 
suggests a proposition for this:
Proposition 4
There will be neither positive (e.g., the corporatist hypothesis) nor 
negative (e.g., the liberal-pluralist hypothesis) linear correlations 
between the structure of labour market institutions and economic 
performance.
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Proposition 4 is largely due to the interactions of competitive pressure and 
structural conditions that determine cross-country differences in economic 
performance. Hence, our competitive pressure hypothesis departs from the 
four established hypotheses discussed in chapter 2. At best, our hypothesis 
implies a non-linear relationship between the structural differences and 
economic performance across countries.
Data from seventeen O.E.C.D. economies are studied over the last 
three decades: from 1961 to 1989. Countries are chosen based on the 
degree of centralization in collective bargaining levels, see e.g., Calmfors 
and Driffill (1988). There are five centralized economies: Austria, Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark, and Finland. Five intermediate countries: Germany, 
Netherlands, Belgium, New Zealand, and Australia. And seven decentralized 
economies: France, U.K., Italy, Japan, Switzerland, U.S.A., and Canada.
As an indicator of competitive pressure from international product 
markets, we employ the level of, and percentage changes in, import 
penetration ratios3. Import penetration is based on O.E.C.D (1990) data for 
cross-country comparisons. We use two groups of economic performance 
indicators: one for the traditional macro-economic performance and the 
other for the manufacturing sector. For the former group, we have the 
standardized unemployment rate and annual changes in GDP deflator drawn 
from Layard etal. (1991). GDP growth rates are calculated using data from 
O.E.C.D. (1990). Additionally, annual percentage changes in real GDP per 
capita and consumer price index are employed. For the manufacturing 
sector, annual percentage changes are used for real hourly wages, 
employment, real value-added and real value-added per employee, and 
producer price index (O.E.C.D., 1990).
We examine the simple and rank correlations between these 
indicators of competitive pressure and economic performance. Rank 
correlations are used to analyze the potential effects of ordinal differences 
in both indicators. For unemployment, we also employ multiple regression 
techniques, including the indicator of competitive pressure. To examine 
combined impacts, Multiple Canonical Correlation methods are employed for
3 Import penetration is defined as total imports divided by total domestic supply (imports 
plus domestic production). For a detailed reason for this indicator, see chapter 4 and also 
Pearson and Ellyne (1985).
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separate sets of indicators4. Our empirical studies are undertaken on a 
yearly bases over time within an economy. For comparative purpose signs 
and sizes of correlation coefficients are compared across different groupings 
of countries .
4. COMPETITIVE PRESSURE AND VARIATIONS IN ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE OVER TIME
4.1 Proposition 1: The intensity of competitive pressures is negatively
related to unemployment and inflation
Our competitive pressure hypothesis suggests that increased competition 
would, on average, force employers and workers to change their bargaining 
strategies, which results in more flexible and consensus-prone labour 
relations. This reduces conflict and increases production. In turn, increased 
production may encourage managers to maintain and/or increase their 
employment levels. Existing workers tend not to risk their job security by 
demanding excessive wage increases but they do sometimes engage in 
concession bargaining. Thus, Proposition 1 follows: "The intensity of 
competitive pressure is negatively related to unemployment and inflation" 
We test this Proposition against data from seventeen O.E.C.D. 
countries over the period of 1961-89. Five economic performance indicators 
are correlated with the level of, and percentage changes in, import 
penetration, for each country: (i) standardized unemployment rates and (ii) 
their annual changes; (iii) inflation rates (measured by changes in GDP
4 Canonical correlation analysis is employed to study relationships between two variable 
sets when each set consists of at least two variables. Some of the research questions that 
can be addressed using this analysis are as follows: (i) To what extent can one set of two 
or more variables be predicted or explained by another set of two or more variables? (ii) What 
contribution does a single variable make to the explanatory power of the set of variables to 
which the variable belongs? (iii) To what extent does a single variable contribute to predicting 
or explaining the composite of the variables in the variable set to which the variable does not 
belong? (iv) What different dynamics are involved in the ability of one variable set to explain 
in different ways different portions of the other variable set? (v) What relative power do 
different canonical functions have to predict or explain relationships? (vi) How stable are 
canonical results across samples or sample subgroups? (vii) How closely do obtained 
canonical results conform to expected canonical results? For a full explanation of canonical 
correlation analysis, see e.g., Thompson (1984).
Here we focus on the first question of these research possibilities; i.e., (i) how the 
combined indicator of the level and percentage changes in import penetration predicts or 
explains various economic indicators, and (ii) how much of the variations of economic 
performances can be explained by the composite variable of competitive pressure.
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Figure 5 .4  Cross-country Comparisons of Simple Correlation Coefficients between 
Time-Series Variations in Competitive Pressure and Economic Performance (I) 
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N o te s :  ( 1 )  L e t t e r s  in  t h e  h o r iz o n ta l  l in e  s t a n d  fo r  s e v e n t e e n  c o u n t r ie s  f r o m  A u s t r ia
t o  C a n a d a  in  d e c r e a s in g  o r d e r  o f  c e n t r a l i z a t io n :  A u s t r ia  ( A U ) ,  N o r w a y  ( N W ) ,  
S w e d e n  ( S W ) ,  D e n m a r k  (D K ) ,  F in la n d  ( F N ) ,  G e r m a n y  (G E ) ,  N e t h e r la n d s  ( N T ) ,  
B e lg iu m  (B E ) ,  N e w  Z e a la n d  ( N Z ) ,  A u s t r a l ia  ( A L ) ,  F r a n c e  (F R ) ,  U n i t e d  
K in g d o m  ( U K ) ,  I t a ly  ( I T ) ,  J a p a n  ( J A ) ,  S w i t z e r la n d  ( S Z ) ,  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o f  
A m e r ic a  ( U S ) ,  C a n a d a  ( C A ) .
( 2 )  'C ,  I ,  a n d  D '  in  t h e  h o r iz o n ta l  l in e  in d ic a t e  u n w e ig h t e d  a v e r a g e  fo r  
c o u n t r y  g r o u p s  o f  c e n t r a l iz e d  ( A U ,  N W ,  S W ,  D K ,  F N ) ,  in t e r m e d ia t e  (G E ,  N T ,  
B E , N Z ,  A L ) ,  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  (F R , U K ,  IT ,  J A ,  S Z ,  U S ,  C A ) ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly .  A n d  
' T '  fo r  t h e  u n w e ig h t e d  a v e r a g e  o f  a ll s e v e n t e e n  e c o n o m ie s .
( 3 )  F ig u r e s  a r e  m a d e  a s  t h e y  a r e  in  o r d e r  t o  in d ic a t e  s iz e  a n d  c o n s is t e n c y  o f  
c o r r e la t io n  c o e f f ic ie n t s  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t l y .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  if m o s t  o f  th e  b a r s  a r e  
a b o v e  t h e  f lo o r ,  t w o  v a r ia b le s  a r e  p o s i t iv e l y  c o r r e la t e d .  I f  t h o s e  b a r s  a r e  
t a l le r  t h a n  0 . 5 ,  c o r r e la t io n s  m a y  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  s t a t is t ic a l ly  s ig n i f ic a n t .
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deflator); (iv) changes in inflation rates; (v) annual percentage changes in 
consumer price index. Rank and simple correlation coefficients tend to 
support this proposition.
As generally accepted, the level of import penetration shows strongly 
positive correlations with unemployment levels over time, and also with 
inflation levels, albeit slightly weaker (see figure 5.4, diagram 1). However, 
percentage changes in import penetration exhibit consistently negative 
correlations with unemployment levels and changes, with three exceptions: 
particulary strong significance with changes in unemployment levels over 
time, but less consistent with the inflation levels and changes (see figure
5.4, diagram 3). Figure 5.4 gives a striking contrast between the effects of 
import penetration levels and their percentage changes on unemployment 
and inflations (compare diagrams 1 & 2 with 3 & 4, respectively). Thus, 
time-series variations of economic performance show that percentage 
changes in import penetration tend to generate expected pressure on 
workers and employers suggested by our theory. More detailed expositions 
will follow.
UNEMPLOYMENT
From simple and rank correlation analyses5, the level of import penetration 
is highly correlated with the increase in the level of unemployment rates, 
with strong statistical significance in most countries except Denmark and 
Japan. The size of simple correlation coefficients shows that the level may 
have relatively less effect on increasing unemployment in the highly- 
centralized economies. Higher percentage changes in import penetration 
seems to exert decreasing pressure on unemployment in most countries 
except New Zealand, U.K. and Switzerland. Unweighted average marginal 
effects across country groupings are least in decentralized economies 
(compare C, I, & D in figure 5.4, diagram 2). All seventeen O.E.C.D. 
countries show negative correlations with annual changes in unemployment 
rates. Marginal effects are weakest in intermediate economies, see figure
5.4. diagram 2.
5 For more on these results, see Appendix IV.
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Table 5.1 Multiple Regression Results between Competitive 
Pressure and Unemployment Rates
Constant Import Penetration Inflation Adjusted
Level % changes (% changes) R2 Prob
Austria -1.23 14.3 -0.02 -0.42 0.44 0.0005
(0.098) (0.000) (0.685) (0.281) [0.830]
Norway 5.66 -12.9 -0.00 -0.09 0.06 0.2240
(0.005) (0.062) (0.986) (0.480) [0.389]
Sweden -0.24 8.6 -0.03 -0.40 0.19 0.0439
(0.794) (0.034) (0.328) (0.076) [0.650]
Denmark -12.3 69.2 -0.27 -1.96 0.22 0.0249
(0.202) (0.068) (0.148) (0.344) [0.861]
Finland -6.13 46.9 -0.14 -1.01 0.33 0.0042
(0.075) (0.006) (0.033) (0.122) [0.567]
Germany -7.32 56.4 -0.12 -0.38 0.67 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.343) (0.595) [0.771]
Netherlands -16.0 64.4 -0.24 -0.76 0.60 0.0001
(0.002) (0.000) (0.258) (0.317) [0.832]
Belgium -18.4 63.0 -0.33 -1.35 0.60 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.100) (0.259) [0.810]
New -13.8 66.7 -0.08 0.02 0.67 0.0001
Zealand (0.000) (0.000) (0.054) (0.851) [0.647]
Australia -15.8 141.4 -0.16 -0.31 0.38 0.0019
(0.004) (0.000) (0.018) (0.728) [0.7041]
France -8.70 82.6 -0.07 -3.38 0.70 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.408) (0.024) [0.755]
U.K. -13.0 101.5 -0.26 -1.71 0.61 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.135) (0.029) [0.658]
Italy -2.00 41.4 0.04 -1.36 0.56 0.0001
(0.170) (0.000) (0.312) (0.009) [0.614]
Japan 0.20 15.8 -0.02 -0.08 0.07 0.2001
(0.811) (0.056) (0.313) (0.528) [0.877]
Switzerland -3.26 17.6 0.04 -0.08 0.64 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.198) (0.155) [0.619]
U.S. 4.00 32.0 -0.04 -2.43 0.34 0.0036
(0.001) (0.043) (0.391) (0.003) [0.466]
Canada -1.61 51.6 -0.11 -0.29 0.58 0.0001
(0.302) (0.000) (0.156) (0.033) [0.628]
Notes: (1) Inflation is percentage changes from the previous years, 
instead of this, changes in inflation rates are used.
For Canada,
(2) [] in the second row of each country means the probability of rejecting the
significance of coefficients.
(3) 'Prob' at the last column stands for the probability of rejecting the null 
hypothesis that F-value for the regression model is too low to be 
appropriate. [] in the same column indicate the degree of first-order auto­
correlations.
When we estimate simple Phillips-type equations introducing the level 
and changes in import penetration as independent variables, we can draw
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the same implications as for the simple and rank correlations6. As common 
sense suggests for, the level of import penetration increases unemployment 
(except in the case of New Zealand). Furthermore, in every country except 
Italy, changes in import penetration seem to have depressionary pressure on 
changes in unemployment rates, although the statistical significance is not 
high. Marginal effects of changes in import penetration are largest in the 
medium-centralized countries and smallest in the decentralized economies 
(see table 5.1). In sum, economies facing higher changes in import 
penetration experience less increase (or even a decrease) in unemployment. 
Thus, our theory is supported since the intensity of competitive pressure 
tends to be negatively related to unemployment.
INFLATION
The level of import penetration is highly correlated with the increase in 
inflation. This is less consistent than in the case for unemployment. 
Percentage changes in import penetration ratios seem to have some 
significant deflationary pressure on changes in inflation. The effects are less 
consistent across country groupings but with greater statistical significance 
than in the case for unemployment. Deflationary pressures appear to be 
most consistent among the highly-centralized economies and least so among 
the medium-centralized economies. Decentralized economies show stronger 
negative relationships, but with less consistency across countries (see 
Diagram 4 of figure 5.4). Changes in inflation rates tend to be positively 
correlated with percentage changes in import penetration except for a few 
economies. Marginal effects between country groupings have the same 
pattern as those of inflation rates.
Thus, greater competitive pressure does not seem to have 
consistently negative effects on inflation rates and their changes. However, 
with consumer price inflation, both indicators of competitive pressure show 
relatively strong negative correlations as expected, and these relations seem 
to be consistent across countries (see figure 5.4, diagrams 3 and 4). Hence,
6 The same implications stand although the model's explanatory powers are not so good 
for time-series variations in unemployment, and in most of the cases, shows first-order auto­
correlations. The R2 is improved significantly from 0.44 to 0.88 when we include quadratic 
and interactive terms for the independent variables.
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it is reasonable to say that competitive pressure does engender relatively 
significant deflationary pressure on inflation rates in both centralized and 
decentralized economies.
4.2 Proposition 2: Competitive pressure is positively related to gross
domestic production and productivity growth
Using similar logic as for Proposition 1, our competitive pressure hypothesis 
predicts that when faced with severe competition, labour relations behaviour 
becomes more flexible and cooperative so that production and productivity 
growth rates may be increased. Empirical studies for the seventeen 
economies show strong support for Proposition 2.
Import penetration levels are negatively related with GDP and 
productivity growth rates, as commonly expected. Percentage changes of 
import penetration, however, show positive relations. These correlations are 
statistically significant and also consistent across countries. Competitive 
pressure tends to have positive effects on GDP growth rates, see Diagrams 
1 & 2 of figure 5.4.
Therefore, on time-series variations in macro-economic performance 
competitive pressure from international competition seems to have 
potentially two important influences:
(i) Levels of import penetration are positively related to 
unemployment and inflation, and negatively to GDP growth rates, 
as one commonly expects;
(ii) Percentage changes in import penetration work in an opposite 
way to their levels, which, in turn, implies that they affect collective 
bargaining behaviour in a systematic manner as our theoretical 
framework suggests.
It follows from the second influence that increased competitive pressure 
from international competition might constrain workers as well as employers 
during collective bargaining. Thus, increased import penetration does not 
necessarily result in more job losses and less domestic production as usually 
believed. Perceived correctly - as a potential external threat to labour 
management relations - employers and unions might co-operate and 
mutually agree concessions on wages, employment, and industrial relations
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practices. However the partners' behaviour might reasonably also be 
affected by the actual structure of bargaining. For instance: (i) Decreasing 
effects on unemployment seem to be stronger in the high to medium- 
centralized countries; (ii) Deflationary pressures are least powerful in the 
intermediate economies; and (iii) Strongest increasing pressures on GDP 
growth rates appear in the decentralized economies.
Thus, structural differences in labour market institutions seem to 
have a significant influence, but none of the four established hypotheses can 
consistently explain these variations in economic performance within an 
economy. Rather there appears to be complicated interactions between 
structural differences and changes in product market conditions like 
competitive pressure. These interactions can be more clearly defined for the 
manufacturing sector. This will occupy the Proposition 3. Before examining 
this proposition, the next sub-section will revisit Propositions 1 and 2 
applying multivariate analyses.
4.3 Multivariate analyses of Propositions 1 and 2
It would be interesting to see if the above implications drawn from 
univariate and marginal analyses can be sustained in a multivariate 
framework. We perform Multivariate Canonical Correlation analysis, for each 
country for the period 1961-89, between competitive pressure (the level 
and percentage changes in import penetration) and macroeconomic 
performance (unemployment, inflation and GDP growth rates).
With the exception of Norway, the Canonical correlation model fits 
extremely well and explains between 10 and 50 per cent of the variance in 
macro-economic performance. In five of the seventeen countries: Denmark, 
Finland, Japan, U.S., and Canada, competitive pressure appears to have the 
expected effects on all three chosen indicators of macroeconomic 
performance, albeit not very strong. All of intermediate-centralized 
economies exhibit decreases in their GDP growth rates and significant 
increases in their unemployment rates. Both of these are associated with 
increased competition. Centralized and decentralized countries reveal mixed 
effects. However, centralized economies on the whole are the best 
performers in terms of adjustments to competitive pressure. Across all three 
indicators, three out of five countries show decreases in unemployment and
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Table 5.2 Canonical Correlation Analyses between Competitive Pressure 
and Macroeconomic Performance: Within-country Variations
Growth Inflation Unemploy
-ment
CC F R
Austria -0.558 -0.021 0.680 0.78 0.0001 0.258
Norway 0.179 0.380 -0.373 0.49 0.3335 0.105
Sweden -0.666 0.697 0.413 0.78 0.0007 0.367
Denmark 0.711 -0.340 -0.490 0.78 0.0002 0.302
Finland 0.572 -0.383 -0.538 0.74 0.0001 0.254
Germany -0.474 -0.090 0.835 0.88 0.0001 0.310
Netherlands -0.490 -0.183 0.788 0.83 0.0001 0.298
Belgium -0.524 -0.287 0.789 0.85 0.0001 0.326
New Zealand -0.182 0.300 0.842 0.86 0.0001 0.277
Australia -0.296 0.128 0.662 0.67 0.0036 0.181
France -0.766 0.484 0.808 0.89 0.0001 0.492
U.K. -0.109 0.330 0.744 0.83 0.0001 0.225
Italy -0.560 0.550 0.606 0.80 0.0001 0.328
Japan 0.711 -0.171 -0.387 0.73 0.0005 0.228
Switzerland -0.160 -0.376 0.808 0.82 0.0001 0.273
U.S. 0.631 -0.456 -0.214 0.64 0.0078 0.217
Canada 0.704 -0.286 -0.697 0.82 0.0001 0.354
Note: CC = Canonical correlation coefficients
F = Wilks' Lambda
R = the standardized variance explained by the first canonical variable of the
level and percentage changes in import penetration ratios.
inflation rates and increases in GDP growth rates. Thus, from the 
multivariate correlations, the U-curve hypothesis seems to be favoured, at 
least for the within-economy time-series variations in macro-economic 
performance. High centralization in collective bargaining structures seem 
more helpful in reducing costs of the adjustments required from increased 
competitive pressure, whereas the intermediate structures appear to be 
more costly.
It should also be noted that when the level and percentage changes 
in import penetration ratios are combined to increase the relationship with 
economic performance indicators, the expected effects of competitive 
pressure tend to be weaker than when using only their (percentage) 
changes. One of the reasons for this might be that the combined canonical 
variable of competitive pressure assigns more weight to the I6vel of import 
penetration ratios, which seems to be influenced in an opposite way to their
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changes, in order to increase relationships7.
Even if we employ another set of economic performance indicators 
(Real GDP per capita and Consumer price inflation). Propositions 1 and 2 can 
still survive. Except for Norway and New Zealand, the Canonical correlation 
model fits extremely well, and explains 10-60 percent of the variance in 
macro-economic performance. In most of medium to decentralized countries, 
competitive pressure seems to have strong expected effects on economic 
performance. When the level and percentage changes in import penetration 
ratios are combined, the effects of competitive pressure tend to be stronger 
in this case than when using only their percentage changes.
7 Coefficients of the Canonical variable for competitive pressures are: 
defined by A * IPR + BMIPR 
where IPR = level of import penetration
dlPR = percentage changes in import penetration
Coefficients A for IPR B for dlPR
Australia + 1.19 -0.80
Austria + 0.96 -0.29
Belgium + 0.94 -0.28
Canada + 1.01 -0.24
Denmark -0.69 + 0.74
Finland -0.71 + 0.86
France + 0.93 -0.31
Germany + 0.95 -0.14
Italy + 0.66 -0.49
Japan -0.97 + 0.49
Netherlands + 0.91 -0.27
Norway + 0.98 + 0.09
New Zealand + 1.09 -0.29
Sweden + 0.94 -0.60
Switzerland + 0.99 + 0 .20
U.K. + 1.08 -0.37
U.S.A. -0.33 + 1.00
In most of the cases, percentage changes in import penetrations (<5IPR) had a role of 
decreasing pressure and their level (IPR) of increasing pressure. For those countries having 
expected effects of competitive pressure, percentage changes of import penetration had a 
role of increasing pressure and their levels of decreasing pressure. In Norway and 
Switzerland, both had increased pressure.
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Table 5.3 Canonical Correlation Analyses between Competitive 
Pressure and Macroeconomic Performance: Within-country Variations of 
Productivity and Consumer Price Inflation
Real GDP CPI CC F R
per capita
Austria 0.344 0.773 0.83 0.0001 0.358
Norway 0.456 0.242 0.58 0.2392 0.133
Sweden 0.106 0.472 0.61 0.0412 0.117
Denmark 0.780 -0.350 0.78 0.0096 0.365
Finland 0.804 -0.263 0.81 0.0066 0.358
Germany 0.060 -0.697 0.72 0.0075 0.245
Netherlands 0.269 -0.881 0.92 0.0001 0.424
Belgium 0.455 -0.817 0.87 0.0002 0.438
New Zealand 0.308 -0.514 0.54 0.1672 0.179
Australia 0.046 0.405 0.53 0.2500 0.083
France 0.682 -0.559 0.78 0.0025 0.389
U.K. 0.393 -0.717 0.72 0.0219 0.334
Italy 0.635 -0.723 0.90 0.0001 0.463
Japan -0.268 0.730 0.76 0.0083 0.303
Switzerland 0.643 -0.805 0.92 0.0001 0.531
U.S. 0.774 -0.796 0.89 0.0002 0.617
Canada 0.731 0.073 0.85 0.0001 0.270
Note: CPI = Consumer Price Index.
CC = Canonical correlation coefficients
F = Wilks' Lambda
R = the standardized variance explained by the first canonical variable of the
level and percentage changes in import penetration ratios.
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As a whole, decentralized countries seem to be the most influenced by 
competitive pressure8.
From the two sets of experiments on the relationships between 
competitive pressure and macroeconomic indicators, we can understand 
how sensitive the structural hypotheses are by examining different sets of 
variables. We can conjecture that structural differences could have different 
impacts on various economic variables. The most obvious conclusion drawn 
from this is that there might be significant roles played by competitive 
pressure on within-country variations in macroeconomic performance and 
consequent changes in collective bargaining behaviour: hence, (i) less 
increase or decrease in unemployment and inflation rates; (ii) less decrease 
or increase in GDP and productivity growth rates.
8 Coefficients of the Canonical variable for competitive pressures are: 
defined by A*IPR + B*<5IPR 
where IPR = level of import penetration
<5IPR = percentage changes in import penetration
Coefficients A forIPR B for <5IPR
Australia -1.15 + 0.53
Austria -0.98 + 0.47
Belgium + 0.79 + 0.39
Canada -0.70 + 0.97
Denmark -0.38 + 1.18
Finland + 0.06 + 0.97
France + 0.27 + 0.84
Germany + 1.00 + 0.00
Italy + 0.47 + 0.64
Japan + 1.18 -0.53
Netherlands + 0.88 + 0.23
Norway + 1.07 -0.23
New Zealand + 0.72 + 0.41
Sweden -1.08 + 0.16
Switzerland + 0.69 + 0.65
U.K. + 0.67 + 0.45
U.S.A. + 0.44 + 0.76
125
4.4 Proposition 3: Intense competitive pressure will show positive
correlations with employment, real value-added and 
labour productivity in the manufacturing sector
Generally speaking, industrialized economies are concerned about the 
effects of import penetration on employment and labour relations, 
particularly in the manufacturing sector. Indeed, structural hypotheses are 
more relevant to adjustments in the manufacturing sector. However, since 
manufacturing and services are inextricably linked and since unionization in 
the latter sector is growing, conventional macro-indicators should show 
similar consequences in both sectors. Thus, Proposition 3 follows from 
propositions 1 and 2 above.
Five performance indicators of the manufacturing sector are chosen 
here from the O.E.C.D. Historical Statistics for the period of 1973-89: (i) 
Real hourly wages; (ii) Producer price index; (iii) Employment; (iv) Real value- 
added; and (v) Real value-added per person employed9. The first two 
indicators capture changes in wage and price-setting behaviour. The other 
three grasp the following respectively: (i) Changes in employment; (ii) 
Changes in the overall pie for dividend bargaining; and (iii) Changes in labour 
productivity10. Except for real hourly wages, the other four indicators for 
manufacturing economic performance supports Proposition 4. Similar to the 
other propositions, percentage changes in import penetration show stronger 
correlations than import penetration levels. When faced with intensified 
competition from abroad, most of the seventeen countries show less 
decrease or increase in employment, real value-added, and labour 
productivity in their manufacturing sectors (see figure 5.5).
In centralized countries, competitive pressure significantly increases 
real wages in manufacturing. For medium-centralized economies, the level 
of import penetration seems to decrease wages, whereas percentage 
changes in import penetration increases them (see figure 5.5, diagrams 1 
and 2). In decentralized countries the effects are mixed. For instance, in
9 See appendix tables for the data. These are based on 1985 exchange rates and prices. 
The data indicate annual percentage changes of each variable.
10 Manufacturing labour productivity might reflect changes in wages and competitiveness. 
Also, if indirect, productivity could be increased from other aspects of labour management 
relations such as new technology agreements and the reduction in restrictive work practices.
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Figure 5 .5  Cross-country Comparisons of Simple Correlation Coefficients between 
Time-Series Variations in Competitive Pressure and Economic Performance (III 
: Employment, Real Value-Added. Labour Porductivity. Real Hourly Wages, 
and Producer Price Index in the Manufacturing Sector
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N o t e s :  ( 1 )  L e t t e r s  in  t h e  h o r iz o n ta l  l in e  s t a n d  fo r  s e v e n t e e n  c o u n t r ie s  f r o m  A u s t r ia
t o  C a n a d a  in  d e c r e a s in g  o r d e r  o f  c e n t r a l i z a t io n :  A u s t r ia  ( A U ) ,  N o r w a y  ( N W ) ,  
S w e d e n  ( S W ) ,  D e n m a r k  (D K ) ,  F in la n d  (F N ) ,  G e r m a n y  (G E ) ,  N e t h e r la n d s  ( N T ) ,  
B e lg iu m  (B E ) ,  N e w  Z e a la n d  ( N Z ) ,  A u s t r a l ia  ( A L ) ,  F r a n c e  (F R ) ,  U n i t e d  
K in g d o m  ( U K ) ,  I t a ly  ( I T ) ,  J a p a n  ( J A ) ,  S w i t z e r la n d  ( S Z ) ,  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o f  
A m e r ic a  ( U S ) ,  C a n a d a  (C A ) .
( 2 )  'C ,  I ,  a n d  D '  in  t h e  h o r iz o n ta l  l in e  in d ic a t e  u n w e ig h t e d  a v e r a g e  fo r  
c o u n t r y  g r o u p s  o f  c e n t r a l iz e d  ( A U ,  N W ,  S W ,  D K ,  F N ) ,  in t e r m e d ia t e  (G E ,  N T ,  
B E , N Z ,  A L ) ,  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  (F R , U K ,  I T ,  J A ,  S Z ,  U S ,  C A ) ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly .  A n d  
' T '  fo r  th e  u n w e ig h t e d  a v e r a g e  o f  a l l  s e v e n t e e n  e c o n o m ie s .
( 3 )  F ig u r e s  a r e  m a d e  a s  t h e y  a r e  in  o r d e r  t o  i n d ic a t e  s iz e  a n d  c o n s is t e n c y  o f  
c o r r e la t io n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t l y .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  i f  m o s t  o f  t h e  b a r s  a r e  
a b o v e  th e  f lo o r ,  t w o  v a r ia b le s  a r e  p o s i t iv e l y  c o r r e la t e d .  I f  th o s e  b a r s  a r e  
t a l l e r  t h a n  0 . 5 ,  c o r r e la t io n s  m a y  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  s t a t is t ic a l ly  s ig n i f i c a n t .
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France, Italy and Canada, competitive pressure has decreasing effects on 
real hourly wages, while in the other economies competitive pressure has 
increasing effects. Regarding annual changes in the producer price index of 
the manufacturing sector: in medium-centralized and decentralized 
economies, competitive pressure tends to decrease producer prices. 
Centralized economies show mixed effects. Only Denmark has experienced 
decreasing producer prices (see figure 5.5, diagrams 1 & 2). Thus we can 
reasonably suggest that even in those countries experiencing increases in 
real hourly wages, producer prices could be lowered by (i) greater increases 
in labour productivity and/or (ii) eliminating restrictive work practices. The 
latter could be initiated by changes in bargaining behaviour in response to 
growing competitive pressure. Is this the case?
In centralized economies, competitive pressure increases real value- 
added in manufacturing. For the other economies, the levels of import 
penetration seem to give mixed effects but their (percentage) changes tend 
to increase it. The size of the marginal effects seem to be greater in 
decentralized countries, and least in intermediate economies (see figure 5.5, 
diagrams 3 & 4).
For labour productivity in manufacturing, the effects are less 
consistent than for the case of real value-added. In decentralized economies, 
competitive pressure increases real value-added per person employed in 
manufacturing with stronger marginal effects. For medium-centralized 
economies, the level of import penetration seems to give mixed effects but 
their percentage changes increase it. The centralized economies show mixed 
effects: i.e., Norway and Denmark experience decreases in productivity. 
Contrary to commonly held beliefs, competitive pressure tends to be 
positively related with changes in manufacturing employment, albeit slightly. 
Marginal effects are greater in centralized and decentralized economies (see 
figure 5.5, diagrams 1 & 2).
In general, the Canonical correlation models do not fit well. They only 
explain 10-40 per cent of the variance in manufacturing-economic 
performance. Only in France, competitive pressure appears to have the 
expected effects on all the indicators of manufacturing economic 
performance, although not very strong. Otherwise, similar implications can 
be drawn from the multivariate analyses. However, when the level and
128
percentage changes in import penetration ratios are combined, the effects 
of competitive pressure tend to be weaker than when using them in 
separate11.
11 Coefficients of the Canonical variable for competitive pressures are: 
defined by A*IPR + B*<flPR 
where IPR = level of import penetration
<5IPR = percentage changes in import penetration
Coefficients A for IPR B for <5IPR
Australia + 0.42 + 0.73
Austria -0.01 + 1.00
Belgium + 0.18 + 0.91
Canada -0.35 + 1.05
Denmark + 0.44 + 0.66
Finland -0.19 + 1.09
France + 0.97 + 0.05
Germany + 1.03 -0.21
Italy -0.53 + 1.23
Japan + 0.91 + 0.18
Netherlands + 0.94 + 0.13
Norway + 1.05 -0.14
New Zealand -0.84 + 1.13
Sweden -0.85 + 1.18
Switzerland + 0.90 + 0.32
U.K. + 0.52 + 0.65
U.S.A. + 0.62 + 0 .54
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Table 5.4 Canonical Correlation Analyses between Competitive 
Pressures and Economic Performance in the 
Manufacturing Sector
Real
Wages
Employ
m ent
Value
Added
VA
per
capita
Producer
Prices
CC F R
Austria na -0 .1 0 0 .78 0 .7 5 0 .1 0 0.81 0 .0 0 9 2 0 .2 9 6
N orw ay 0.61 0 .5 4 -0 .03 -0 .5 0 0 .3 4 0.71 0 .3 5 6 0 0 .2 0 6
Sweden 0 .1 9 0 .2 6 0 .6 2 0 .6 0 0 .3 8 0 .7 6 0 .1 9 3 9 0 .2 0 0
Denmark 0 .2 0 0 .5 6 0 .3 8 -0 .2 9 -0 .2 8 0 .7 2 0 .5 0 4 6 0 .1 3 2
Finland na 0 .4 9 0 .5 7 0.21 0 .1 7 0 .6 2 0 .4 5 8 2 0 .161
Germany -0 .2 7 0 .4 2 -0 .0 4 -0 .3 2 -0 .5 4 0 .8 5 0 .0 6 1 9 0 .1 2 9
Netherlands -0 .3 4 0 .5 8 0 .2 7 -0 .1 4 -0 .4 7 0 .8 4 0 .0 2 9 5 0 .1 5 4
Belgium
New
0 .1 4 0 .5 2 0 .5 8 0 .3 4 -0 .4 8 0 .8 2 0 .0 9 5 6 0 .1 9 4
Zealand na 0 .0 2 0 .5 5 0 .3 7 na 0 .6 9 0 .4 3 6 4 0 .1 4 6
Australia na 0 .5 5 -0 .0 2 -0 .5 0 -0.31 0 .8 2 0 .0571 0 .1 6 3
France -0 .6 0 0.11 0 .2 0 0 .2 0 -0 .0 8 0.91 0 .0 0 0 6 0 .0 9 2
U.K. 0 .4 2 0 .2 2 0 .5 4 0 .4 5 -0 .5 8 0 .6 9 0 .5 3 3 8 0 .2 1 2
Ita ly -0 .2 4 -0 .5 0 0 .6 5 0.81 -0 .2 2 0 .9 3 0 .0001 0 .2 8 7
Japan 0 .5 2 0 .0 5 -0 .0 2 -0 .0 2 0 .6 3 0 .9 2 0 .0 0 0 3 0 .1 3 4
Switzerland na 0.61 na na -0 .3 5 0 .7 9 0 .0 2 7 6 0 .2 4 7
U.S. 0 .3 2 0 .5 3 0.71 0 .6 8 -0.81 0 .9 7 0 .0001 0 .401
Canada -0 .18 0 .8 4 0 .8 3 0 .4 7 0 .2 6 0 .9 6 0 .0001 0 .3 4 4
Note: CC = Canonical Correlation Coefficients
F = Wilks' Lambda
R = standardized variance explained by the first canonical variable of the
level and percentage changes in import penetration ratios.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this section we summarize the arguments derived from our empirical tests 
of time-series variations by referring to our theoretical framework outlined 
in chapter 4. With a few exceptions, most of the O.E.C.D. countries time- 
series changes in unemployment rates are positively related with the level 
of import penetration and related negatively to their percentage changes. 
Economies with higher import penetration may be assumed to suffer more 
in terms of employment. This is mainly due to required structural 
adjustment. However, increased competitive pressure from higher 
percentage changes in import penetration would have some substantial 
influences on the strategic responses of employees as well as employers. 
In turn, these might lead to changes in collective bargaining behaviour which 
would then become a countervailing force to those negative impacts.
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For example, it can be inferred that sectors directly affected by 
foreign competition might respond by: (i) increasing job-losses and 
experiencing consequential resistance from workers and unions; (ii) facing 
further increases in import penetration, which raises concern among workers 
and employers about their survivability. This fear may restrain labour 
shedding and increase workers' concessions on cost-reducing measures 
such as pay-cuts, short-time working, removing restrictive work practices, 
and introducing new production technologies, etc.; (iii) when moderately hit 
by foreign competition employers might ask for workers' concessions on 
labour relations as well as wages in return for promises of security of 
employment12. These pressures easily spill over to the non-affected sectors 
with higher changes in import penetration, which may have possibly 
contributed to reducing unemployment at an aggregate economy level. 
Similar reasoning can be found in Ingram (1991):'... Initially, companies had 
to cut costs and increase productivity in the face of falling demand for 
output. Inefficient plant had to be closed and capacity reduced, resulting in 
a sharp increase in redundancies. Since these immediate responses to the 
recession in the early 1980s, companies had to continue to focus attention 
on maximising the effectiveness with which they used their resources, not 
least labour, and on maintaining a competitive position in their product 
market. The effect of increased competition in the product market has 
therefore reinforced the need for companies to look continually for possible 
improvements in their organisation of working practices. ...' Ingram (1991; 
pp.3-4).
This explanation can be, even if partly, confirmed by the relationship 
between GDP growth and competitive pressure: GDP growth is negatively 
related with the level of import penetration, but positively with their 
percentage changes. Contrary to the generally accepted view, in every
O.E.C.D. country percentage changes of foreign competition exhibit positive
12 Similar arguments can be found in numerous case studies. For example, one of the 
most accepted views of the effects of recession on collective bargaining behaviours is: 'With 
European unemployment topping over 12 million and unemployed in the U.S. numbering 
around 10 million, job security has overtaken pay levels as the number one priority of union 
negotiators. In the U.K. and other European countries, this trend is illustrated by pay 
standstill and pay settlements below the rate of inflation. In the U.S., however, key 
manufacturing sectors are in crisis, and employees have gone even further to take pay cuts 
to preserve their jobs and keep the company afloat.' I.L.O. (1984, pp. 123-124)
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relationships. Also without exception, real GDP per capita is positively 
related with competitive pressure. Hence, when faced with higher foreign 
competition, employers in most O.E.C.D. economies seem to have made the 
greatest effort in increased productivity while minimizing layoffs. They 
achieve this by inducing concessions from workers and unions and 
rationalising productive operations.
We might expect that these effects would be more prominent in 
manufacturing since it has been the most affected by international 
competition. Further, in many O.E.C.D. countries collective bargaining 
results of major industries such as automobile and steel, are more or less 
followed by other sectors in the economy. Annual percentage changes in 
manufacturing employment show positive relationships with the level of, 
and changes in, import penetration with fewer exceptions in the former 
case. The reasons are clearer when we examine employment together with 
other related indicators such as real wages, producer prices, real value- 
added and real value-added per capita (see table 5.5).
From the simple correlations with percentage changes in import 
penetration, regardless of centralization, most O.E.C.D. countries exhibit 
positive signs for manufacturing performance indicators with the exception 
of producer prices. In only two decentralized countries - France and Canada, 
changes in competitive pressure seems to be negatively related with real 
wages and positively with employment. Netherlands and Italy show negative 
correlations in both cases. In the six other O.E.C.D. economies, when faced 
with higher competitive pressure, manufacturing employment tends to have 
suffered less even with greater increases in real hourly wages in 
manufacturing. Meanwhile, time-series variations in manufacturing value- 
added are positively correlated with competitive pressure without exception. 
Furthermore, labour productivity (real value-added per worker employed in 
manufacturing sector) is also positive, except in the cases of Norway, 
Denmark, and Australia. Therefore, the influence of competitive pressure on 
collective bargaining behaviour is supported.
In other words, in most of the O.E.C.D. countries, higher competitive 
pressure seems to make workers' and unions' attitudes more cooperative 
and/or concessionary. Also they tend to induce employers to make more 
effort to increase productivity by means other than shedding labour. There
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Table 5.5 The Effects of Competitive Pressure on Annual Percentage 
Changes in Economic Performance Indicators of the 
Manufacturing Sector: a summary
Real
Wages
Employment Producer
Prices
Real Value 
Added
Real VA 
per capita
Centralized + + + + +
Economies [AU] [DK] [NW,DK]
+ + + + +
[AU] [DK] [NW] [NW.DK]
Intermediate + + - + +
Economies [NT] [NT,NZ] [AL]
- + - + -
[BE] [GE,AL] [BE,NZ]
Decentralized + + _ + +
Economies [FR,IT,CA] [IT] [FR,CA]
- + - + +
[FR,IT,CA] [IT,JA] [JA,CA] [JA] [JA]
Notes: (1) Signs in the second row of each group are from the multivariate Canonical
correlations with the level of and percentage changes in import
penetrations as indicators of competitive pressure. Others from simple
correlations with percentage changes in import penetrations.
(2) [] for exceptions. Country abbreviations should be read;
AU: Austria NW: Norway SW: Sweden
DK: Denmark FN: Finland GE: Germany
NT: Netherlands BE: Belgium NZ: New Zealand
AL: Australia FR: France UK: U.K.
IT: Italy JA: Japan SZ: Switzerland
US: U.S. CA: Canada
is no significant changes in those effects from the Multivariate Canonical 
correlation analysis where: (i) Netherlands, Germany and Japan are added 
to the neo-classical paradigm in terms of real wages and employment; (ii) 
exceptions in real value-added and labour productivity are made.
Thus, our competitive pressure hypothesis is empirically supported 
by the relationship between time-series variations of economic performance 
and indicators of competitive pressure13. Over the period 1961-89, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, economic indicators seem to improve with 
increases in import penetration. At least, in most of the countries analyzed, 
more intense competitive pressure is related with economic performance as 
follows: (i) Less increase in unemployment and inflation rates; (ii) Less
13 We do not however infer causality.
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decrease in production and productivity growth rates; (iii) Less decrease in 
manufacturing employment, manufacturing real value-added, and 
manufacturing labour productivity. Hence, propositions 1, 2 and 3 in section 
three, also derived from our competitive pressure hypothesis, are supported 
by empirical analysis of 17 O.E.C.D. economies.
With regard to the four established hypotheses discussed in chapter 
2, which focus on cross-country differences in the structure of labour 
market institutions, we tested them by investigating empirical results of our 
three propositions for three different country groupings: (i) Centralized; (ii) 
Intermediate; (iii) Decentralized economies. Interestingly, against our data 
from 17 O.E.C.D. countries the established hypotheses were found wanting. 
Indeed, definitive support cannot be given to any one of them. This is clear 
from table 5.6. The U-curve and liberal-pluralist hypotheses are partly 
verified however. As far as the relationship between competitive pressure 
and economic performance over time is concerned, a revised U-curve 
hypothesis tends to be favoured. Namely, economic performance is better 
in those countries with extremely centralized or decentralized bargaining 
structures. The latter tends to be more functional compared to the former. 
So our proposition 4 is partly supported:
"There will be neither positive (e.g., the corporatist hypothesis) nor negative 
(e.g., the liberal-pluralist hypothesis) linear correlations between the 
structure of labour market institutions and economic performance. "
More on these will be undertaken by direct cross-country studies in the next 
chapter.
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Table 5.6 How Four Hypotheses on Structural Differences of Labour 
Market Institutions can be Related with the Effects of 
Competitive pressure on Economic Performance?
Favoured Hypothesis by Simple Multivariate
Correlations Canonical
Correlations
Macro-economic indicators
Unemployment (-) 1 >C >  D U-curve (C >D >I)
GDP deflator (-) D> C> 1 [RU] 1 > D>C [IU]
GDP growth ( + ) D> C> 1 [RU] D> C > I  [RU]
Real GDP per capita ( + ) D> C> 1 [RU] D>C > I  [RU]
Consumer price index (-) Liberal (D > 1 > C) l > D > C  [IU]
Manufacturing sector
indicators
Real hourly wages (-/ + ) l > D > C  [IU] l > D > C  [IU]
Employment ( + ) D> C> 1 [RU] 1 > C> D
Real value added ( + ) D> C> 1 [RU] U-curve (C>D>I)
Real value added per capita
( + ) Liberal (D>I>C) D>C > I  [RU]
Producer price index (-/+) l > D > C  [IU] l > D > C  [IU]
Notes: (1)0  for expected signs from competitive pressures 
hypothesis.
(2) C,D, and I are for centralized, decentralized, and 
intermediately-centralized economy groups.
(3) >  for the size difference from the simple average of the 
relevant correlation coefficients of each economy in the 
same group.
(4) IU and RU are for 'Inverse-U' and 'Revised-U' hypotheses 
respectively.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE EFFECTS OF COMPETITIVE PRESSURE ON LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE:
A Cross-country Comparative Study
1. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter we have shown that time-series variations of 
economic performance indicators tend to support our competitive pressure 
hypothesis. Over the period of 1961-89 most of the O.E.C.D. countries 
have not been hurt too much by increases in import penetration. Simple and 
rank correlations suggest that higher annual percentage changes in import 
penetration might have produced pressure on labour relations. Workers and 
employers may have chosen less aggressive strategies in response to higher 
competitive pressure. At least, industrial relations processes and outcomes 
may have become less conflictual and less rigid. On average, these 
behaviourial changes should have resulted in the following outcomes at an 
economy level: (i) Less increase in unemployment and inflation rates; (ii) 
Less decrease in total production and productivity growth rates; and (iii) 
Less decrease in manufacturing employment, manufacturing real value- 
added, and labour productivity in manufacturing. Although these correlations 
do not prove underlying causality of our hypothesis, they display a marked 
consistency across seventeen O.E.C.D. economies. Thus, they can be 
interpreted as a partial and an indirect support for the assumed causality 
between competitive pressure, changes in industrial relations behaviour, and 
changes in economic performance indicators.
Comparisons of the different country groupings do not lend support 
to any of the four established hypotheses which focus on cross-country 
differences in the structure of labour market institutions. Our empirical 
analysis in the previous chapter favoured a revised U-curve hypothesis. 
Namely, those countries with extreme-centralized or decentralized bargaining 
structures tend to show enhanced economic performance in response to 
competitive pressure. But, unlike the original U-curve hypothesis, the group 
of decentralized countries are more adaptable than their centralized 
counterparts.
This chapter will directly examine these cross-country experiences,
and will compare the existing four hypotheses with our own competitive 
pressure hypothesis. As we noted in chapter two, the four existing 
hypotheses emphasize the differences in industrial relations structures 
across countries. The liberal-pluralist and the corporatist arguments tend to 
favour either decentralized or centralized collective bargaining structures. 
The so-called U-curve hypothesis lends support to both extreme centralized 
and decentralized structures, while the interactive argument does not defend 
any particular form of collective bargaining structure but stresses the 
interactions between the structure of collective bargaining and other 
influential factors such as party complexion of governments and the degree 
of union coverage (see table 6.1). Together these four hypotheses seem to 
provide a comprehensive set of arguments for the possible relationships 
between the structure of labour market institutions and macro-economic 
performance.
Table 6.1 Four Hypotheses on the Relationship between Cross-country 
Difference in the Structure of Labour Market Institutions and 
Macro-economic Performance
Hypotheses Main Arguments
Liberal-Pluralist Economic performance and economic 
adjustment are better in countries where the 
scope of both trade unions and governments 
is highly limited.
Corporatist Economic performance is better in countries 
with centralized organizational structures and 
the mechanism of consensus-prone interplay 
between interest groups and government.
U-curve Both heavy centralization and extreme 
decentralization are conducive to real wage 
restraint, whereas intermediate degrees of 
centralization are harmful.
Interactive There are interactive and conditional 
relationships between the rate of unionization 
and the levels of wage bargaining as well as 
between the party complexion of 
governments and the level of wage 
bargaining.
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The first three hypotheses have their own theoretical frameworks 
according to beliefs or disbeliefs in the invisible hand of competitive 
markets. Those disbelieving the invisible hand either have developed models 
of imperfect competition or have tried to incorporate some arguments from 
other fields of academia. For example, corporatists introduce the concept 
of "encompassing organizations" from the political science literature to 
emphasize their internalization of external effects. On the other hand, 
combining imperfect competition in product and labour markets has resulted 
in various models of wage setting behaviour, such as monopoly union 
models, efficiency wage theories, search and mismatch explanations, etc1. 
The interactive hypothesis also does not support the invisible hand but in a 
different sense. Rather than constructing any serious attempt to make a 
distinctive theoretical framework, Paloheimo (1990) emphasizes plausible 
non-linear and interactive relationships between explanatory variables.
Our own competitive pressure hypothesis, focusing on industrial 
relations behaviour, also partly relies on structural differences of labour 
market institutions. These are assumed to distort workers' and employers' 
perceptions of competitive pressure. From our theoretical framework 
developed in chapter four, we found that if labour market structures are 
highly centralized, the conduct of labour relations may be more cooperative. 
However, their marginal effect is relatively weaker than that of competitive 
pressure. Hence, our hypothesis suggests, at best, that centralized 
economies would be more adaptable to changes in competitive pressure. 
More generally, our hypothesis proposes that there will be complicated 
interactions between labour market structures and competitive pressure. 
Together these act upon behaviourial changes in labour relations. Thus, a 
corollary of Proposition 4 follows: Cross-country structural differences may 
not be the most important factor to explain different experiences of macro- 
economic performances across countries.
1 One of the most widely accepted models is that of Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), 
which is based on price-setting and wage-setting equations. According to Carlin and Soskice 
(1990), economists such as Blanchard, Dreze, Layard, Nickell, Rowthorn, Sachs, and 
Summers developing the "New Keynesian Macroeconomics" which: 'roots macroeconomics 
in the micro-foundation of imperfectly competitive labour and product markets. Bargaining 
between unions and oligopolistic employers matches the institutional context of Western 
European economies, and the approach lies behind the analysis of changing rates of 
unemployment (NAIRUs) and the persistence of high unemployment in Europe.'
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In order to compare the four established hypotheses with our own 
competitive pressure hypothesis, this chapter will comprise three sections. 
In section two, we will describe the data and methodologies used in our 
empirical tests. Section three is devoted to examining the effects of 
competitive pressure and labour market structural indicators on cross­
country differences in economic performance. A major aim of this section 
is to find if the four propositions of our competitive pressure hypothesis can 
survive these cross-country empirical studies. Propositions suggested by our 
own competitive pressure hypothesis are:
Proposition 1
The intensity of competitive pressure is negatively related to 
unemployment and inflation.
Proposition 2
Competitive pressure is positively related to gross domestic 
production and productivity growth.
Proposition 3
Intense competitive pressure will show positive correlations with 
employment, real value-added and labour productivity in the 
manufacturing sector.
In the last section, we will summarize the major findings and outline some 
implications.
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data for competitive pressure and economic performance indicators are the 
same as those used in the previous chapter. Differences in the structure of 
labour market institutions will be pursued in two ways. Firstly, we will
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employ the centralization and the U-curve indices of Calmfors and Driffill 
(1988). Table 6.2 shows various indices for the structure of labour market 
institutions. Except the revised centralization index for the U-curve 
hypothesis (CD in the first column), indices are closely related with each 
other. Secondly, we will also use a complementary set of indicators (see the 
last three columns of table 6.2) which underlie the centralization index. 
These are borrowed from Layard et al. (1991).
Generally speaking, indices of labour market structural differences are 
based on a few institutional factors. The concept of corporatism seems 
vaguely to capture the extent to which some broader interests influence the 
determination of individual wages. Besides the degree of centralization of 
wage bargaining, the corporatist concept appears to incorporate: (i) The 
degree of government involvement in wage negotiations; (ii) The existence 
of 'consensus' between labour and firms with shared perspectives on the 
goals of economic activity; and (iii) The aims of wage setting systems to 
obtain lower wages than would otherwise be the case.
The most frequently quoted classification is the Bruno and Sachs' 
ranking; see column E, table 6.2. This is based on an index involving central 
union influence on wage setting, employer coordination, shop floor union 
power, and the presence of works councils within firms. The first three 
factors are closely related to centralization but the works council variable is 
designed to measure consensus between labour and employers.
Calmfors and Driffill attempt an index of centralization of wage 
bargaining, column A, table 6.2, by ranking countries according to the 
extent of coordination both within and between various central 
organizations. Schmitter's and Cameron's rankings - columns B & C 
respectively, table 6.2 - consider only the union side, but the latter also 
takes into account the extent of unionization. This is an attempt to measure 
cooperation among workers in general rather than only among unions. The 
main problem associated with this approach is judging the extent to which 
variations in unionization rates reflect differences in the formal and informal 
coverage of union contracts. Finally, Blyth's index, column D, table 6.2, 
ordered countries according to two criteria: (i) The extent to which unions 
and employers are joined into central bodies with executive negotiating
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Table 6.2 Rank Orderings of Countries According to their Structures of
Labour Market Institutions
CD
Centralization Indices 
A B C D E UD
Separate
Indicators
WC EC
Austria 1 1 1 3 1 1 3 3 3
Norway 2 2 2 2 2 4 3 3 3
Sweden 3 3 2 1 3 4 3 3 3
Denmark 7 4 4 6 4 7 3 3 3
Finland 8 5 4 5 5 8 3 3 3
Germany 9 6 8 8 8 2 3 2 3
Netherlands 13 7 6 7 10 3 3 2 2
Belgium 14 8 7 4 9 9 3 2 2
New Zealand 15 9 . 6 11 2 2 1
Australia 17 10 10 7 15 3 2 1
France 16 11 12 15 12 13 3 2 2
U.K. 12 12 13 9 13 12 3 1 1
Italy 11 13 14 12 14 14 3 2 1
Japan 10 14 a 16 11 10 2 2 2
Switzerland 6 15 9 11 . 6 2 1 3
U.S. 5 16 10 14 15 17 1 1 1
Canada 4 17 11 13 16 16 2 1 1
Source: A compiled table based on Calmfors & Driffill (1988) and Layard, Nickell & Jackman
(1991)
Notes: (1) A is from Calmfors and Driffill (1988).
(2) B is from Schmitter (1981).
(3) C is from Cameron (1984).
(4) D is from Blyth (1979).
(5) E is from Bruno and Sachs (1985).
(6) With the exception of column CD, low numbers indicate higher 
centralization.
(7) CD is a revised ranking of column A.
(8) UD = the degree of union density
WC = the level of workers' coordinations
EC = the level of employers' coordinations
These are from Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991): 1 represents low; 2
represents medium; and 3 represents high.
(9) Correlation coefficients between indices are as the following table.
CD A B C D
A 0.27
B 0.57 0.86
C 0.38 0.88 0.87
D 0.33 0.94 0.93 0.82
E 0.39 0.77 0.76 0.71 0.74
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powers; and (ii) The level at which bargaining takes place.
All of these classification are inevitably subjective2. We may use 
each of these institutional factors separately in order to understand the 
development of labour markets more directly. Even though the relative 
rankings do not change significantly over time, (unless it is a very long-run 
period), we can detect important changes in each factor which, in turn, will 
influence bargaining outcomes and, hence economic performance.
As before, our main empirical methodologies are rank and simple 
correlations between competitive pressure and economic performance 
indicators, and between the structure of labour market institutions and 
economic performance. Multiple regressions for cross-country difference in 
unemployment rates and Multiple Canonical Correlations will also be studied 
for seventeen O.E.C.D. economies. Unlike other studies, we will carry out 
cross-country comparative empirical studies on an annual basis from 1961 
to 19893.
These data and methodologies are similar to existing empirical 
studies. This is important in order to facilitate comparisons between our 
model and the established ones. Table 6.3 summarizes data of three such 
studies: Calmfors and Driffill (1988), Paloheimo (1990) and Layard et al. 
(1991). Mainly due to the lack of internationally comparable data on labour 
market structures, existing studies used rank correlations and/or ordinal 
variables in multiple regressions. Their primary concern is to explain cross­
country differences in macroeconomic performance, especially 
unemployment rates. In addition to this, they examine employment, 
economic growth, inflation, etc. As explanatory variables, all studies employ 
the centralization index of Calmfors and Driffill (1988), in addition to their 
own other structural variables. Layard et a! (1991) set of variables on labour 
market institutions is the most extensive and includes unemployment benefit 
and government spending on labour market programmes, in addition to
2 Calmfors and Driffill (1988; p. 18 and pp. 24-25).
3 In the Appendix III, we will report empirical findings for the average economic 
performance over specific periods. To enable us to do this, we divide thirty years into four 
separate periods: 1961-69, 1969-73, 1973-79, and 1979-89, based on O.E.C.D. (1990). 
This is largely to keep comparability of international data. These four periods represent 
economic performance of: (i) The 1960s; (ii) The first oil-price shock; (iii) The 1970s with 
further supply-side shocks; and (iv) The 1980s.
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conventional variables relating to union coverage and centralization / 
coordination of trade unions as well as employers associations. Paloheimo 
(1990) includes various economic policy variables such as one which 
indicated the effect of the government's complexion. Calmfors and Driffill 
and Layard et a! neglect this area. Paloheimo measures party complexion of 
governments by the average number of Left-wing cabinet seats in proportion 
to total cabinet seats4. For economic policy, Paloheimo makes crude proxy 
variables for monetary, fiscal, and wage policies which include: (i) Fiscal 
policy by PSBR (the difference between total outlays of government and 
current receipts of government) as a percent of GDP; (ii) Monetary policy by 
the growth of money supply (M1 plus quasi money); and (iii) Wage policy 
by average increases in hourly earnings in manufacturing. These three 
important studies focus on similar time-frames and countries to the ones we 
have employed.
4 Political science literature often includes variables on government complexion. See e.g., 
Schmidt (1983; pp. 1-26); Lange and Garrett (1985; pp.792-827).
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Table 6.3 Summary o f Three Studies
Calmfors & Driffill (1988), 
Paloheimo (1990)
Layard, Nickel & 
Jackman (1991)
Testing Method Rank correlations 
Regressions 
*Simple correlations
Regressions (static and 
dynamic)
Countries 17 O.E.C.D.
*18 O.E.C.D. (Ireland)
Static: 20 O.E.C.D. 
Dynamic: 19 O.E.C.D. 
(except Portugal)
Data Periods 1974-85/1963-73
*1974-79/1980-85
(Averages)
Static: 1983-88 
(average)
Dynamic: 1956-88 
(pooled time-series 
cross-section data)
Dependent
Variables
Unemployment rate 
Employment 
Okun index 
Performance index 
•Economic growth 
•Consumer Price Index
Unemployment rate
Independent
Variables
Rank orderings of 
centralization 
•Union membership 
(1975 and 1980) 
•Average number of left- 
wing cabinet seats/total 
seats
•Economic policy 
variables
Benefit duration 
Replacement ratio 
Active labour market 
spending/GDP 
Coverage of collective 
bargaining 
Union coordination 
Employer coordination 
Changes in inflation of 
GNP/GDP deflator
Sources O.E.C.D. Historical 
Statistics and Main 
Economic Indicators
O.E.C.D. Economic 
Outlook
Employment Outlook, 
Country Reports and 
other various sources
Notes: * indicates only for Paloheimo (1990).
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3. COMPETITIVE PRESSURE AND CROSS-COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
3.1 Proposition 1: The intensity of competitive pressure in negatively
related to unemployment and inflation
In order to compare this proposition based on our own competitive pressure 
hypothesis with existing structural hypotheses, we introduce two sets of 
indicators in addition to competitive pressure: (i) centralization and U-curve 
indices based on Calmfors and Driffill (1988); and (ii) the degree of union 
coverage as well as workers' and employers' coordinations based on Layard 
et al {1991). Table 6.4 gives expected signs of correlation coefficients for 
the validity of each hypothesis.
Our competitive pressure hypothesis seems to be neither supported 
nor rejected. As shown in figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, indicators of competitive 
pressure exhibit less consistent correlations over time, although not strongly 
opposite to the expected negative signs. In contrast to the time-series 
studies of the previous chapter, cross-country variations in unemployment 
and inflation rates show negative correlations more consistently with the 
level of import penetration (IPR), see Diagram 1 & 2 of figure 6.1. Consumer 
price inflation is also explained better by cross-country difference in import 
penetration levels, see figure 6.2. However, it should be noted that any of 
the established structural hypotheses cannot be strongly supported, either. 
Rank correlations favour the corporatist hypothesis as far as unemployment 
is concerned: Centralization index consistently shows positive relations only 
with cross-country differences in unemployment rates. The U-curve index 
also consistently exhibits positive correlations since the 1970s (see 
Appendix IV table C1). The same holds true for consumer price inflation, but 
only for the 1970s (see Appendix IV table C2). Economies with higher levels 
of employers' coordinations show relatively consistent negative correlations 
with unemployment and inflation rates, while countries with higher union 
coverage show positive signs (see figures 6.1 and 6.2). All in all, empirical 
studies of Proposition 1 does not strongly support any of the hypotheses 
described in table 6.4. Detailed explanations for each indicator of macro- 
economic performance will follow.
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Table 6.4 Expected Signs o f Correlations for Five Alternative Hypotheses
Hypothesis Unemployment
rate
Inflation
rate
Consumer
Price
Index
Indicator
Competitive - - - IPR
Pressure
Hypothesis
DIPR
Liberal-Pluralist - - - C
Hypothesis + + + UD
+ + + WC
+ + + EC
Corporatist + + + C
Hypothesis - - - UD
- - - WC
- - - EC
U-curve
Hypothesis
+ + + CD
Interactive _ - UD
Hypothesis - - - WC
- - - EC
IPR = Level of import penetration
DIPR = Percentage changes in import penetration
C = Centralization index
CD = U-curve index
UD = Union coverage
WC = Workers' coordination
EC = Employers' coordination
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES
Contrary to within-economy time-series variations, rank correlations suggest 
that even if not significant, the level of import penetration tends to exert 
decreasing pressure on the differences in unemployment rates across 
countries, except for the period after the mid-1980s (see Appendix IV table 
C1, column 1). Percentage changes in import penetration give mixed and 
seemingly inconsistent explanations especially before the early 1970s. In the 
1970s economies faced with increases in import penetration experience 
relatively less increase in unemployment rates whereas in the 1980s these
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U n e m p l o y m e n t  R a te
Inflation Rate
(1)
61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 C 61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 C
63 67 71 75 79 83 87 A 63 67 71 75 79 83 87 A
[D ia g r a m  1 ]  vear vear [ D ia g r a m  2 )
■  Level of import penetration
If' Changes in import penetration
correlation coefficient correlation coefficient
[D ia g r a m  3 ]
(1)
61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 C
63 67 71 75 79 83 87 A
year
[ D ia g r a m  4 ]  
H  Workers' coordination 
■  Employers' coordination
■  Union Density
correlation coefficient correlation coefficient
N o t e s :  ( 1 )  'S ,  A ,  B , a n d  C '  s t a n d  fo r  t h e  u n w e ig h e d  a v e r a g e s  o f  t h e  c o e f f ic ie n t s
o v e r  t h e  1 9 6 0 s ,  o v e r  t h e  1 9 7 0 s ,  o v e r  t h e  1 9 8 0 s ,  a n d  o v e r  t h e  w h o le  
p e r io d ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly .
( 2 )  F ig u r e s  a r e  m a d e  a s  t h e y  a r e  in  o r d e r  t o  in d ic a t e  s iz e  a n d  c o n s is t e n c y  o f  
c o r r e la t io n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t l y .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  i f  m o s t  o f  t h e  b a r s  a r e  
a b o v e  t h e  f l o o r ,  t w o  v a r ia b le s  a r e  p o s i t iv e l y  c o r r e la t e d .  I f  th o s e  b a r s  a r e  
t a l l e r  t h a n  0 . 5 ,  c o r r e la t io n s  m a y  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n i f ic a n t .
147
Figure 6.2 Simple Correlation Coefficients between Environmental Conditions and 
Cross-country Differences in Consumer Price Index Changes, 1973-89
correlation coefficient
E$ Level of import penetration 
H I Changes in import penetration 
Ml Union Density 
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year
N o te s :  ( 1 )  ' S ,  A ,  B, a n d  C '  s t a n d  fo r  t h e  u n w e ig h e d  a v e r a g e s  o f  t h e  c o e f f ic ie n t s
o v e r  t h e  1 9 6 0 s ,  o v e r  t h e  1 9 7 0 s ,  o v e r  t h e  1 9 8 0 s ,  a n d  o v e r  t h e  w h o le  
p e r io d ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly .
( 2 )  F ig u r e s  a r e  m a d e  a s  t h e y  a r e  in  o r d e r  t o  in d ic a t e  s iz e  a n d  c o n s is t e n c y  o f  
c o r r e la t io n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t l y .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  i f  m o s t  o f  t h e  b a r s  a r e  
a b o v e  t h e  f l o o r ,  t w o  v a r ia b le s  a r e  p o s i t iv e l y  c o r r e la t e d .  I f  th o s e  b a r s  a r e  
t a l l e r  t h a n  0 . 5 ,  c o r r e la t io n s  m a y  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  s t a t is t ic a l ly  s ig n i f ic a n t .
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increase far more5. Simple correlations show a similar, but clearer picture. 
Up to the 1970s, levels of import penetration are negatively related with the 
unemployment rate and afterwards related positively. Interestingly, the size 
of the correlation coefficients increases over time. Percentage changes in 
import penetration are not significantly related with cross-country 
differences in unemployment rates, see figure 6.1, diagram 1.
As far as unemployment is concerned, indices of labour market 
structural differences appear to have more consistent explanatory power 
than those of competitive pressure (see Appendix IV table C1, columns 4 
& 5). During the years from 1961 to 1989, the more centralized economies 
seem to be less subject to increases in unemployment rates relative to the 
decentralized ones. This is especially the case in the early to mid-1970s 
when the relationships are statistically significant. After the 1970s, the 
index employed by the U-curve hypothesis works well in explaining cross­
country differences in unemployment experience. However, its explanatory 
powers are weak for the period before the 1970s. In fact, the U-curve index 
shows statistical significance only after the mid-1980s. From these results, 
it seems reasonable to conjecture that in the years before the oil-price 
shocks had some significant influences on economic activities, corporatism 
worked reasonably well. However, once some kind of adjustments were 
introduced to absorb these shocks, the economies at both extreme ends of 
centralization seemed to perform better than medium-centralized economies 
as the U-curve hypothesis suggests.
When union coverage, and workers' & employers' coordinations are 
separately related to cross-country differences in unemployment rates, a 
clearer picture emerges. Contrary to the commonly held belief, before the 
mid-1970s, economies with higher union coverage seem to experience 
lower rates of unemployment - though with decreasing marginal effects over 
time. However, after the mid-1970s, unemployment rates in economies with 
relatively high union coverage conform to the commonly held belief and 
interestingly show increasing marginal coefficients. Economies with greater 
cooperation between workers and managers seem to suffer less
5 For details, see appendix table C1, column 2 and 3. Although this is the case it is not 
statistically robust.
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unemployment, but with larger coefficients on employers' cooperation, see 
figure 6.1, diagram 3. In the 1960s, cross-country differences in workers' 
coordinations become less influential over time but experience their 
strongest effects before the mid-1970s. Their marginal influence become 
stronger before losing it in the late 1980s. During the 1970s, cross-country 
differences in employers' coordinations become less powerful in explaining 
divergences in unemployment rates across countries.
Multiple regressions which include changes in the rates of inflation 
in addition to competitive pressure and structural indices seem to shed 
doubt on these interpretations. The best models in each year, with different 
combinations of competitive pressure indicators, have relatively little 
explanatory power6 with regard to cross-country differences in 
unemployment rates throughout the period from 1961 to 1989. Table 6.5 
summarizes the overall picture: (i) Inflation-unemployment tradeoffs are not 
well confirmed7; (ii) Throughout the period, employers' coordinations show 
negative effects; (iii) Only after 1975, workers' coordinations show 
consistently negative relations only after 1975; (iv) Since 1978, union 
coverage is positively related with unemployment rates, but before that 
show mixed signs; and (v) Indicators of competitive pressure do not show 
decreasing effects in many of the cases. After the early 1970s, the levels 
of import penetration, when included, show positive signs since the early 
1970s. However, unlike rank and simple correlations, multiple regressions 
indicate that economies facing higher percentage changes in import 
penetration experience less increase in unemployment rates, especially in 
the 1980s.
6 Adjusted R2 span from -0.02 to 0.70. In most of the case multiple regression models 
explain just around 30 per cent.
7 Even in five years of the 1960s changes in inflation rates are positively related with 
unemployment. It is surprising to find that five years in every decade exhibit positive 
relationships with these explanatory variables of competitive pressure and labour market 
institutions.
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Table 6.5 Multiple Regression Results for Cross-country Differences in
Unemployment Rates
Constant Im port Penetration S tructure  Indices
IPR DIPR CP UD WC EC DDP R2 P
1961 6.96 -0.12 - 1.15 0.12 •0.98 0.30 0.24 0.157
(1.93) (0 .10) (0 .88) (0 .90) (0 .73) (0 .32)
1962 6.49 1.80 -0.93 0.47 -1.56 -0.28 0.36 0.073
(1.56) (0 .82) (0 .68) (0 .65) (0 .54) (0 .20)
1963 5.09 -1.14 -0.28 0.51 -1.41 -0.11 0.34 0.085
(1.42) (0 .54) (0 .66) (0 .66) (0 .55) (0 .27)
1964 4.34 -0.01 -0.58 0.27 -0.74 -0.06 -0.0 0.478
(1.56) (0 .08) (0 .72) (0 .70) (0 .51) (0 .21)
1965 4.04 -1.17 -0.54 0.96 -1.13 0.21 0.25 0.144
(1.27) (0 .63) (0 .59) (0 .67) (0 .43) (0 .19)
1966 1.09 -4.10 0.22 0.68 0.79 -1.15 0.36 0.65 0.007
(0 .89) (2.97) (0 .05) (0 .40) (0 .41) (0 .29) (0 .18)
1967 3.16 0.47 -0.06 0.47 -0.94 -0.11 0.19 0.202
(1.20) (0 .38) (0 .59) (0 .61) (0 .41) (0 .23)
1968 2.26 0.01 0.54 -0.01 -0.73 0.28 0.07 0.356
(1.51) (0 .11) (0 .61) (0 .69) (0 .44) (0 .19)
1969 2.54 -1.65 0.13 0.23 0.32 -0.97 -0.02 0.10 0.340
(1.32) (4 .68) (0 .08) (0 .75) (0 .67) (0 .45) (0 .14)
1970 5.70 -0.16 -0.77 0.50 -0.88 -0.04 0.38 0.062
(1.47) (0 .09) (0 .68) (0 .68) (0 .44) (0 .15)
1971 5.17 0.17 -0.27 0.22 - 1.24 -0.14 0.28 0.124
(1.67) (0 .20) (0 .81) (1.13) (0 .69) (0 .17)
1972 3.94 0.12 0.18 0.17 - 1.21 0.34 0.37 0.065
(1.77) (0 .09) (0 .72) (0 .74) (0.50 (0 .21)
1973 6.57 5.11 -0.27 -0.64 0.09 - 1.47 0.34 0.60 0.013
(1.39) (4 .07) (0 .09) (0 .61) (0 .58) (0 .42) (0 . 11)
1974 4.47 -0.65 -0.19 0.08 -1.00 0.16 0.39 0.056
(1.40) (0 .38) (0 .64) (0 .64) (0 .49) (0 .09 )
1975 9.66 1.29 0.01 -1.27 - 1.94 -0.02 0.38 0.063
(2.39) (0 .52) (0 .94) (0 .93) (0 .75) (0 .08)
1976 4.66 0.10 0.42 -0.37 -1.05 -0.20 0.11 0.294
(2.53) (0 .13) (1.27) (1.37) (0 .81) (0 .24)
1977 6.49 -1.39 0.92 -1.32 -0.78 0.16 0.03 0.413
(3 .10) (1.34) (1.31) (1.25) (0 .90) (0 .49)
1978 4.61 -0.06 1.39 -0.70 -1.10 -0.01 -0.0 0.685
(3 .36) (0 .23) (1.60) (1.65) (1.22) (0 .50)
1979 4.83 -0.07 1.48 -0.35 - 1.59 -0.14 -0.0 0.496
(3 .02) (0 .17) (1.20) (1.16) (1.26) (0 .44)
1980 4.36 -0.56 1.83 -0.95 - 1.33 -0.05 0.10 0.315
(3 .03) (0 .99) (1.40) (1.36) (0 .95) (0 .23)
1981 5.20 14.1 -0.21 1.07 -0.56 -2.30 -0.08 0.12 0.314
(3 .61) (11.7) (0 .31) (2 .09) (1.60) (1.46) (0 .42)
1982 6.93 13.5 -0.09 1.66 - 1.17 -2.39 0.40 0.18 0.242
(4 .42) (12.4) (0 .29) (2 .06) (1.78) (1.32) (0 .47)
1983 4.75 0.41 4.10 -1.17 -2.64 0.04 0.40 0.053
(4 .63) (0 .23) (1.62) (1.55) (1.19) (0 .37)
1984 9.80 16.5 -0.22 0.87 -1.27 -2.65 -0.49 0.41 0.068
(6 .30) (11.0) (0 .31) (2.12) (1.53) (1.28) (0 .36)
1985 5.65 1.19 3.65 -2.72 - 1.74 -0.16 0.39 0.058
(3 .24) (2.02) (1.38) (1.36) (1.05) (0 .36)
(continued)
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Table 6 .5  Cont/d
C onstant Im port Penetration Structure  Indices
IPR DIPR CP UD WC EC DDP R2 P
1986 -0.32 0.83 5.52 - 1.36 -2.50 0.59 0.60 0.008
(3 .48) (0 .35) (1.33) (1.14) (0 .85) (0 .38)
1987 4.54 -0.12 3.60 -1.78 - 1.89 -0.28 0.43 0.042
(3 .62) (0 .34) (1.31) (1.24) (0 .99) (0 .40)
1988 5.46 -0.31 2.95 -0.85 -2.12 0.23 0.40 0.054
(2.88) (0 .22) (1.22) (1.23) (0 .89) (0 .32)
1989 6.70 -0.27 1.63 0.07 -2.04 -0.41 0.30 0.110
(2.90) (0 .17) (1.16) (1.24) (0 .98) (0 .49 )
Notes: (1) R2 is adjusted with the degree of freedom.
(2) P is for the probability that the model does not fit.
(3) Numbers in () are t-statistics for each coefficient.
(4) Independent variables are as follows:
IPR = level of import penetration
DIPR = percentage changes in import penetration
CP = difference (simple changes) in import penetration
UD = union-density index
WC = workers' coordination index
EC = employers' coordination index.
INFLATION RATES
With regard to cross-country differences in the experience of inflation, the 
levels and changes in import penetration also do not have significant and 
consistent explanatory power. Nevertheless, according to rank correlations,
the levels of import penetration seem to exert deflationary pressure/
particularly from the mid-1970s onwards. Percentage changes in import 
penetration yields so many mixed effects on inflation across countries that 
no suitable exposition can be provided (see Appendix IV table C2, columns 
1 & 2). Simple correlation coefficients appear to give similar but somewhat 
clearer explanations. From 1973 onwards, except for 1985, those countries 
with higher levels of import penetration are related, albeit weakly, with 
lower increases in inflation, see Diagram 2 of figure 6.1. During the late 
1970s percentage changes in import penetration appear to exert larger 
deflationary pressure, but not after that.
Further, the centralization index does not suggest any consistent 
interpretation. This is also the case for the revised centralization index of the 
U-curve hypothesis. Though, those economies with intermediately 
centralized bargaining structures might suffer more inflation (see Appendix 
IV table C2, final two columns). When structural differences are broken
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down into three components, we find partial reasons why combined indices 
do not fit well. Countries with high union coverage and coordination 
between workers are more or less related with high inflation. Even countries 
with higher coordinations between employers had experienced higher 
inflation up to the early 1970s, since then however, these countries have 
had less increase in inflation, see Diagram 4 of figure 6.1. Cross-country 
differences in union coverage have notably lost their marginal influences 
since the mid-1980s, and even show negative correlations in 1986 and 
1987. Over the early to mid-1980s, workers' coordinations have influenced 
cross-country differences in the experience of inflation with increasing force. 
Largely, employers' coordinations have been a crucial factor to restrain 
inflation since the mid-1970s.
If we take annual percentage changes in the consumer price index as 
an alternative inflation indicator, a rather different picture emerges. 
Economies with higher levels of import penetration exhibit less increase in 
consumer prices, except in a few cases, see figure 6.2. However, changes 
in their levels give mixed correlations. Until the early 1980s, centralized 
economies are subject to a higher increase in consumer prices. Since then 
they have experienced less increase. Except for the late 1980s, intermediate 
economies seem to be the worst performers in terms of consumer price 
inflation, see appendix, table C9. When labour market structural conditions 
are separately considered, those countries with higher union coverage and 
workers' coordinations are more susceptible to greater increases in 
consumer prices, whereas those with higher employers' coordinations are 
more susceptible to lower increases. These relationships are consistent over 
time, see figure 6.2.
3.2 Proposition 2: Competitive pressure is positively related to gross
domestic production and productivity growth
Similar to Proposition 1, each alternative hypothesis of table 6.4 is 
empirically tested by investigating correlations with the growth rates of 
Gross Domestic Production (GDP) and real GDP per capita. Expected signs 
are exactly opposite to those in table 6.4. Empirical studies of Proposition 
2 favour our own competitive pressure hypothesis, see figure 6.3.
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Figure 6 .3  Simple Correlation Coefficients between Environmental Conditions and
Cross-country Differences in GDP Growth Rates and Rea! GDP per capita, 1973 -8 9
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Workers' coordination 
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[ D ia g r a m  3 ]
N o t e s :  ( 1 )  ' S ,  A ,  B , a n d  C '  s t a n d  fo r  t h e  u n w e ig h e d  a v e r a g e s  o f  t h e  c o e f f ic ie n t s
o v e r  t h e  1 9 6 0 s ,  o v e r  t h e  1 9 7 0 s ,  o v e r  t h e  1 9 8 0 s ,  a n d  o v e r  t h e  w h o le  
p e r io d ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly .
( 2 )  F ig u r e s  a r e  m a d e  a s  t h e y  a r e  in  o r d e r  t o  in d ic a t e  s iz e  a n d  c o n s is t e n c y  o f  
c o r r e la t io n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t l y .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  i f  m o s t  o f  th e  b a r s  a r e  
a b o v e  th e  f l o o r ,  t w o  v a r ia b le s  a r e  p o s i t iv e l y  c o r r e la t e d .  I f  th o s e  b a r s  a r e  
t a l le r  t h a n  0 . 5 ,  c o r r e la t io n s  m a y  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  s t a t is t ic a l ly  s ig n i f ic a n t .
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Percentage changes in import penetration seem to exert significant pressure 
on workers and employers so that their strategic behaviour in labour 
relations may have become more cooperative and resulted in increased 
productivity. Any other structural hypothesis cannot be supported by the 
evidence of Proposition 2.
Regarding the growth rate of gross domestic production, percentage 
changes in import penetration show positive correlations, whilst their levels 
are negative. These relationships are statistically significant in the 1960s 
and late 1980s, see e.g., appendix, table C3. Similarly, univariate 
correlations tell us that economies faced with higher import penetration 
levels seem to suffer slower growth with larger marginal effects in the 
1980s, see figure 6.3, diagram 1. Increased competitive pressure on the 
other hand, tends to be positively related with production growth rates, 
except in the 1970s. The marginal influence of competitive pressure over 
time decreases in the 1960s and in the mid to late 1970s, while increases 
in the 1980s. Structural indices do not appear to perform well. The 
centralization index, when significant, displays positive relations, which 
means that decentralized economies may perform better in terms of growth 
rates. This unexpectedly supports the liberal-pluralist hypothesis, see 
appendix, table C3, column four. For the 1960s the U-curve index tells an 
opposite story to what it is intended to, whereas after 1970s there does not 
appear to be any consistent explanation, see appendix, C3, column five. 
Further structural differences in labour market institutions do not appear to 
give coherent interpretations even if separately studied, see figure 6.3, 
diagram 2: (i) Most of the time countries with high union coverage seem to 
suffer greater decreases in growth rates, except in the period from the mid- 
1970s to the early 1980s; (ii) Higher coordinations do not seem to help 
increase growth rates, especially in the 1980s. Interestingly, in the 1980s 
the marginal effects of cross-country differences in union coverage become 
greater over time, while those in workers' coordinations become smaller.
For most of the period between 1973 and 1989, with few 
exceptions, economies faced with higher levels of import penetration seem 
to suffer more losses of annual percentage changes in real GDP per capita. 
This is especially so since the mid-1980s, see appendix, table C6. Those
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«with higher changes in import penetration levels, however, seem to 
experience higher growth rates in their productivity except for a few years. 
In the 1980s, their marginal effects were growing, see figure 6.3, diagram
3. Intermediately centralized economies are the worst performers in terms 
of productivity growth rates, see appendix, table C6, final column. It is not 
so obvious, as sometimes popularly believed, that countries with higher 
union coverage suffer slower growth of real GDP per capita. Since the mid- 
1980s, their marginal effects show growing influences, although not 
significantly so. Up to the early 1980s cross-country differences in 
workers' coordinations are positively related with productivity growth rates. 
Since then their marginal influence becomes smaller and shows negative 
correlations. Higher coordinations between employers do not provide any 
consistent explanation.
3.3 Multivariate evidence on Propositions 1 and 2
Even if the Canonical models do not fit well and explain only up to 30 
percent of variance, multivariate correlations can account for up to 94 per 
cent of variance. Implications to be drawn include: (i) Since 1973, it seems 
rather exceptional for economies facing increased competition to suffer in 
terms of GDP growth and inflation rates; (ii) During the early 1970s, 
countries facing intense competitive pressure seem to experience less 
increase in unemployment, while after the 1970s it is common for these 
countries to experience higher increases in unemployment rates, see figure 
6.4, diagram 1.
When combined with the variables for structural differences in labour 
market institutions, Canonical multivariate models show much better 
statistical fitness. They show high and significant F-values in 15 cases 
across 29 years. Also they explain variances in economic performance 
across countries to the degree of 20 to 46 per cent with high combined 
correlation coefficients. For each macro-indicator, even if it is not so 
coherent, rather better inferences are available, see figure 6.4. Economies 
with the most intense competitive pressure, higher union coverage and 
coordinations are positively related with GDP growth and inflation rates, and 
negatively related with unemployment rates. Up to the mid-1970s, it is
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Figure 6.4 Multiple Canonical Correlations between a Set of Macro-economic Performance 
Indicators and a Combined Indicator of Environmental Conditions HI, 1961-89  
: Unemployment, Inflation, and GDP Growth Rates
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N o t e s :  ( 1 )  ' S ,  A ,  B , a n d  C '  s t a n d  fo r  t h e  u n w e ig h e d  a v e r a g e s  o f  t h e  c o e f f ic ie n t s
o v e r  t h e  1 9 6 0 s ,  o v e r  t h e  1 9 7 0 s ,  o v e r  t h e  1 9 8 0 s ,  a n d  o v e r  t h e  w h o le  
p e r io d ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly .
( 2 )  F ig u r e s  a r e  m a d e  a s  t h e y  a r e  in  o r d e r  t o  in d ic a t e  s iz e  a n d  c o n s is t e n c y  o f  
c o r r e la t io n  c o e f f ic ie n t s  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t l y .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  i f  m o s t  o f  t h e  b a r s  a r e  
a b o v e  t h e  f l o o r ,  t w o  v a r ia b le s  a r e  p o s i t iv e l y  c o r r e la t e d .  I f  t h o s e  b a r s  a r e  
t a l l e r  t h a n  0 . 5 ,  c o r r e la t io n s  m a y  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  s t a t is t ic a l ly  s ig n i f ic a n t .
( 3 )  F o r  th e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n d i t i o n s  w e  u s e d  d i f f e r e n t  c o m b in a t io n  o f  
c o m p e t i t i v e  p r e s s u r e  a n d  la b o u r  m a r k e t  s t r u c t u r a l  in d ic a to r s  a s  f o l lo w s .
•  D i a g r a m  1 ;  o n ly  C o m p e t i t i v e  P r e s s u r e  In d ic a t o r s  ( b o th  t h e  le v e l  o f
a n d  p e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e s  in  im p o r t  p e n e t r a t io n s )
•  D i a g r a m  2 ;  C o m p e t i t i v e  P r e s s u r e  In d ic a t o r s  (b o th  t h e  le v e l  o f  a n d
p e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e s  in  im p o r t  p e n e t r a t io n s )  c o m b in e d  w i t h  L a b o u r  
M a r k e t  S t r u c t u r a l  In d ic a t o r s  (u n io n  c o v e r a g e ,  w o r k e r s ’ a n d  
e m p l o y e r s '  c o o r d in a t io n s )
•  D i a g r a m  3 ;  P e r c e n t a g e  C h a n g e s  in  Im p o r t  P e n e t r a t io n s  c o m b in e d
w i t h  L a b o u r  M a r k e t  S t r u c t u r a l  In d ic a t o r s  (u n io n  c o v e r a g e ,  w o r k e r s '  
a n d  e m p l o y e r s '  c o o r d in a t io n s )
•  D ia g r a m  4 ;  A n n u a l  C h a n g e s  in  Im p o r t  P e n e t r a t io n s  c o m b in e d  w i t h
L a b o u r  M a r k e t  S t r u c t u r a l  In d ic a t o r s  (u n io n  c o v e r a g e ,  w o r k e r s '  a n d  
e m p l o y e r s '  c o o r d in a t io n s ) .
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Figure 6 .5  Multiple Canonical Correlations between a Set of Macro-economic Performance 
Indicators and a Combined Indicator of Environmental Conditions (II). 1973-89  
: Annual Percentage Changes in Rea! GDP per capita and Consumer Price index
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N o t e s :  ( 1 )  ' S ,  A ,  B , a n d  C '  s t a n d  fo r  t h e  u n w e ig h e d  a v e r a g e s  o f  t h e  c o e f f ic ie n t s
o v e r  t h e  1 9 6 0 s ,  o v e r  t h e  1 9 7 0 s ,  o v e r  th e  1 9 8 0 s ,  a n d  o v e r  t h e  w h o le  
p e r io d ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly .
( 2 )  F ig u r e s  a r e  m a d e  a s  t h e y  a r e  in  o r d e r  t o  in d ic a t e  s iz e  a n d  c o n s is t e n c y  o f  
c o r r e la t io n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t l y .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  if  m o s t  o f  t h e  b a r s  a r e  
a b o v e  t h e  f l o o r ,  t w o  v a r ia b le s  a r e  p o s i t iv e ly  c o r r e la t e d .  I f  th o s e  b a r s  a r e  
t a l l e r  th a n  0 . 5 ,  c o r r e la t io n s  m a y  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n i f ic a n t .
( 3 )  F o r  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n d i t io n s  w e  u s e d  d i f f e r e n t  c o m b in a t io n  o f  
c o m p e t i t i v e  p r e s s u r e  a n d  la b o u r  m a r k e t  s t r u c t u r a l  in d ic a t o r s  a s  f o l lo w s .
•  D i a g r a m  1 ;  o n ly  C o m p e t i t i v e  P r e s s u r e  In d ic a t o r s  ( b o th  t h e  le v e l  o f  
a n d  p e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e s  in  im p o r t  p e n e t r a t io n s )
•  D i a g r a m  2 ;  C o m p e t i t i v e  P r e s s u r e  In d ic a to r s  (b o t h  t h e  le v e l  o f  a n d  
p e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e s  in  im p o r t  p e n e t r a t io n s )  c o m b in e d  w i t h  L a b o u r  
M a r k e t  S t r u c t u r a l  In d ic a to r s  (u n io n  c o v e r a g e ,  w o r k e r s '  a n d  
e m p l o y e r s '  c o o r d in a t io n s )
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exceptional for such economies to suffer increases in unemployment rates. 
Once either percentage or simple changes in import penetration is included 
as an indicator of competitive pressure, there is no real difference in 
interpretations, see figure 6.4, diagrams 3 & 4.
Using an alternative set of macro-economic indicators, correlations 
from multivariate models are not improved. Even if they do not fit well and 
explain little, correlation coefficients imply that those economies with 
increased competitive pressures seem to suffer less decrease in productivity 
and less increase in consumer prices. Canonical models with indicators for 
labour market structural difference and competitive pressure do not provide 
significantly different implications, see figure 6.5. As a whole. Propositions 
1 & 2 tend to be supported, if weak, by cross-country multivariate analyses 
for 17 O.E.C.D. economies.
3.4 Proposition 3: Intense competitive pressure will show positive
correlations with employment, real value-added and 
labour productivity in the manufacturing sector
With the same logic as Proposition 2, figures 6.6 and 6.7 strongly support 
our competitive pressure hypothesis. With few exceptions, percentage 
changes in import penetration show relatively consistent positive 
correlations with annual percentage changes in employment, real value- 
added and labour productivity of the manufacturing sector across countries. 
By contrast, empirical results for the other hypotheses show little 
significance. However, real wages and producer prices of the manufacturing 
sector do not lend strong support to our competitive pressure hypothesis 
(see figures 6.7 and 6.8). Multivariate analyses also show similar supports 
for this proposition (see figure 6.9). Each of these manufacturing 
performance indicators will be explained below.
PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF EMPLOYMENT IN MANUFACTURING
If not strong and consistent through time, countries with a higher levels of 
import penetration, especially in the second half of the 1970s, seem to 
suffer more in employment terms, while those with higher (percentage) 
changes suffer less; compare two bars in figure 6.6, diagram 1. Except in
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Figure 6 .6  Simple Correlation Coefficients between Environmental Conditions
and Cross-country Differences in Employment and Real Value-Added
in the Manufacturing Sector, 1973 -8 9
E m p lo y m e n t R e a l  V a lu e - A d d e d
(1)
73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 B 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 B
74 76 78 80  82 84 86 88 A C 74  76 78 80  82 84 86 88 A C
year U  Level of Import Penetration year
[D ia g r a m  1 J m  Changes in Import Penetration [D ia g r a m  2 )
correlation coefficient correlation coefficient
correlation coefficient correlation coefficient
73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 B
74 76 78 80  82 84 86 88 A C 
year
[D ia g r a m  4 ]
73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 B
74 76 78 80  82 84 86 88 A C
year f l  Union Density
i f  Workers' Coordination[ D ia g r a m  3 ]
X  Employers' Coordination
N o te s :  ( 1 )  'S. A ,  B , a n d  C '  s t a n d  fo r  t h e  u n w e ig h e d  a v e r a g e s  o f  t h e  c o e f f ic ie n t s
o v e r  t h e  1 9 6 0 s ,  o v e r  t h e  1 9 7 0 s ,  o v e r  t h e  1 9 8 0 s ,  a n d  o v e r  t h e  w h o le  
p e r io d ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly .
( 2 )  F ig u r e s  a r e  m a d e  a s  t h e y  a r e  in  o r d e r  t o  in d ic a t e  s iz e  a n d  c o n s is t e n c y  o f  
c o r r e la t io n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t l y .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  i f  m o s t  o f  t h e  b a r s  a r e  
a b o v e  t h e  f lo o r ,  t w o  v a r ia b le s  a r e  p o s i t iv e l y  c o r r e la t e d .  I f  t h o s e  b a r s  a r e  
t a l l e r  t h a n  0 . 5 ,  c o r r e la t io n s  m a y  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n i f ic a n t .
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Figure 6. 7 Simple Correlation Coefficients between Environmental Conditions
and Cross-country D ifferences in Real Value-Added per capita and Real Hourly Wages
in the Manufacturing Sector, 19 7 3 -8 9
R e a l V a lu e - A d d e d  per capita
correlation coefficient
R e a l H o u r ly  W a g e s
correlation coefficient
(1)
73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 B 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 B
74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 A C 74  76 78 80 82 84 86 88 A C
year ■  Level of Import Penetration year
[D ia g r a m  1 ] H  Chanaes jn imp0rt Penetration [D ia g r a m  2 ]
correlation coefficient correlation coefficient
(1)
73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89  B 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 B
74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 A C 74 76  78 80 82 84  86 88 A C
year H  Union Density year
[D ia g r a m  3 ]  H  Workers' Coordination [ D ia g r a m  4 1
S  Employers' Coordination
N o te s :  ( 1 )  'S ,  A ,  B , a n d  C '  s t a n d  fo r  t h e  u n w e ig h e d  a v e r a g e s  o f  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t s
o v e r  t h e  1 9 6 0 s ,  o v e r  t h e  1 9 7 0 s ,  o v e r  t h e  1 9 8 0 s ,  a n d  o v e r  t h e  w h o le  
p e r io d ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly .
( 2 )  F ig u r e s  a r e  m a d e  a s  t h e y  a r e  in  o r d e r  t o  in d ic a t e  s iz e  a n d  c o n s is t e n c y  o f  
c o r r e la t io n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t l y .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  i f  m o s t  o f  t h e  b a r s  a r e  
a b o v e  t h e  f l o o r ,  t w o  v a r ia b le s  a r e  p o s i t iv e l y  c o r r e la t e d .  I f  t h o s e  b a r s  a r e  
t a l l e r  t h a n  0 . 5 ,  c o r r e la t io n s  m a y  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  s t a t is t ic a l ly  s ig n i f ic a n t .
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Figure 6 .8  Simple Correlation Coefficients between Environmental Conditions
and Cross-country Differences in Producer Price Index
in the Manufacturing Sector, 1973 -8 9
correlation coefficient
Level of Import Penetration 
Changes in Import Penetration
[ D ia g r a m  1 ]
correlation coefficient
Union Density 
Workers’ Coordination 
Employers' Coordination
[ D ia g r a m  2 ]
N o t e s :  ( 1 )  ' S ,  A ,  B , a n d  C '  s t a n d  fo r  t h e  u n w e ig h e d  a v e r a g e s  o f  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t s
o v e r  t h e  1 9 6 0 s ,  o v e r  t h e  1 9 7 0 s ,  o v e r  t h e  1 9 8 0 s ,  a n d  o v e r  t h e  w h o le  
p e r io d ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly .
( 2 )  F ig u r e s  a r e  m a d e  a s  t h e y  a r e  in  o r d e r  t o  in d ic a t e  s iz e  a n d  c o n s is t e n c y  o f  
c o r r e la t io n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t l y .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  i f  m o s t  o f  t h e  b a r s  a re  
a b o v e  t h e  f l o o r ,  t w o  v a r ia b le s  a r e  p o s i t iv e l y  c o r r e la t e d .  I f  th o s e  b a r s  a re  
t a l l e r  t h a n  0 . 5 ,  c o r r e la t io n s  m a y  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  s t a t is t ic a l ly  s ig n i f i c a n t .
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Figure 6.9 Multiple Canonical Correlations between a Set of Manufacturing Economic 
Performance Indicators and a Combined Indicator of Environmental Conditions,  1973-89
c o rre la tio n  c o e ff ic ie n t
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N o t e s :  ( 1 )  ' S ,  A ,  B , a n d  C '  s t a n d  fo r  t h e  u n w e ig h e d  a v e r a g e s  o f  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t s
o v e r  t h e  1 9 6 0 s ,  o v e r  t h e  1 9 7 0 s ,  o v e r  t h e  1 9 8 0 s ,  a n d  o v e r  t h e  w h o le  
p e r io d ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly .
( 2 )  F ig u r e s  a r e  m a d e  a s  t h e y  a r e  in  o r d e r  t o  in d ic a t e  s iz e  a n d  c o n s is t e n c y  o f  
c o r r e la t io n  c o e f f ic ie n t s  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t l y .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  i f  m o s t  o f  t h e  b a r s  a r e  
a b o v e  t h e  f l o o r ,  t w o  v a r ia b le s  a r e  p o s i t iv e l y  c o r r e la t e d .  I f  t h o s e  b a r s  a r e  
t a l l e r  t h a n  0 . 5 ,  c o r r e la t io n s  m a y  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n i f ic a n t .
( 3 )  F o r  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n d i t i o n s  w e  u s e d  d i f f e r e n t  c o m b in a t io n  o f  
c o m p e t i t i v e  p r e s s u r e  a n d  la b o u r  m a r k e t  s t r u c t u r a l  in d ic a to r s  a s  f o l l o w s .
•  D i a g r a m  1 ;  o n ly  C o m p e t i t i v e  P r e s s u r e  In d ic a t o r s  (b o th  t h e  le v e l  o f  
a n d  p e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e s  in  im p o r t  p e n e t r a t io n s )
•  D i a g r a m  2 ;  C o m p e t i t i v e  P r e s s u r e  In d ic a t o r s  (b o th  t h e  le v e l  o f  a n d  
p e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e s  in  im p o r t  p e n e t r a t io n s )  c o m b in e d  w i t h  L a b o u r  
M a r k e t  S t r u c t u r a l  In d ic a t o r s  (u n io n  c o v e r a g e ,  w o r k e r s '  a n d  
e m p l o y e r s '  c o o r d in a t io n s )
( 4 )  F o r  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r in g  e c o n o m ic  p e r f o r m a n c e  in d ic a to r s ,  w e  e m p l o y e d  
a n n u a l  p e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e s  in : i) R e a l  H o u r ly  W a g e s ;  ii) E m p lo y m e n t ;  ii i)  R e a l 
V a lu e - A d d e d ;  iv )  R e a l  V a lu e - A d d e d  per capita-, v )  P r o d u c e r  P r ic e  In d e x .
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1980 and 1983, economies facing higher percentage changes in import 
penetration suffer less decreases in manufacturing employment.
Decentralized economies seem to suffer relatively less decrease in 
manufacturing employment. And rank correlations of the U-curve index 
indicate that intermediate economies must have suffered a greater loss of 
manufacturing jobs after the mid-1980s, with statistical significance, see 
appendix, table C5, last three columns. As expected, higher union coverage 
is negatively related with employment changes across countries except in 
a few years. However, it is notable that high coordinations do not help to 
reduce manufacturing job losses in most of the cases, see figure 6.6, 
diagram 3.
PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF REAL VALUE-ADDED IN MANUFACTURING
Similar to the case of manufacturing employment, economies with higher 
import penetration levels experience greater decreases in real value-added 
except in a few years with strong statistical significance. Those with higher 
(percentage) changes in import penetration appear to suffer less in terms of 
the size of the surplus for dividend bargaining up to the 1980s except for 
three years: 1974, 1980 and 1985, see Diagram 2 of figure 6.6.
Highly-centralized economies undergo greater loss in real value- 
added, with strong significance in the 1970s. Not only higher union 
coverage but also higher coordinations are both negatively related with the 
size of pie, especially in the late 1980s, see Diagram 4 of figure 6.6.
PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF REAL VALUE-ADDED PER CAPITA IN 
MANUFACTURING
Rank correlations of import penetration levels do not provide a consistent 
explanation for real value-added per capita in manufacturing. However, 
when rank correlations of import penetration are significant, economies with 
higher import penetration levels appear to suffer more in terms of 
manufacturing labour productivity, see appendix, table C8. Simple 
correlations give positive signs for the 1970s and negative for the 1980s. 
In particular, this is the case since the mid-1980s. Since the mid-1980s, 
however, marginal coefficients are increasing towards the positive, see
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figure 6.7, diagram 1. Percentage changes in import penetration tends to be 
related with less suffering in terms of manufacturing productivity, even if 
not consistent through time, see appendix, table C8. The first and second 
halves of the 1980s show increasing marginal correlations with positive 
signs, see Diagram 1 of figure 6.7. Both high and low-centralized countries 
seem to perform better in terms of labour productivity in manufacturing, in 
some cases with statistical significance, see appendix, table C8, last three 
columns. Similar to the case of real value-added, since the mid-1980s, 
higher coordinations of both employers and workers have not helped to 
boost the manufacturing labour productivity, see Diagram 3 of figure 6.7. 
Though, economies with higher union coverage seem to have suffered less 
decrease in labour productivity in the 1970s.
PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF REAL HOURLY WAGES IN MANUFACTURING
From the late 1970s to the mid-1980s - except 1980 economies with higher 
levels of import penetration seem to have experienced lower increases in 
real hourly wages. Percentage changes, meanwhile, show negative relations 
in the 1980s - except 1984, 1988 and 1989. One plausible interpretation 
might be that industrialized countries faced with more intense competitive 
pressure could not afford to pay higher real wages in the 1980s, see 
appendix, table C4, columns one and two. Simple correlations suggest a 
similar picture, even if weak, for the effects of import penetration levels and 
their percentage changes, see figure 6.7, diagram 2.
With regard to the degree of centralization, rank correlation signs are 
almost opposite to those for the levels of import penetration: i.e., higher 
centralized countries seem to show higher increases in real wages during the 
late 1970s to the mid-1980s. But from 1985 onwards, these economies 
have experienced less increases. The revised U-curve index exhibits almost 
the same signs as those of the centralization index, but with greater 
statistical significance. Therefore, it seems reasonable to infer that 
intermediate economies might be more susceptible to increases in real 
hourly wages for the manufacturing sector, see appendix, table C4, last 
three columns.
From the simple correlation coefficients, those economies with higher
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union coverage seem to experience increases in real wages except for a few 
years. Their marginal effects become stronger in the late 1980s. High 
coordinations of both workers and employers tend to reduce real wages in 
the period from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, but not always as 
presumed. In the late 1980s, economies with higher coordinations in both 
parties tend to show positive correlations with real hourly wages, see figure 
6.7, diagram 4.
Even if regression models do not fit very well in most of the years8, 
multiple regression results give a clear picture, see table 6.6. Cross-country 
differences in import penetration levels are the most important determinant 
in explaining different experiences of changes in real hourly wages. 
Although they are the most significant explanatory variable, they are not 
statistically significant. With the exception of two cases, import penetration 
levels are negatively related with real hourly wages. Their percentage 
changes show mixed signs and have relatively small marginal coefficients. 
The degree of union coverage is positively related except in 1976. 
Interestingly, cross-country differences in workers' and employers' 
coordinations give opposite signs in most years. In the 1980s, workers' 
coordinations may have resulted in real wage increases but lower than 
otherwise, whereas employers' coordinations are higher. Once interaction 
terms between independent variables are included in the regression models 
(see the lower half of table 6.6), the implications become more complicated 
and significantly different from those based on regressions without 
interaction terms. At least they show that there might be more than a linear 
relationship between competitive pressure, structural differences in labour 
market institutions, and changes in real wages.
8 Only in four out of seventeen years do generalized linear regression models show 
statistical fitness (this includes levels and percentage change in import penetration as well 
as labour market structural indicators as independent variables). Nevertheless, with the 
exception of three years the models explanatory power span more than 40 per cent of all 
variations.
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Table 6.6 Generalized Linear Models for the Effects of Competitive Pressure
and Labour Market Institutions on Annual Percentage Changes of 
Rea! Hourly Wages in Manufacturing
(!) Without Interaction Terms
Constant Import-penetrations 
IPR DIPR CP
Structural-indices 
UD WC EC R2 P
1973-5.48 -6.54 0.62 3.67 3.82 -4.15 0.56 0.298
(5.74) (15.3) (0.36) (2.72) (3.20) (2.52)
1974-4.35 19.8 -0.21 1.10 -1.05 1.33 0.79 0.049
(2.54) (8.45) (0.19) (1.31) (1.74) (1.44)
1975 2.02 -4.29 0.44 1.01 6.07 -4.83 0.74 0.801
(4.25) (9.64) (0.27) (1.39) (2.08) (1.92)
1976 2.81 -0.23 -0.04 -1.43 3.56 -1.27 0.37 0.637
(4.04) (11.3) (0.25) (1.79) (2.28) (1.84)
1977-0.04 -8.59 0.38 1.45 2.65 -2.91 0.14 0.950
(8.69) (23.8) (0.93) (4.45) (4.08) (3.30)
1978-0.49 -10.2 0.03 2.93 -0.97 -0.77 0.57 0.285
(2.48) (7.58) (0.17) (1.24) (1.81) (1.31)
1979-3.09 0.42 0.73 1.67 -1.30 0.66 0.078
(1.81) (0.16) (0.85) (1.25) (0.98)
1980-4.29 -1.00 2.41 -3.36 1.63 0.48 0.276
(2.34) (0.98) (1.07) (1.69) (1.29)
1981 0.68 -7.24 -0.20 1.33 0.78 -2.36 0.60 0.253
(2.56) (8.05) (0.30) (1.41) (1.61) (1.30)
1982 1.09 -7.38 0.02 1.11 -0.43 -0.41 0.42 0.548
(1.80) (5.31) (0.13) (0.88) (1.09) (0.89)
1983 0.91 -10.7 -0.10 1.72 -1.83 0.31 0.49 0.433
(2.95) (7.59) (0.22) (1.31) (1.62) (1.20)
1984-5.90 -10.3 0.35 2.68 -0.69 0.76 0.44 0.515
(6.89) (6.86) (0.36) (1.63) (1.38) (1.37)
1985-0.45 -8.31 -0.06 1.71 -1.18 0.63 0.32 0.728
(2.12) (6.95) (0.24) (1.14) (1.44) (1.18)
1986-3.13 -7.93 0.20 2.18 -2.57 2.61 0.62 0.214
(3.38) (6.00) (0.39) (1.32) (1.30) (1.06)
1987-2.48 -10.9 -0.49 2.79 -0.10 0.39 0.84 0.023
(2.09) (5.72) (0.17) (1.02) (1.28) (1.10)
1988-3.20 -0.38 0.42 1.07 -0.69 0.94 0.72 0.099
(1.68) (4.58) (0.13) (0.79) (0.99) (0.79)
1989-3.33 4.22 0.29 0.29 -0.08 0.67 0.59 0.257
(1.82) (5.34) (0.12) (0.85) (1.06) (0.86)
(continued)
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Table 6.6 Cont/d
(II) With Interaction Terms
73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89
CON + + - + - + - - - - + - - - - + -
IPR(1) + - + - + - + + + + - + - + + - +
DIPR(2) - + - -■ - - + - - + + + + + + - +
(1*2) + - + + + + - + + + - - + - - + -
UD(3) - - + + + + - + - + + - - - + + +
(1*3) + + - + - - + - - - - - + - - - -
(2*3) + - + - - + + + - - + + - + - - +
WC(4) + - + - + - + + + - - + + + + - +
(1*4) - + - + - + - - - + + - - - - + -
(2*4) + - + + + + - + + + - - + - - + -
(1*2*3) - + - - - - + - - - + + - + + - +
EC(5) - + + + - + - + +
Notes: (1) For the interaction terms, numbers on the right-hand side of each variable are
used for briefness sake:
IPR = level of import penetration
DIPR = percentage changes in import penetration
CP = difference (simple changes) in import penetration
UD = union density index
WC = workers' coordination index
EC = employers' coordination index
CON = constant
* = interactions between variables
R2 = explained variance
P = probability of the model-inappropriateness
(2) Throughout the period, cross-country general linear models with interaction
terms can explain 100 percent of variance in annual percentage changes of real 
hourly wages in manufacturing. And all the F-values are large enough to reject 
the null hypothesis of model inappropriateness.
PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF PRODUCER PRICE INDEX IN 
MANUFACTURING
Levels of, and percentage changes in, import penetration tend to be 
negatively related with changes in manufacturing producer prices, even if 
not so consistent through the period in question, see appendix, table C10. 
During the first half of the 1980s, economies with higher import penetration 
levels experience increases in producer prices. But in the 1970s, they have 
stronger marginal effects of depressing producer prices over time. 
Percentage changes in import penetration generate decreasing pressure on
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producer prices, albeit not very strong, see figure 6.8, diagram 1.
Decentralized economies tend to have been relatively less volatile to 
increases in producer prices in the 1980s. Intermediate countries might have 
been faced with more increases in producer prices for the manufacturing 
sector, see appendix, table C10, last three columns. Not surprisingly, high 
union coverage is positively related with producer prices except for a few 
years. Workers' coordinations seem to work as desired by showing negative 
correlations with producer prices in the late 1970s, but in most of the 
1980s produced positive correlations, see figure 6.8, diagram 2. Further, 
employers' coordinations tend to decrease producer prices except for a few 
years in the 1980s, but with smaller and smaller marginal effects.
4. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
Tables 6.7, 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10 summarize the effects of competitive 
pressure and the structure of labour market institutions on cross-country 
differences in economic performance. Differences in competitive pressure 
across economies tend to give expected influences on cross-country 
differences in economic performance, albeit not strong. With the 
unemployment and inflation rates, import penetration levels show negative 
correlations, whereas their percentage changes give inconclusive effects. 
This implies that economies with higher import penetration levels tend to 
have experienced less increase in unemployment and inflation rates than 
those with lower levels. However, with regard to the GDP growth rate, 
economies with higher import penetration levels exhibit negative 
correlations, while their percentage changes are positive. These countries 
would not have performed better in terms of growth rates. Cross-country 
differences in import penetration levels, thus, do not give consistent 
explanations for economic performance across countries, see table 6.7.
Although relatively weak, percentage changes in import penetration, 
like in the case of time-series variations within an economy, tend to show 
expected signs in about a half of all relevant cases. Economies facing higher 
changes in import penetration tend to show: (i) less increase or decrease in 
unemployment, inflation, and consumer price changes; (ii) less decrease or
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increase in production and productivity growth rates, see tables 6.7 and 
6 .8 .
Similarly, for cross-country differences in economic performance in 
the manufacturing sector, our competitive pressure hypothesis is partly 
confirmed. Economies faced with higher competitive pressure show less 
decrease or increase in manufacturing employment and labour productivity 
relative to the others with lower pressures, see table 6.9. Canonical multi­
variate correlations, including both levels of and percentage changes in 
import penetration as a combined indicator of competitive pressure, support 
those findings for cross-country difference in economic performance, except 
for unemployment and real hourly wages in manufacturing, see table 6.10.
Economies faced with higher competitive pressure show less 
decreases or increases in production growth rates. However this is less 
obvious for unemployment and inflation rates. Comparing economies facing 
intense competition with those facing lower competitive pressure, the 
economic performance of the former is better in terms of productivity and 
consumer price inflations. For the manufacturing sector, our evidence 
suggests that competitive pressure might have helped to increase 
employment, real value-added, and labour productivity. In sum, both simple 
and rank correlations and multi-variate correlations imply that economies 
experiencing high levels of competitive pressure may have suffered less in 
terms of economic performance. These results, however, should be 
interpreted with some caution since correlations are, in some cases, 
insufficiently strong to be statistically significant. Nonetheless, the overall 
thrust and direction of the relationships support our findings in chapter five 
and three propositions of our competitive pressure hypothesis.
Using annual data, we also tested the two conventional hypotheses - 
the corporatist and the U-curve, see tables 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9. Rank 
correlations with the index of centralization in bargaining levels tend to be 
positively related to: (i) Unemployment and production growth rates; (ii) 
Annual changes in real GDP per capita and consumer price inflation; (iii) 
Annual changes in real hourly wages, employment, and labour productivity 
in manufacturing. They tend to be negatively related to: (i) Inflation; and (ii) 
Changes in manufacturing producer prices.
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Most correlations provide evidence against the corporatist 
hypothesis. Except for the three correlations which include: (i) Cross­
country differences in unemployment rates; (ii) Changes in consumer price 
inflation; and (iii) Manufacturing real hourly wages. Nevertheless, 
centralization of bargaining levels are found to be helpful at least in 
preventing unemployment increases and in restraining rapid wage rises. 
Except for production growth rates and changes in manufacturing labour 
productivity, rank correlations for the revised index of centralization exhibit 
expected signs, but again with little statistical significance. Thus, the U- 
curve hypothesis of Calmfors and Driffill (1988) seems to be partly 
supported by our study.
When indicators for the structure of labour market institutions are 
broken down into three components, we discovered interesting implications 
for the degree of union coverage, see tables 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9. Those 
economies with higher union coverage tend to experience lower rates of 
unemployment up to the mid-1970s, and higher rates since then. Also in 
many cases, these economies show less variation in real GDP per capita. 
Conventional wisdom can be applied to the other indicators. But workers' 
and employers' coordinations, which are important determinants of the 
centralization index are inconsistent. Multi-variate correlations including the 
structural indicators as well as competitive pressure suggest similar 
implications with those including only competitive pressure, see table 6.10. 
Signs are reversed for consumer price inflation, changes in real hourly 
wages and labour productivity of the manufacturing sector.
All in all, our analyses supports, if partly, our competitive pressure 
hypothesis. Those economies facing higher pressures tend to show better 
economic performance compared to the others facing lower pressures. The 
underlying logic behind this phenomena is addressed in the previous two 
chapters. However, cross-country empirical findings do not overwhelmingly 
support our hypothesis compared to the U-curve hypothesis, for example. 
One message might be that cross-country differences in economic 
performance can be more fully explained by looking at competitive pressures 
and the structure of labour market institutions at the same time. The other 
reason may be that cross-country analyses are more limited by the inter-
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country data compatibility. The fact that our competitive hypothesis is 
strongly supported by time-series variations within an economy, but not 
sufficiently by cross-country studies, reflects this data problem.
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Table 6.7 Summary o f Findings on the Effects o f Competitive Pressure on Cross-country Variations (!)
UNEMPLOYMENT---------------------------INFLATION GDP GROWTH RATE------
simple corr. rank corr. simple corr. rank corr. simple corr. rank corr.
COMPETITIVE
PRESSURE
Level of IPR - [17/29] - [25/29] - [19/29] -[19/29] -[23/29] - [22/29]
+ (1978-89) - (1961-83) - (1973-84 0/-(1973-89) - (1961-69 - (1962-68
- (1961-77) (1986-87) 1986-89) + (1962-67) 1983-89) 1983-89)
Percentage + [15/29] + [17/29] + [16/29] -[17/29] + [1 9 /2 9 ] + [22/29]
changes in IPR + (1983-87) 0/ + (1981-88) + (1963-69 + (1963-70)
80-84, 86-89) 0/ + (1973-84)
Changes in IPR - [15/29] - [16/29] + [17/29] + [15/29] + [20/29] + [21/29]
+ (1983-89) - (1976-81) + (1961-66) + (1963-69) + (1963-69)
STRUCTURES OF
LABOUR MARKET
INSTITUTIONS
Centralization + [29/29] - [17/29] + [19/29]
of bargaininglov/olc (1961-89) - (1961-67) + (1983-89)IcVcIo
U-curve index + [21/29] + [19/29] + [17/29]
+ (1970-89) + /0(1971 -82) + (1962-71)
* (1984-89)
Union density - [15/29] + [24/29] - [20/29]
(1961-67. 1968-76) - (1961-66
+ (1977-89) 1983-88)
Workers7 - (1961-89) + [24/29] - [17/29]
coordination - (1983-89)
Employers' - [29/29] - [18/29] - [18/29]
coordination (1961-89) - (1973-89) - (1983-89)
Notes: * = statistical significance at 10 per cent level.
Table 6.8 Summary o f Findings on the Effects o f Competitive Pressures on Cross-country Variations (II)
PRODUCER PRICE INDEX IN MANU. 
simple corr. rank corr.
------------REAL GDP PER'CAPITA ~
simple corr. rank corr.
U0N3UMERTRTCE1NDEX 
simple corr. rank corr.
COMPETITIVE
PRESSURE
Level of I PR
Percentage 
changes in IPR
STRUCTURES OF 
LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS
Centralization 
of bargaining 
levels
U-curve index
Union density
Workers'
coordination
Employers'
coordination
-[12/17]
- (1983-89)
+ [12/17]
+ (1979-84)
+ [9/17]
- (1983-87)
+ [9/17]
+ [10/17]
[12/ 17]
+ [12/17]
0/ + (1973-77)
+ [9/17]
+ (1984-88)
- [13/17]
- (1974-81) 
1983-87)
- [14/17]
- (1973-81 
1986-89)
- [9/17]
- (1975-78)
+ [13/17]
+ (1975-78 
1980-85)
+ [14/17]
+ (1981-88) 
-[17/17]
- (1973-89)
-[16/17] 
+ (1984)
-[9 /17]
+ [10/17]
0/ + (1973-82)
+ [12/17]
+ (1973-80)
-[11/17]
- (1973-80)
+ [11/17]
- (1975-78)
- [13/17] 
-(1977-80 
1985-88)
- [11/17]
- [9/17] 
-(1980-85)
+ [14/17] 
0+(197486)
+ [12/ 17]
+ (1981-85)
+ [11/17]
- (1975-79)
- [12/ 17]
- (1973-81)
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Table 6.9 Summary of Findings on the Effects of Competitive Pressure on Cross-country Variations (Hi): For the Annual Percentage 
Changes in Manufacturing Sector Economic Performance
REAL HOURLY WAGES EMPLOYMENT REAL VALUE-ADDEDTERXAFITA
simple corr. rank corr. simple corr. rank corr. simple corr. rank cor
COMPETITIVE
PRESSURE
Level of I PR + [9/17] + [10/17] - [11/17] - [12/17] + [9/17] + [9/17]
- (1981-85) + (1973-76 
1985-89)
- (1976-81) - (1976-81) - (1984-89) -*(198487)
Percentage + [9/17] + [10/17] + [15/17] + [12/17] + [10/17] + [13/17]
changes in IPR + (1975-80) + (1973-79 
1984-89)
+ (1977-81) + (198189)
STRUCTURES OF
LABOUR MARKET
INSTITUTIONS
Centralization + [9/17] + [12/17] + [10/17]
of bargaining + (1977-84) + (1976-79) + (198488)
levels - (1985-89)
U-curve index + [11/17]
+ *(1977-83)
- [11/17] 
-*(1983-88)
+ [11/17] 
+ *(1975-78 
1985-88)
Union density + [14/17] -[13/17]
- (1976-81 
1986-89)
- [10/17]
- (1983-88)
Workers' - [9/17] - [12/17] - [11/17]
coordination - (1980-85) - (1983-88)
Employers' - [9/17] - [12/17] - [11/17]
coordination - (1977-84) - (1983-88)
Notes: * = Statistical significance at 10 per cent level.
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Table 6.10 Summary of Findings from Canonical Multivariate Correlation
Analyses
Competitive Pressure Plus
Labour Market 
Structures
Unemployment + [17/29] + [22/29]
- (1966-68, 74-76,
83-84, 86-87)
Inflation - [15/29] (1970-74) - [15/29] (1970-74)
GDP growth rate + [20/29] (1979-83) + [19/29] (1979-82)
Real GDP per
capita + [16/17] (1978-89) + [15/17] (1979-89)
Consumer price
index - [10/17] (1974-77 + [10/17] (1973-76)
Producer price 1983-86) - [10/17] (1975-77
index in 1986-89)
manufacturing - [9/17] (1974-76) - [10/17] (1976-77
Real hourly 1979-81)
wages in + [13/17]
manufacturing - (1981-83, 1985)
Employment in
manufacturing + [13/17] (1984-88) + [11/17] (1978-82
Real value-added 1986-89)
in manufacturing + [11/17] (1977-82) + [9/17] (1978-82)
Real value-added - (1983-87)
per capita in + [12/17] (1974-78 - [10/17] (1975-77
manufacturing - (1985-87) 1980-84) 1985-87)
Notes: (1) Competitive pressure is comprised of the level and percentage changes in
import penetration ratios, while the labour market structure is comprise of 
the degrees of union density, workers' and employers' coordinations.
(3) Multiple indicators for economic performance are in two groups; one for
unemployment, inflation, and GDP growth rate; the other for economic 
performance indicators for the manufacturing sector plus real GDP per 
capita and consumer price index, all of which are based on their annual 
percentage changes.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
COMPETITIVE PRESSURE, LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
; Supplementary evidence from case studies
1. INTRODUCTION
Our competitive pressure hypothesis developed in chapter 4 has been, in 
part, confirmed by our empirical studies based on data from seventeen 
O.E.C.D. countries. Our theory suggests that sectors or economies which 
experience increased competitive pressure are more likely than not to 
increase their economic performance. Both time-series and cross-country 
variations in economic performance show expected relationships with 
competitive pressure. Although we deliberately develop our theory to avoid 
directly measuring behaviourial variables, the behaviourial dimension can be 
indirectly examined by studying the potential effects of competitive pressure 
on economic performance. This way, we can also contribute to the debate 
on the role of labour market institutions in explaining cross-country 
differences in economic performance. However, our arguments would be 
significantly strengthened if we could find direct supportive evidence for 
these behaviourial changes.
This chapter is devoted to this endeavour. We do this by synthesizing 
data from a number of case studies, especially those on specific countries1. 
In the first section major empirical results regarding our theory are 
recapitulated. The second section will briefly examine a cross-country 
comparative study on the changes in industrial relations systems. The 
following two sections assess supportive evidence for in the U.K. and the 
U.S.2 The last section will summarize our qualitative evidence and suggest
11ndustry or company-level case studies would be more appropriate for our purpose. Even 
if many studies are available, they have little common ground which makes comparisons 
difficult. Thus in this section, we focus our attention on country-specific case studies using 
industry and company level data.
2 One reason to investigate these two economies is that there are more studies about the 
possible effects of environmental pressure on wage bargaining processes and outcomes for 
the U.K. and U.S. Also the British experience represents an example of economies which 
have faced with many changes in their formal system, while that of the U.S. represents 
economies which have had less change: 'Changes that need consideration, however, are 
those that have taken place in the 1980s in France, Britain, Sweden and Australia, in 
contrast to the United States and Japan where there have been few systematic changes'
implications for research in the future.
2. THE EFFECTS OF COMPETITIVE PRESSURE ON LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: A recapitulation of 
empirical findings
One of our most important findings is that import penetration has two 
significant effects. Higher levels of import penetration has a negative 
influence on time-series changes in employment within an economy. Larger 
changes in import penetration, on the other hand, tends to generate 
countervailing pressure to employment3. The latter finding supports the 
underlying logic of our theoretical framework. That is, more intense 
competitive pressure may elicit changes in the behaviour of workers, as well 
as employers, at the bargaining table in such a way that bargaining 
processes and outcomes might be more supportive of economic 
performance. These countervailing competitive pressures on unemployment 
rates turn out to be strongest in those economies with intermediately- 
centralized bargaining structures. This is contrary to Calmfors and Driffill 
(1988), widely accepted, U-curve hypothesis. However, once both the level 
and percentage change in import penetration ratios are included together, 
multivariate correlations exhibit positive signs with unemployment due to 
the larger positive effect of the levels. In this case, the U-curve hypothesis 
seems to be favoured.
Cross-country variations in unemployment do not tend to be 
explained consistently by any indicator of competitive pressure. 
Nevertheless, those economies facing higher import penetration levels tend 
to have suffered less in terms of unemployment rates up to the mid-1970s. 
Also it is interesting to note that almost the same implications can be drawn
Clarke and Niland (1991; p. 165)
3 Differences in the size of coefficients tell us that the marginal effects of import 
penetration levels are a lot stronger than those of countervailing forces from their changes. 
Also those coefficients for the level of import penetration are statistically significant in all the 
17 countries, while for the percentage changes they are significant only in Finland, New 
Zealand, and Australia. However, for the purpose of this thesis the finding that signs of 
percentage changes in import penetration on unemployment rates are negative except in Italy 
and Switzerland among 17 countries cannot but be emphasized enough.
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for inflation measured by the GDP deflator, since 1973. Inflation measured 
by the consumer price index consistently shows negative signs across time 
as well as across countries. Is this mainly due to lower prices of imported 
consumer goods? Not necessarily, because the producer price index is also 
negatively related with competitive pressure. Thus, there is a strong case 
in favour of our own hypothesis that perceptions of competitive pressure 
may engender a slower increase in inflation: either from wage restraint or 
from greater increases in productivity. Despite the fact that differences in 
the size of marginal effects cannot be proved, it is significant that all the 
indicators for production and productivity growth rates are positively related 
with percentage changes in import penetration. This is the case for the time- 
series variations within an economy as well as cross-country variations 
especially in the 1980s, see table 7.1.
Table 7 .1 The Effects of Competitive Pressure on Economic 
Performance: Comparisons Between Time-series and Cross­
country Variations
Time-series Variations 
Level % change MCC
Cross-country Variations 
Level % change MCC
Macro-economic 
Indicators 
GDP growth* + + +
Inflation* + - - - - -
Unemployment* + - + - + /- +
Real GDP per 
capita + + + + +
Consumer price 
index . . . _ .
Indicators for
Manufacturing
Sector
Real wages + + + -/ + -/ + +
Employment + + + - + +
Real value-added + + + - + +
Real value-added 
per capita _ + + -/ + + +
Producer price 
index - - - - - -/ +
Notes: (1) * = Data not based on annual percentage changes.
(2) Sings are not consistent across country or over time. Correlations with
each variable tend to show the above signs in more than half of the cases. 
If both signs have similar number of cases, then we treat it as ambiguous 
I-/ +  ).
(3) MCC: Multiple Canonical Correlations
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Percentage changes in import penetration tend to generate pressure on 
workers and employers which influences their strategic choices. This is 
predicted by our theory. Indeed, not only over time but also across country, 
these choices tend to show consistent relationships with economic 
performance indicators. Employer and employee choices are4:
(i) Negatively related with unemployment and inflation rates5;
(ii) Positively related with production and productivity growth rates;
(iii) Positively related with annual changes in employment, real value- 
added, labour productivity of the manufacturing sector.
These findings lend support, if not complete, to our competitive pressure 
hypothesis derived from changes in industrial relations.
Direct qualitative evidence on behaviourial changes behind these 
relationships lend significant support to our arguments for the competitive 
pressure hypothesis. To do this we must examine whether there has been 
any changes in labour relations in the industrialized countries over the last 
two or three decades. And if so, explain why and judge whether these have 
been influenced by international competitive pressure. To do this we review 
changes in European labour relations systems during the last two decades. 
This will be carried out in section 3. Sections 4 and 5 will examine industrial 
relations processes and outcomes of the U.K. and the U.S.
3. CHANGES IN EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEMS
Broadly speaking, the 25 years of unprecedented and sustained economic 
growth and, to a large extent, full employment that started in the late 
1940s, enabled workers to receive regular improvements in their living 
standards and working conditions, see e.g., Clarke and Niland (1991). 
Accordingly labour relations have been pretty receptive to changes in the
4 These correlations are not strong enough to be statistically significant in some cases 
(see, for details, chapters 5 and 6).
5 Inflation is measured in three different ways: By changes in GDP deflator; Consumer 
prices; and Manufacturing producer prices.
180
economic climate before the Second World War, and also relatively peaceful 
until the 1960s:
'Before the war, the determination of wages and working conditions 
reflected the state of trade: improvement when business was good 
and no improvement or even cuts when business was bad...At least 
up to the time that economic growth faltered, near the end of the 
1960s, such improvement helped ensure a high degree of industrial 
peace in most of the countries/ Clarke and Niland (1991; p.3)
However, many industrial relations systems had not really adjusted to the 
changed economic environment when, in 1979, the second major rise in oil 
prices hit the non-oil-producing countries. It is regarded as unprecedented 
in the history of industrial relations that during the 1970s the trend in 
income distribution and in industrial relations was favourable to labour and 
its representatives, even when the long post-war expansion had finally come 
to an end6.
'These events, together with others no less important, such as the 
massive resurgence of unemployment, did not appear to give rise to 
any substantial constraints on industrial relations or to diminish either 
the political or the bargaining power or the recognition of the unions.' 
Baglioni (1991; p.2)
Indeed, during the 1970s there was an incongruity between economic 
under-performance and the progressive advance in the objectives and 
accomplishments of trade union action. This encouraged governments to 
confront their labour relations systems. In the case of the U.K., this led to 
important changes in employment legislation. While results of the measures 
taken by various countries and of the processes which emerged show a 
number of similarities, they also provide evidence of the persistence or 
emergence of significant differences, see e.g., Baglioni (1989; p.253).
Even if difficult, these similarities and divergences in the experience 
of European countries are summarized in figure 7.1. The shared features of 
the 1970s primarily involve political relations at the higher levels of 
collective bargaining. In the 1980s, by contrast, decentralizing trends and 
concession bargaining were common across Europe. In the 1970s, 
divergences are found in the mechanisms of concertation between different
6 The oil shocks of the early 1970s triggered recession and an end to the expansionist 
years, see e.g., Baglioni (1991).
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Figure 7.1 Commonness and Divergences o f European Industrial
Relations Systems Over the 1970s and the 1980s
[ COMMONNESS ]
[ DIVERGENCES ]
strong recognition of 
organized labour
the methods and workings 
of concertation
development of 
decentralized bargaining
the presence or absence 
of industrial democracy 
projects
the prevalence and 
independence of 
decentralized bargaining
the importance and 
incidence of national- 
level bargaining
widespread resort to 
national-level collective 
bargaining
unimportance of employer- 
initiated participation 
scheme
recognition of the 
legitimacy and the 
function of organized 
labour
the presence and 
difficulties of 
concertation practices 
and institutions
the extent of 
deregulation in 
employment and in the 
renumeration of labour
regression, or absence 
of experiments in 
industrial democracy 
especially in private 
sector
a modest increase in the 
extent of managerial 
strategies of worker 
participation through 
unions
a growing and ramified 
presence of worker 
participation schemes 
apart from if not hostile 
to the unions
Source: Authors' compilation from Baglioni (1991; pp. 30-31).
Notes: (1 )------------ and = stand for features of the 1970s and the 1980s respectively.
(2) a, b and c are points to be discussed in the text.
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interest groups and also in plant level industrial relations. This includes 
company-level bargaining, steps towards the deregulation of employment 
and to use of labour. In the 1980s, differences are striking and substantial, 
especially in the political and institutional spheres. Furthermore, differences 
are even perceptible in the general state of relations between business and 
labour, and hence, in the national level of collective bargaining. Interestingly, 
common features of the 1970s become divergent in the 1980s, while 
divergent features of the 1970s become common in the 1980s. Several 
changes should be noted:
(i) The development of decentralized collective bargaining across 
European countries, with concomitant decreases in the importance 
and incidence of national level bargaining, see a & a' in figure 7.1;
(ii) The relative slowness in recognizing the legitimacy and function 
of organized labour, see b in figure 7.1;
(iii) A modest increase in the extent of managerial strategies of 
worker participation with or without unions across countries, see c 
in figure 7.1.
These changes may indirectly imply that, at an economy level, flexibility 
increases at the expense of consensus. A t the level of the business unit, 
flexibility and consensus might increase and result in more flexible and 
cooperative labour relations. However, it is not altogether clear from existing 
studies how influential international competitive pressure has been in these 
changes. The previous two chapters which highlight consistent relationships 
between competitive pressure and economic performance across countries 
and over time suggest that they might have played a significant role.
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 present in greater detail cross-country differences 
in labour relations as well as the major characteristics of their changes in the 
1980s. The tables show that, across countries, employers increasingly 
demand flexibility, and business units show a reduction in the rigidities 
accumulated during the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, employers 
demonstrate a preference for decentralized employment contracts which 
emphasize company-level bargaining. However, employers' attitudes to
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Table 7.2 Major Characteristics of European Industrial Relations: Changes 
in Actors' Position in the 1980s
Actors Characteristic Features of Industrial Relations
State Prevalence of conservative governments
Transnational convergence in its action
the need to curb the budget deficit and inflation; to 
improve international competitiveness 
the effort to curb the rise in labour cost, to control 
wage rises, mainly through incomes policy 
Significant differences in:
the treatment of labour unions 
the degree of recognition accorded to unions 
the role unions are permitted to play 
Little convergence to relations between the state, unions and 
employer organizations (concentration)
Employers Determination and initiative to remodel the industrial relations 
system
maintain the legitimacy of the unions as representatives 
of the collective interests of working people 
Convergence in:
the demand for flexibility intending to attenuate or 
eliminate many rigid rules accumulated during the 
1960s and 1970s
- internal flexibility; changes in: (i) work organization, (ii) 
working hours, (iii) work performance, (iv) job tasks, 
and (v) wage system
- external flexibility; change in: (i) the number of 
employees, (ii) non-standard, (iii) employment contracts, 
and (iv) worker mobility
the preference for decentralization in the management 
of employment contracts (a clear preference for 
bargaining at the company level) 
the renewed employer political presence 
Divergences in:
employer attitudes to workers and their union 
representatives (managerial styles)
Unions Weakened political presence of the unions
The growth of division between central labour organizations 
and, in some cases, within the same organization 
A perceptible decline in the authority of central confederations 
Divergences in the level of union membership and its changes 
A substantial decline in strikes dating back to the mid-1970s 
a diminution in the share of traditional bread and butter 
strikes over wages and working conditions in industry 
strikes increasingly dependent on economic variables 
and to be pro-cyclical
- recession strikes taking on a defensive character with 
a tendency to decline
- unemployment tending to exercise restraint
Source: A compiled table, largely based on Baglioni (1991; pp.10-29)
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Table 7.3 Major Characteristics o f European Industrial Relations:
Industrial Relations Processes in the 1980s
Processes Characteristic Features of Industrial Relations
Political Arena Greater, more active and often direct intervention of
the public powers
generally helping structural changes to 
reduce the role of national contracts in 
favour of local negotiations
Collective Bargaining General pattern of increasing difficulties for
collective bargaining (more evident at the start of 
the 1980s) compared to previous years 
Significant national differences in the degree of 
solidity of collective bargaining practices 
Convergence between political variables and 
industrial relations; collective bargaining not 
necessarily depending on political conditions even 
where there is a tendency to stronger state 
intervention
the relative solidity of collective bargaining 
practices heavily affected by economic 
conditions and by management style in 
labour relations 
Decentralization in collective bargaining 
Increased bargaining over flexibility; more 
substantial with respect to internal than external 
flexibility
Increased worker participation, but without much 
progress in industrial democracy
managers dealing with workers directly, 
ignoring or cutting across union 
representatives
growing demand for and experience of the 
involvement of workers 
The reduction in working hours being traded off 
against the firms' ability to arrange working time in 
line with their own functional needs 
More wage claims adjusted by performance of 
structural-economic indicators such as 
competitiveness, labour productivity, and anti­
inflation adjustment
but renewed real wage growth or at least a 
halt in the downward trend from 1984 to 
1986, particularly in manufacturing 
- wage rises not being granted to the public 
sector
increasing wage drift, wider salary ranges 
not always set by collective bargaining, 
discretionary and individual salary decisions
Source: A compiled table, largely based on Baglioni (1991; pp.10-29)
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workers and union representatives exhibit some cross-country differences 
which manifest themselves as distinct management styles. In addition to 
differences in union membership levels and changes, there are differences 
in the growth of divisions between, and in some cases within, central labour 
organizations. Notably, there has been a substantial decline in strikes, in 
particular the traditional bread-and-butter strikes over wages and working 
conditions in industry. Strikes have become increasingly dependent on 
economic variables. These changes in employers' and unions' positions in 
labour relations suggest that they might have become more perceptive of 
changes in economic conditions like international competitive pressure.
Over the same period, government approaches to labour relations do 
not appear to have changed consistently across countries. Our theory 
deliberately omitted the role of the state and focuses instead on the 
behaviourial interactions between workers and employers. Collective 
bargaining processes are not necessarily dependent on political conditions 
even where there is a tendency of stronger state interventions, see table 
7.3.
From table 7.3, two other developments can be noted: (i) Increased 
worker participation; and (ii) Changes in wage claims, interestingly it has 
become acceptable for managers to deal with workers directly and ignore 
their union representatives. Wage claims are increasingly adjusted by the 
performance of structural-economic indicators such as competitiveness and 
labour productivity7. Wage drift has increased, suggesting wider salary 
ranges which are not always set by collective bargaining. These changes in 
the process of collective bargaining processes support our competitive 
pressure hypothesis.
Even though the 1980s have not been a time of radical 
reconstruction of the bases of industrial relations, it is widely agreed that 
they have nevertheless witnessed changes in the power relationships 
between unions and employers and a strengthening of the emphasis on 
operational efficiency - in particular through enhancing flexibility at the 
workplace, see e.g., Clarke and Niland (1991; p.18). For example, in
7 In the 1980s there has been a proliferation of studies on these developments. For a 
specific case study, see Bradley and Estrin (1987).
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collective bargaining, management strategy generally has played a stronger 
role, and also there has been a greater emphasis on decentralization, with 
more matters being dealt with at the enterprise or workplace level. 
However, there has been no sweeping change in the way in which wages 
and working conditions are determined, see e.g., Clarke and Niland (1991; 
p. 170). Furthermore, industrial relations systems continue to vary 
considerably between countries, both in their form and in their efficacy as 
can be seen in table 7.4. All in all, it should be noted that there have been 
substantial shifts in the focus and style of collective bargaining, with 
stronger emphasis on strategy and workplace bargaining and consultation 
arrangements8.
These changes in industrial relations systems across countries 
strongly support our competitive pressure hypothesis. Changes suggest that 
there has been a greater emphasis on changes in strategic behaviour of 
workers as well as employers rather than cross-country differences in the 
structure of industrial relations systems themselves. In the next section, we 
will provide supportive evidence at an economy level with specific reference 
to the U.K. and the U.S. respectively.
8 There are some studies which would disagree with this, see e.g., Batstone (1988 ); 
Edwards (1986); and Kelly (1988). However, their work is pitched at a different level to 
what is being argued here and these data - particularly Batstone's - is slightly dated.
187
Table 7.4 Changes in European Industrial Relations System Since 1980 
Compared with those in Pre-1980
Type Belgium Denmark Sweden Germany
National concertation 3 - 1 2 -0 2-1/3 2-  1
Industry-wide bargaining 3 -2 3 -2 3 -2 3 -3
Decentralized bargaining 2 -3 2 -3 2 -3 1 - 2
Worker participation with 
union involvement 1 - 2 1 - 1/0 1 - 1 + 3 -2
Worker participation 
without union 0 - 1 1 - 1 + 0 - 0  + 0 - 1
Individual bargaining 1 - 1 + 0 -0  + 0 - 0  + 1 - 1 +
Individual contracts in 
the secondary labour 
market 0 - 1 1 - 1 + 1 - 1 + 0+ - 1
Degree of soundness of 
the bargaining process -2 -1 0 0
Type Netherlands France U.K.
National concertation 3 - 1 3 - 1 1 -0
Industry-wide bargaining 3 -2 3 -3 3 - 1
Decentralized bargaining 1 - 2 1 -3 3 -3  +
Worker participation with 
union involvement 3 -3  + 1- - 2 1 - 1
Worker participation 
without union 0 - 1 1 - 2 + 0 - 1-
Individual bargaining 1 - 1 + 1 - 2 2 -3
Individual contracts in 
the secondary labour 
market 1 - 1 + 1 - 2- 1 - 2 +
Degree of soundness of 
the bargaining process -2 1 -1
Sources:
Notes:
Tables 2.3, 3.3, 4 .1, 5.10, 7.7, 10.1, and 11.7 in Baglioni and Crouch 
(1991). For the 'degree of soundness' see Baglioni (1991; pp.239-240). 
The numbers on the left of each entry indicate the relative degree 
of a certain type of the industrial relations system before 1980, 
and those on the right show how much changes have been since 
1980.
The higher numbers indicate the higher degree of each type. 
Each entry is based on those country studies and evaluated more 
or less subjectively.
For the definition of 'degree of soundness', the numbers indicate 
followings; -2 for seriously weakened bargaining, -1 for somewhat 
weakened bargaining, 0 for intact collective bargaining, and 1 for 
traditionally weak but strengthening bargaining. Baglioni originally 
included Spain and Portugal as 'traditionally weak bargaining'.
( 1 )
(2 )
(3)
(4)
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4. PERCEIVED ENVIRONMENTAL PRESSURE AND CHANGES IN 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING OUTCOMES FOR THE U.K.
Three developments in industrial relations have been particulary important 
in the U.K. during the 1980s, see e.g., Crouch (1991; p.326):
(i) The almost complete rejection by the Conservative government of 
the search for national compromise in industrial relations that had 
characterized the policy of all parties since at least 1940 and, 
arguably, since the early twentieth century;
(ii) The installation of a tough legal framework for trade union action, 
marking the final end of the so-called voluntarist tradition that dates 
back to 1871;
(iii) In several sectors of the economy, the emergence of the 
company as the most important level for industrial relations activity, 
replacing the branch, shop-floor and state levels that had previously 
competed for importance within the British system.
With hindsight, the following questions will be addressed: (i) What have 
been the major developments of wage determination processes? and (ii) 
How might competitive pressure affect wage bargaining?
Within manufacturing there has been a decline in collective 
bargaining. This is partly because some employers took the opportunity of 
the economic and political climate of the 1980s to stop dealing with unions, 
and partly because the recession mainly hit large firms rather than small 
ones, see e.g., Crouch (1991; p.333). Compared with changes in earnings 
for the whole economy, those of the manufacturing sector show relatively 
less increase in the early 1980s but more from late 1983 onwards9.
9 This is the case even though manufacturing was seriously hit by recession, see e.g., 
Crouch (1991; p.334).
* Changes in earnings (1980 = 100)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Whole economy 125.8 137.6 149.2 158.3 171.7 185.3
Manufacturing 123.6 137.4 149.7 162.8 177.6 191.2
Difference -2.2 -0.2 0.5 4.5 5.9 5.9
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Table 7.5 Increase in Earnings by Industry for U.K.
Industry 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 19 8 3-8 4 No. o f 
S e ttlem ents
Food, Drink,
Tobacco 18.3  + 9 .9  + 8.1 + 6 .5  + 6.1 1 64
Chemicals 16.9 10 .0  + 8 .0  + 6 .5  + 6 .2 172
M etals 16 .5 8 .0 - 6.7 4 .8 - 5 .4 - 9 4
Mechanical
Engineering 15.4- 8 .3- 6 .4- 5.3- 5 .6 - 431
Instrum ent
Engineering 16 .0 9 .2 6.9 5.8 6 .3  + 1 74
Textiles 15.0- 8 .5 6 .6 5.8 6 .2 101
Bricks, T imber,
Furniture 16 .6 8.8 6 .6 5 .5 6 .3 70
Paper, Printing
Publishing 18 .2  + 9 .8  + 6.9 6.1 6 .6  + 100
A ll Settlem ents 16.3 9 .0 7 .0 5.7 6 .0 1306
Source: Gregory et at. (1985; p.348; table 3).
Note: + (-) denotes an increase significantly above (below) the average for the remaining
settlements at 5 per cent.
Inter-industry variations however, show significant differences. Indeed, in 
the 1980s, over a cumulative period of five years, three industries - food, 
chemicals and paper - emerged as high settlers, whereas metals, mechanical 
engineering and textiles were relatively low settlers, see table 7.510. The 
latter three industries, in fact, have been faced with greater competitive 
pressure from international markets and have experienced higher levels and 
larger changes in import penetration.
Although there is no direct way to see the effects of competitive 
pressure on wage settlements, it is reasonable to assume that 'profits', 
'degree of monopoly power', and 'risk of redundancy' might have exerted
Source: Department of Employment Gazette; recited from Crouch (1991), Table 11.4.
Crouch associated this reversal in trend to Britain's poor training system which failed to 
produce skilled workers. Further Crouch argued that in much of the manufacturing industry 
little has really changed in collective bargaining: 'In manufacturing shop-steward 
organizations and local bargaining arrangements just waited quietly during the worst of the 
recession, and by the mid-decade had begun to be active again.' (p.334)
However, if we consider inter-industry variations of and their factors of influence 
in wage settlements (see text), these arguments need to be re-evaluated. There have been, 
at least, significant changes in the conduct of collective bargaining, especially in response 
to changes in the economic climate and profitability of industry including competitive 
pressure from international markets.
10 For a detailed discussion, see e.g., Gregory et al. (1985; pp. 347-348).
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Table 7.6 Proportion of Respondents Citing the Factors as 'Very 
Important' in Wage Negotiations for the U.K.
Factors 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84
Upward Pressures
1. Profits 11 11 16 19 21
2. Degree of 
monopoly power 6 4 3 4 4
3. To recruit/ 
retain labour 22 7 6 5 9
4. Cost of living 
increases 60 47 45 36 40
5. Industrial action 
(threatened) 2 2 2 1 3
6. Industrial action 
(taken) 3 2 1 2 2
Downward
Pressures
7. Profits 45 62 60 53 45
8. Degree of 
monopoly power 38 56 52 52 51
9. Risk of 
redundancy 20 43 35 27 21
10. Other 2 6 3 4 3
Source: Gregory et at. (1985; p.350; table 4).
Notes: (1) There are six more factors listed in the original article, 'Other factors 
influencing level of settlement.
(2) Full citations for the factors stated are as follows: 1/7. Level of 
establishment/company profits. 2. Management able to pass on substantial 
part of pay increase in prices. 3. A need to improve ability to recruit/retain 
labour. 8. Management unable to pass on substantial part of pay increase 
in prices. 9. Risk of redundancy if large pay increase awarded. 10. This 
factor has changed over period: for 1979/80 dealing with the impact of 
direct tax cuts; for 1980-81 with that of government exhortation; and for 
the rest with that of employee involvement policies.
downward pressure on wages, see tables 7.6 and 7.7. It may not be 
surprising, as Gregory et al. (1985; p. 351) argue that product market 
pressure, from profits and prices, has consistently outweighed the risk of 
redundancy as a downward pressure on wage settlements. The former two 
factors have been significantly more affected by international competitive 
pressure than the third factor (see chapters 5 and 6). The more important 
point may be that managers in the low-wage industries have given too much 
emphasis to 'profits' and 'the risk of redundancy' in wage negotiations. In 
contrast, the high settlers have given less importance to all three plausible 
indicators of competitive pressure: (i) 'Profits'; (ii) 'Degree of monopoly 
power'; (iii) 'Risk of redundancy'. In fact, high settlers cite 'profits' more 
often as upward pressure, see table 7.7.
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Table 7.7 Factor Ratings for High (H) and Low (L) Settlers
Factors 1 97 9 /8 0 1980/81 1 9 8 1 /8 2 19 8 2 /8 3 1 9 8 3 /8 4
H L H L H L H L H L
Upward Pressures
1. Profits
2. Degree o f 
m onopoly pow er
3 . To recru it/ 
retain labour
4. Cost o f liv ing
+ +
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
increases
5 . Industria l action 
(threatened)
6. Industrial action 
(taken)
Downward
Pressures
+
7 . Profits
8 . Degree o f
~ + + + + +
m onopoly pow er 
9. Risk o f
“ + - - +
redundancy 
10. O ther
+ + - + +
Source: Gregory et at. (1985; p.350; table 4).
Notes: (1) There are six more factors listed in the original article, 'Other factors
influencing level of settlement.
(2) Full citations for the factors stated are as follows: 1/7. Level of
establishment/company profits. 2. Management able to pass on substantial 
part of pay increase in prices. 3. A need to improve ability to recruit/retain 
labour. 8. Management unable to pass on substantial part of pay increase 
in prices. 9. Risk of redundancy if large pay increase awarded. 10. This 
factor has changed over period: for 1979/80 dealing with the impact of 
direct tax cuts; for 1980-81 with that of government exhortation; and for 
the rest with that of employee involvement policies.
(3) + (-) denotes an influence significantly above (below) the
average for the remaining sectors in that year at 5 per cent 
level.
This line of argument can also be applied to the finding by 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1988) that wage rates appear to be shaped by 
employers' financial prosperity (cited as 'profitability/productivity' and 'all 
establishment could afford') and also affected by external pressure which 
can be captured by those factors cited as the: 'increasing cost of living', 
'going rate in industry', and 'external pay structure'11. It is also interesting 
to note that even if union and non-union pressure upon wages settlements 
are apparently similar, with the exception of merit payments for individual
11 Blanchflower and Oswald (1988) are similar in spirit to Gregory et a/. (1985; 1986).
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Table 7.8 Factors Influencing the Level of Pay in the Most Recent 
Settlement (per cent responsesI
Manuals Non-Manuals
Union Non-union Union Non-union
All establishment
could afford 11 5 9 7
Increased cost of
living 34 29 37 32
Going rate in
industry 15 23 13 19
Merit/individual
performance 4 20 5 33
Published norms 3 2 3 4
Internal pay
structure 2 3 6 15
External pay
structure 15 15 9 11
Government
regulation 6 3 10 2
Strikes 1 0 0 0
Profitability/
productivity 34 35 37 38
Economic climate 9 2 13 3
Other 13 7 15 6
Not answered 8 3 11 1
Number of
establishments 488 613 356 904
Source: Blanchflower and Oswald (1988; p.366; table 2).
performance12, union sectors seem to be more perceptive of changes in the 
'economic climate', see table 7.813. This supports, albeit indirectly, one of 
the propositions of our theory: that workers in densely-unionized companies 
tend to perceive competitive pressure more accurately, see chapter 4.
Ingram (1991) highlights the extent of changes in working practices 
that have been linked to pay settlements during the 1980s. Even if his 
analysis is focused on the 1980s, he finds a number of significant changes 
in working practices introduced simultaneously with wage negotiations. 
Moreover, he also indicates that there was an increase in such practices
12 Blanchflower and Oswald (1988; pp.367-368).
13 In the late 1980s, the financial performance of the firm had become increasingly 
important in wage settlement determination. According to Gregg and Yates (1991), this 
indicates that 'financial pressures on the firm were increasingly being transmitted to the 
workforce.' However, it could also be interpreted that workers and unions have become 
more perceptive of financial performance of the company, see e.g., Gregg and Yates (1991 ; 
pp.361-376).
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with the intensification of competitive pressure. Similarly, Machin and 
Wadhwani (1989) find that unionized plants were more likely to have 
experienced a change in working practices in the 1980s, showing larger 
effects where there was a simultaneous increase in product market 
competition14. These studies further support, if indirectly, our findings of 
positive correlations between competitive pressure and macro-economic 
performance.
5. CHANGES IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PRESSURE, PROCESS AND
OUTCOMES: A cross-sector study for the U.S.A.
Increasingly, widespread economic problems have been viewed as largely 
originating from pressure engendered by long-term changes in the nature of 
the international economy. Industrial policy directed at such problems often 
critically depends on the active participation and cooperation of employees, 
employers and government. Although the shape of the ensuing relationships 
have not yet become clear during the first half of the 1980s, see Kochan 
and Wever (1991), a variety of experiments and changes have taken place 
in industrial relations in the U.S.
Indeed, it is widely agreed, at least in the U.S., that the globalisation 
of markets and structural adjustments have combined to make it 
increasingly more difficult for unions to "take wages out of competition" 
through collective bargaining by standardising costs among producers. 
According to Kochan and Wever (1991) wage settlements in major 
bargaining units averaged 1 to 3 per cent below those that would have 
resulted had collective bargaining continued to follow the wage patterns of
14 They also suggested that 'organisational change' was more likely if:
(a) The plant is larger, probably because restrictive practices are more likely to be present 
in the first place.
(b) The plant is experiencing financial distress.
(c) The plant is foreign-owned.
(d) In the recent past, the plant has been taken over (although the evidence here is rather 
weak).
(e) The plant has a joint consultative committee (i.e., a "voice" effect).
(f) In the recent past, the product market has become less concentrated. Importantly, there 
is a suggestion that the union effects on organisational change are much larger in cases 
where there is a simultaneous increase in product market competition.
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Table 7.9 Concessions by Manufacturing industry Group15
Industry Group Number of 
concession 
negotiations
% of unionized 
affected 
(estimates)
Food 16 20
Tobacco 0 0
Textile mill 3
Apparel 8 30
Lumber 1 5
Furniture 0 0
Paper 3 5
Printing 6 22
Chemicals 1 28
Petroleum products 2 25
Rubber and plastics 5 44
Leather and products 1 35
Stone, clay and glass 5 20
Primary metal 27 40
Fabricated metal 1 1
Non-electric machinery 17 35
Electrical & electronic 4 45
Transportation equipment 31 48
Instruments 0 0
Miscellaneous manufacturing 3 33
Source: Cappelli and McKersie (1985; p.229; table 11.1).
the 1970s. However, evidence suggests that concessions were far from 
uniform across industries. Indeed, Cappelli and McKersie (1985) draw 
attention to this fact with data from the 1982 U.S. labour negotiations, see 
table 7.9. The number of concessions was higher in those industries such 
as food, primary metal, non-electric machinery, and transportation 
equipment. These industries had a reputation for their union density. In 
descending order of magnitude the most densely unionised were: 
transportation equipment, electrical and electronic, rubber and plastics, and 
primary metal industries. Unsurprisingly, most of these industries have been 
faced with relatively higher international competition. This suggests that 
increased product market competition, combined with declining levels of 
unionisation, produce a fundamental shift in wage setting institutions and
15 Data in table 7.9 are originally from the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) and includes 
all cases where parties were negotiated concessions. They do not show where agreement 
had been reached.
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Table 7.10 Collective Bargaining Pressures, Process and Outcomes in the 1982 U.S. Bargaining Rounc(6
Industry Auto Steel Rubber Clothing Trucking Airlines Meat­ Electrical Oil
packing products refining
Environmental Economic
Pressures
International competition X X X X
Domestic nonunion competition X X X X X X X
Regulatory change X X
Bargaining Process
Changes in degree of X X X X X
centralization
Shift in role of IR function X X X
New forms of communication
or tactics X X X X X X
Bargaining Outcomes
Compensation level
concessions X X X X X X
Changes in pay criteria X X X
Work rules X X X X X X
Job Security X X X X
Union jurisdictional issues X
Labour-management
cooperation X X X X
16 Note that in the table, X is placed in each category box where they found a significant development within 1982 bargaining in an industry; 
sometimes affected only one major company or agreement while in other cases pervading the whole industry. For more details on their sample and 
methodology, see Katz (1985; pp. 214-215).
collective bargaining outcomes17.
How has competitive pressure affected the changes and outcomes 
in collective bargaining process across industries? Data reported in table 
7.10 suggests that those industries with international competition seem to 
have significantly more experience of labour-management cooperation than 
otherwise, especially in the auto, steel and clothing sectors. In fact, the nine 
industries mentioned in table 7.10 can be grouped into four according to the 
nature and the extent of economic pressure:
(i) Stable (or favourable) pressure (electrical products and oil 
refining);
(ii) Intense pressure from domestic sources (trucking, airlines, and 
meat-packing);
(iii) Intense pressure from both domestic and international markets 
(auto, steel, and rubber); and
(iv) Historically high competitive pressure (clothing).
It is notable that those industries in groups (i) and (iv) have not shown 
significant developments while those under intense pressure in the other 
groups exhibited major changes including bargaining processes and 
outcomes18. Even though those in (i) and (iv) are similar in the sense that 
there are no remarkable changes, it should be noted that in the clothing 
industry - group (iv) - labour and management constantly had adapted to the 
threat of competition throughout the post-World War II period:
17 It should be noted that the most general development associated with concession 
bargaining has been a broadening of the bargaining agenda to include employment levels and 
strategic business decisions. In previous periods, employment levels were not an issue in 
bargaining mainly because they remained reasonably stable; if at all, employment 
adjustments occurred incrementally and temporarily (Cappelli and McKersie 1985; p.227). 
However, the incidence of concession agreements are falling; the amount of concession 
activity followed the worsening economic climate from 1981 to 1982 with a time lag - 
increasing as the economy declined and receding as the downturn slowed in late 1982-3 
(ibid. p.230).
18 Note that those pay and work-rule concession in these industries are consistent with 
a national slow-down in the rate of compensation increases. Similar types of changes have 
occurred in these and other industries during previous economic recessions.
However, the magnitude of the reduction in the rate of pay increases and the scope 
of work-rule changes set the 1982 concessions apart from the outcomes of bargaining in 
previous recessions, see Katz (1985).
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'In industries that have been declining for some time, such as the 
textile and garment industries, the economic aspects of bargaining 
has been adjusting for quite a while and the process of adapting to 
the worsening environments has been more gradual. One could draw 
an analogy here to a dam that holds back pressure until it finally 
breaks, leading to a big collapse; contracts that adjust continually 
and gradually to economic changes may avoid that sudden collapse/ 
Cappelli and McKersie (1985; pp.231-232)
Except for 'labour management cooperation', there are no marked 
differences between the two groups of industries when they are exposed to 
increased competitive pressure. Thus, it is difficult to distinguish between 
the effects of competitive pressure generated by international markets and 
those from domestic sources such as non-union competition and regulatory 
changes19.
It is enough to say here that there seems to be a significant 
difference in bargaining processes and outcomes across industries, possibly 
through the mechanism devised in our theoretical framework, namely 
through subtle interactions of strategic changes in response to perceived 
competitive pressure by both employers and workers. These changes do not 
seem to be specific to the early 1980s; except, that is, for their speed and 
depth. Indeed, as we have seen in chapters 5 and 6, there has been 
continuous, even if not too apparent, adjustments in the conduct of labour 
market institutions in response to the competitive pressure.
19 The importance of economic pressure - either from domestic or international 
competition - in explaining changes in collective bargaining behaviour is also emphasized in 
the following: 'The reasons for the upsurge in activity (like concession bargaining) can be 
traced to a number of developments that have placed substantial economic pressure on 
many industries in the United States. Changes in import penetration, enlargement of the 
nonunion sector, and deregulation have placed substantial competitive pressure on many 
industries, especially manufacturing, to cut costs through concessions. The importance of 
economic pressure was the determining factor in the twenties and thirties as well...This 
current period of concession bargaining, like the Depression, has been one where structural 
economic changes have not been confined to isolated industries...These industries have been 
under pressure to cut costs in order to meet new competitive pressures, and concessions 
have been an obvious way to do that.' Cappelli and McKersie (1985; p.231)
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6. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
Albeit limited in scale and scope, these case studies seem to support our 
theoretical predictions in chapter 4 as well as our empirical findings in 
chapters 5 and 6. As we can see in table 7.11, one of the most striking 
common features of changes in industrial relations systems between the 
two decades is that, even with continuing variations across countries in 
their form and efficacy, there have been substantial shifts in the focus and 
style of collective bargaining with stronger emphasis on strategy and 
workplace bargaining, and consultation arrangements. These shifts are more 
impressive across industries within an economy in response to varying 
degrees of competitive pressure, especially in the 1980s. For example, in 
the U.S., more practices of labour management cooperation can be found 
in those industries faced with more intense international competition such 
as auto, steel, and clothing sectors. In the U.K., lower wage settlements 
were made in metals, textiles and mechanical engineering which have also 
experienced higher competitive pressure.
Among the factors cited as influencing wage settlements in these 
industries, profits and the degree of monopoly power of their bargaining 
units as well as the risks of redundancy have exerted significant downward 
pressure and their importance has been increased. Although there is no way 
of directly disentangling the effects of competitive pressure from these 
studies, it is notable that there are considerable relevant differences 
between industries faced with higher competitive pressure and those with 
less. Indeed, it is not unusual to find that those companies facing severe 
international competition tend to be more subject to declining profits and 
monopoly power, and that they may experience more structural adjustments 
resulting in redundancy problems20.
On the other hand, governments have never been indifferent to 
employment trends and the evolution of industrial relations in industries
20 Company case studies (e.g., Chrysler in the U.S., British Leyland in the U.K., and 
Volkswagen in Germany) lend support to our theory. When faced with trouble from 
increased competitive pressure these companies pursue similar reform strategies based on 
enhanced cooperation and participation, see e.g., Altshuler et al. (1984); Katz (1986); 
Streeck (1984).
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Table 7.11 A Comparative View of the Evidence from Theory and 
Practice for the Competitive Pressure Hypothesis
Theory and Empirical Findings Supplementary
Evidence in Practice
More intense competitive pressure 
Perception process
Strategy formulation
Profitability 
Survivability 
Redundancy threats
Interactions of strategic choices
Bargaining outcomes
More cooperative 
Trade-offs between concessions 
in wages, more employment 
security, and working practices
Economic performance at an economy 
level
Decrease/less increase in: 
unemployment 
inflation
producer prices in manuf.
Increase/less decrease in:
GDP growth rate 
real GDP per capita 
employment in manuf 
real value-added in manuf. 
labour productivity in manuf.
Auto industry
In the U.S.:
correctly perceived only from the 
early 1980s 
changes in wage rules 
increased involvement of workers 
and union in corporate decision­
making 
In the U.K.:
development of consultative 
arrangements
removal of restrictive working 
practices 
In Germany:
co-determination with union's 
readiness to cooperate
The experience in the U.K.
Increase in company-level 
bargaining
Low wage settlements in industries with 
more intense international competition 
(metals, textiles, mechanical engineering 
industries)
Downward pressure on wage 
settlements 
profits
degree of monopoly power 
risk of redundancy 
Union sectors more perceptive of 
changes in economic climate
The experience of the U.S.
Less increase in wages in the early 
1980s
More concession bargaining in 
transportation equipment, electrical and 
electronic, rubber and plastics, primary 
metal industries
More labour-management cooperation in 
auto, steel and clothing sectors with 
more intense international competition
Changes in industrial relations systems 
between the 1970s and the 1980s 
(commonness)
Decentralization 
Increase in worker participation 
with/without unions
facing structural adjustment problems, especially when they are engendered 
by international competition. Even if policy suggestions by Altshuler et a/ 
(1984) are only based on the automobile industry, our analysis suggests 
that they could be applied to other sectors as well. Indeed there seems to 
be a consistent trend of changes in those industries faced with increased 
competitive pressure as seen above. According to Altshuler et at. (1984), 
governments can encourage cooperative reform strategies in response to 
competitive challenges by:
(i) Resisting pressures to remove legal employment protection, such 
as the lay-off notification requirements, that now exist in many 
European countries;
(ii) Encourage management to engage in manpower planning so that 
long-term employment cuts and companies' long-term manpower 
policies can be subject to early and extensive consultation and 
negotiation with labour to enable the two sides to exhaust all 
available alternatives to dismissals;
(iii) Direct publicly funded programmes to help manage short-term 
cyclical changes in labour input;
(iv) Provide aid to ailing companies, contingent upon management 
and labour agreeing on a scheme that provides for accountable and 
responsible participation of labour representatives in decision-making, 
this coupled with other accommodations, such as adjustments in 
compensation, will increase the chances of the companies becoming 
competitive;
(v) Encourage share ownership by workers, if necessary with 
changes in tax and other legislation, in order to strengthen workers' 
interest in their company's performance and competitiveness. At the 
same time, offer employees an opportunity to participate in the 
making of company policy;
(vi) Facilitate the creation of flexible compensation systems that are 
responsive to economic conditions.
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It should be noted, however, that these policies can help improve 
competitiveness when they are accompanied by compromises on labour's 
part which make work rules more flexible, and link the growth of 
renumeration to the firm's health. At the same time, governments might 
have to consider creating programmes to cope with the social costs 
associated with inevitable employment decline in some severely hit sectors 
by encouraging retraining and relocation and by providing temporary income 
support for displaced workers, such as the active labour market policies 
which have been already well established in Sweden and Germany. More 
cautious approaches are needed in order to encourage workers and unions 
to perceive competitive pressure in an appropriate manner. For example, the 
duration of unemployment benefits might have to be considered. However, 
none of these policy suggestions are a panacea:
'All they can do is provide favourable conditions under which 
management and labour can work together in pursuit of common 
economic interests. Whether or not labour and management respond 
to those conditions is ultimately up to them.' Altshuler et at. (1984; 
p. 221)
Our studies suggest that there should be a more coordinated approach in 
various fields of government policy. For example, conventional macro- 
economic tools, industrial and trade policies should be linked more closely 
to industrial relations and firm-specific policies.
In sum, we found further, indirect support from existing case 
studies. However, case studies are not carried out to any generally accepted 
format. Thus, data tends to be patchy. This is a pity since case studies can 
provide useful supplementary data to econometric studies. However, if they 
are to be more useful to the pursuit of knowledge they need to adopt a 
consistent framework. Our study suggests that there should be a 
coordinated approach to accumulate information at company or industry 
levels for the relationship between product markets and labour market 
institutions. Historical and dynamic studies on individual economy's 
industrial relations systems would have added another dimension to our 
study of labour relations behaviour and economic performance.
202
CHAPTER EIGHT 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
One of the primary questions we address in this thesis is; what might be the 
potential role of increased competitive pressure on the relationship between 
labour market institutions and economic performance? This quest is 
motivated by the debate on the relationships between labour market 
institutions and macroeconomic performance: is it the structure and/or the 
nature of labour market institutions that matter for cross-country differences 
in economic performance? Chapter 2 is devoted to a critical survey of four 
established hypotheses on the relationships between indicators of labour 
market institutions and those of macroeconomic performance.
Our critical survey of these four hypotheses places a greater 
emphasis on their underlying logic of transmission mechanisms. This 
suggests that the corporatist and liberal-pluralist hypotheses, proposing 
linear relationships, rests upon two competing arguments; flexibility versus 
consensus. The liberal-pluralist hypothesis is grounded on the view that 
wage increases would be more readily restrained if market forces were 
allowed to play a larger role and this would lead to wage flexibility. Disciples 
of liberal-pluralism believe in the invisible hand and regard the 
decentralization of wage bargaining systems as a competitive force. 
Corporatists believe the contrary; that wage setters would reconcile broad, 
social interests with higher centralization of bargaining institutions. This 
evokes an offhand consensus of wage restraint when needed. The U-curve 
and interactive hypotheses prefer non-linear correlations and stand in- 
between corporatism and liberal-pluralism. They map mechanisms of 
flexibility and consensus onto two extreme ends of an imaginary horizontal 
axis. Supporters of each hypothesis, however, construct their arguments 
based on different ways of blending flexibility and consensus, with the 
common faith that they might be in operation at the same time.
The U-curve hypothesis of Calmfors and Driffill (1988) mix flexibility 
and consensus in a straightforward manner, finding predominant forces 
according to the degree of centralization of collective bargaining levels. On 
the other hand, the interactive hypothesis of Paloheimo (1990), unlike any
other, realizes that there might be negative as well as widely-accepted 
positive effects in both mechanisms of flexibility and consensus. Apart from 
the expected positive effects, both of these two could have negative side- 
effects if they act in opposite directions. Thus, flexibility and consensus 
might cause higher increases in wages, on average, when wage restraint is 
needed, if their influences were stronger in some sections of the economy 
where negative side-effects are more predominant than in anywhere else. 
Similar to the U-curve hypothesis, these two are mixed, but in a more 
complicated way because of their two-sided influences according to the 
interactions between the levels of unionization and centralization. In fact, 
Paloheimo's empirical study draws similar implications to those of Calmfors 
and Driffill, but with more complicated interactions between the level of 
unionization and centralization.
To date, most empirical studies relating cross-country differences in 
the structure of labour market institutions to those in macroeconomic 
performance tend to favour the U-curve or the interactive hypotheses. For 
their empirical methodologies, they employed Phillips-type multiple 
regression techniques, whether it was about prices (Bruno and Sachs 1985; 
McCallum 1983) or wages (Bean et a i 1986; Newell and Symons 1987), 
or simply investigate simple and rank correlations (Calmfors and Driffill 
1988; Paloheimo 1990) between the two sets of indicators. Apart from the 
vagueness of the concepts in use like corporatism and centralization of 
bargaining levels one crucial question remains. To what extent do inter­
country variations really reflect fundamental differences in behaviour or are 
they due to either spurious correlations, or to specification differences?
Further, it is not so surprising to find that there have been much 
wider cross-country differences in economic performance even within the 
group of countries which were supposed to have similar bargaining 
structures. Thus, it is justified to ask once again the much-debated question 
of whether it is really the structural differences of labour market institutions 
that contribute to understanding diverse experience of economic 
performance such as unemployment, inflation and growth rates not only 
across countries but also within an economy. At the same time, it seems 
necessary that the conduct of labour market institutions, rather than simply
204
their structural differences, should be examined in more detail. We note not 
only a priori needs to link changes in product market conditions with the 
conduct of labour market institutions. But also the critical understanding of 
the four established hypotheses suggests the necessity of studying the 
behaviourial dimension of labour market institutions. It is essential to fill the 
missing connection between structure and performance though extremely 
difficult.
For the purpose of investigating behaviourial aspects of labour market 
institutions, chapter 3 introduces various fields of study: international trade, 
employment and labour relations; changes in environmental conditions, 
strategic behaviour, and organizational adaptations. Chapter 3 provides a 
synthesis of these diverse theories and constructs a micro-foundation of 
labour relations and economic performance. It suggests that competitive 
pressure from international markets is one of the most important 
environmental conditions influencing the strategic choices of workers/unions 
as well as employers' strategies. This is in keeping with traditional industrial 
relations research which suggests that influence exerted by product market 
competition on collective bargaining is structured by, and may be mitigated 
by, the existing arrangements for setting labour costs, see e.g.. Commons 
(1909). The preeminence we give to competitive pressure was prompted by 
the fact that the globalization of markets and the internationalization of 
national economies over the past two or three decades has greatly altered 
the context within which employment relations and policies operate; see 
e.g., Marshall (1989); Burton (1989); Kruse (1988); Abowd and Lemieux 
(1990); and Mills and Lovell (1985).
Even if there is no consensus on the employment effects of 
manufacturing trade, import competition seems to give workers a choice 
between jobs and wages. According to Tyson and Zysman (1988), wages 
have responded differently in different industries with varying degrees of 
trade pressure. Employers' perceptions of import competition (is it 
temporary or permanent?) affects their choice of strategies. If they think 
competition is temporary, then they tend to sacrifice a short-term decrease 
in profits by retaining their employees even though this results in an increase
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in wages. Heywood (1986) shows that higher imports tend to lower wages, 
especially in imperfectly competitive markets. And wage decline happens 
only when new unexpected imports alter the bargaining agreement.
Kruse (1988) reports that the average duration of joblessness varies 
directly with the rise in primary industry's import share with about an 8-year 
lag. Based on a comparative study of U.S. and Canada by Abowd and 
Lemieux (1990) find consistent relations between international trade and 
collective bargaining outcomes: (i) Employment growth is slowed more 
severely by import penetration than a comparable change in real shipments;
(ii) For the U.S., an unexpected change in import penetration is more 
sensitive to employment; (iii) The effects of expected changes in 
international competition on real wage rates show opposite signs between 
the two countries: for the U.S., import penetration decreases real wages but 
increases them in Canada. These arguments, at least, show us that changes 
in international manufacturing trades might influence employment and 
wages in a consistent manner, but their actual effects would be diverse 
between different countries, for which there is no systematic explanation.
Leibenstein's X-inefficiency theory suggests that, in general, the 
greater the environmental pressure, the greater the X-efficiency of the firm, 
ceteris paribus. The nature of the decision which can be represented by the 
degree of procedural rationality depends on the extent of the environmental 
pressure. Also every individual in a firm has a different type of decision 
function which is assumed to be lexicographic. From this, we can identify 
at least two or three different decision functions, respectively for employers 
and workers, which are step-wise in response to perceived competitive 
pressure.
Cooke and Meyer (1990) define industrial relations strategies into 
three: Union avoidance; Union-management collaboration (as single­
approach strategies); and a Mixture of these two. The following arguments 
are suggested: (i) When markets worsen by increased import penetration 
and labour markets tighten, managers will choose one of the more 
aggressive single-approach strategies; (ii) The higher unionized the company 
is, employers will choose collaboration strategy; (iii) The higher the firm's 
labour intensity and the higher average investment in plants, mixed
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strategies will be chosen; (iv) The greater the number of plants, mixed 
strategies will be chosen over collaboration; (v) The higher the ratio of the 
cost of goods to sales, strategies will be changed from mixed to 
collaborative. Even if these arguments are constrained by marginal analysis, 
they give us a good guide to set up a new theoretical framework.
In addition to these, some of the strategic choice theories in response 
to changes in environmental conditions are also ushered in from various 
sources (Streeck 1987; Child 1972; Hrebiniak and Joyce 1985; Whittington 
1988). Also a few theoretical efforts - mainly by applying game theory - to 
strategic choices in industrial relations are reviewed (Soskice 1990; Brunetta 
and Carraro 1990). These studies suggest that differences in economic 
performance such as unemployment, inflation and growth rates can be 
explained more efficiently by considering labour market agents' strategic 
behaviour, which can be influenced significantly by the structural differences 
in labour market institutions, in response to changes in product market 
conditions. And among the changes in product market conditions, we have 
shown competitive pressure from international trade would have the most 
important influence on employees' as well as employers' behaviour. 
Therefore, we argue it would be worthwhile to attempt to make a 
theoretical framework linking product markets, labour market institutions, 
and economic performance systematically.
In chapter four, a serious effort is made to construct a theoretical 
framework of competitive pressure, labour market institutions, and 
economic performance by synthesizing the dispersed theories. We define a 
concept of competitive pressure, derived from those studies of international 
trade, employment and labour relations. We argue that competitive pressure 
is a crucial environmental factor which influences the strategic behaviour of 
employers and workers/unions in collective bargaining. Applying the X- 
inefficiency theory of Leibenstein, step-wise perceptions and decision 
functions for each group of economic agents are set up with some special 
assumptions. From the studies of industrial relations strategies we develop 
a set of alternative strategies for labour relations: Cooperation, Non­
cooperation, and Acquiescence. In order to make a systematic framework,
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we examine strategic interactions from our choice theories and game 
theoretic approaches, which, in turn, lead to an equilibrium pair of labour 
relations strategies of managers and workers. From these pairs of 
equilibrium strategies, a further attempt is made to derive the nature of 
labour relations into four types, incorporating the two mechanisms of 
flexibility and consensus - recognizing both their negative and positive 
effects - on which the four established hypotheses are considered to be 
based: flexible-consensus(F-C), flexible-friction(F-F), rigid-consensus(R-C), 
and rigid-friction(R-F). Finally, applying the studies of organizational 
adaptations, we relate these four types of labour relations behaviours to the 
differences in economic performance. This leads us to develop an 
hypothesis for the relationships between product market conditions captured 
by competitive pressure, structural differences of labour market institutions 
and their economic performance.
We develop the competitive pressure hypothesis from a simulation 
study, resulting in 242 cases from the combination of environmental 
conditions with which an hypothesised firm is assumed to face. We find 
that the company would show improved performance through positive 
effects of enhanced flexibility and consensus when faced with higher 
intensity of competitive pressure. Chapters 5 and 6 tests this hypothesis 
and demonstrates that at an aggregate economic level, differences in 
economic performance show expected correlations with competitive 
pressure. These empirical results support our arguments on behaviourial 
changes in labour relations at a company level as constructed in the 
theoretical simulation.
Our empirical studies rest on data from seventeen O.E.C.D. 
countries. Chapter 5 pursues time-series variations in economic performance 
within a national economy, and chapter 6 focuses on cross-country 
variations. Data are collected from the O.E.C.D. Historical Statistics largely 
with cross-country comparisons in mind for the 29 year period between 
1960 and 1989: (i) The levels of and changes in import penetration ratios, 
defined by total imports as a proportion to total supply (GDP plus imports), 
are used for indicators of competitive pressure; (ii) Annual percentage
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changes in real GDP growth, real GDP per capita and consumer price index 
are used for macroeconomic performance indicators; (iii) Annual percentage 
changes in real hourly wages, employment, real value-added, real value- 
added per person employed, producer price index are used for indicators of 
the manufacturing sector performance. Indicators for the structure of labour 
market institutions (the degree of unionization, workers' and employers' 
coordinations), standardized unemployment and inflation (GDP deflator) 
rates are used for the same data in the study of Layard et a!. (1991).
In addition, the centralization index of collective bargaining and its 
revised index for the U-curve hypothesis are borrowed from Calmfors and 
Driffill (1988). Similar to those empirical studies for the established 
hypotheses, simple and rank correlation techniques are employed between 
competitive pressure, indicators for differences in the structure of labour 
market institutions, and economic performance. Also Phillips-type equations 
including the competitive pressure indicator are estimated for unemployment 
and real wages. In addition, Multiple Canonical Correlation Methods are used 
in order to see the combined effects of different indicators for competitive 
pressure and economic performance.
From these quantitative empirical studies at an economy level, the 
competitive pressure hypothesis is confirmed for the time-series as well as 
the cross-country variations in economic performance. In chapter seven, a 
further effort is made to supplement these findings with more qualitative 
case studies.
Therefore, this thesis has made a serious attempt to uncover the 
potential effects of competitive pressure from international markets on 
labour market institutions and economic performance, primarily at an 
economy level. By emphasizing changes in the strategic behaviour of 
employees as well as employers, our own competitive pressure hypothesis 
is suggested: differences in cross-country economic performance is 
significantly influenced by economic agents changing their behaviour as a 
result of their perceptions of competitive pressure. Indeed, from a 
theoretical simulations at company or plant levels, marginal effects of more 
intense competitive pressure are found to be positive with respect to
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economic performance. This implies that not only employers but also 
employees might adapt their strategies of labour relations in such a way that 
those organizations faced with higher competitive pressure tend to have 
mor e positive, rather than negative, effects of flexibility and consensus. This 
promotes economic performance.
This logic from competitive pressure to economic performance is 
supported by empirical studies at an economy level for the seventeen
O.E.C.D. countries. Significance is found for time-series variations within an 
economy rather than cross-country variations at a certain year or period. Our 
work suggests that changes in labour market institutions are continuous; but 
not, as some commentators suggest, contingent upon recession, see e.g., 
Katz (1985). In effect, cross-country comparisons of rank and simple 
correlations between competitive pressure - measured by annual percentage 
changes in import penetration ratio - and economic performance proved to 
be pretty consistent. Empirical results for cross-country studies provide 
similar interpretations, even though with weaker statistical significance.
As far as structural differences of labour market institutions are 
concerned, none of the four established hypotheses are consistently 
supported by our empirical studies. For cross-country variations, the U-curve 
hypothesis tends to be most favoured but not consistent. Hence, we cannot 
reject all four hypotheses in favour of our own competitive pressure 
hypothesis. Nevertheless, our hypothesis is important for its policy 
implications. Our work suggests that: (i) It may be of no great use either 
altering the degree of centralization in collective bargaining levels or 
attempting to implant a corporatist regime, because they do not play a 
decisive role in changes in economic performance, as traditionally expected;
(ii) Rather it might be more meaningful to examine how to enhance flexibility 
and consensus in response to changes in product market conditions, 
especially to competitive pressure from international markets.
It would be very difficult to devise specific policies based on these 
implications drawn from this thesis. However, the following broad policy 
suggestions can be made. In order to influence the level of unemployment 
and inflation, policies should attempt to coordinate demand-management
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economic policies such as fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies with 
supply-side policy measures directed towards more micro-levels.
Industrial relations and firm-specific policies might be better served 
by the following micro strategies: (i) More disclosure of performance-related 
information to enhance industrial democracy; (ii) Financial aid to ailing 
companies contingent upon providing accountable and responsible 
participation of labour representatives; (iii) Extending profit sharing and 
share ownership in order to increase workers' interests in their company's 
performance and competitiveness; (iv) Facilitating the creation of flexible 
compensation systems; (v) Stimulate early retirement and work-sharing 
arrangements instead of making redundancies when needed with discrete 
use of employment protection legislation like lay-off notification 
requirements; (vi) Long-term manpower planning to be subject to early and 
extensive consultation and negotiation with labour. In this regard, we need 
to integrate the organization's human capital strategies with its strategies 
for physical and financial capital, see e.g. Bradley (1992).
On the other hand, it is important to recognize a salient fact that 
higher percentage changes in import penetration, even if their levels may be 
harmful in some sense, can serve as a countervailing force to increase in 
real wages and unemployment. Considering the increased interdependence 
of the world economy, it does not seem justified to protect trade. Rather, 
together with the above mentioned policies, there should be more 
liberalization of trade restrictions. For the severely hit industries, rather than 
yielding to increased demands for trade protection, a set of industrial 
policies with tax and subsidy controls might be more appropriate.
In sum, this thesis examined macro-economic effects of the conduct 
of labour relations systems. For this purpose, we made an attempt to 
integrate theoretically such fields as industrial relations, business strategy, 
organizational behaviour, and labour economics. We proposed international 
competition as our important pressure on employers and employees which 
influence their strategic choices. The theory developed in chapters three and 
four provided a basis for cross-country comparative studies on the macro- 
economic effects of labour relations behaviour. In chapters 5 and 6, we
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carried out empirical studies using data from seventeen O.E.C.D. economies 
to test our competitive pressure hypothesis. Chapter 7 augmented our 
econometric analysis by supportive evidence from case studies.
This thesis has made a contribution to the study of industrial 
relations by examining the role of labour market institutions in explaining 
economic performance. Firstly, it has constructed a theoretical framework 
at disaggregate levels with a greater emphasis on behaviourial aspects of 
labour market institutions. Secondly, employing various empirical 
methodologies we tested the potential effects of competitive pressure on 
labour market institutions and economic performance based on our own 
theoretical framework. Unlike other studies, both time-series and cross­
country variations were studied for the seventeen O.E.C.D. countries using 
the Multivariate Canonical Correlation Method as well as simple/rank 
correlations and multiple regression techniques1. In addition to these 
quantitative analyses we examined our theory against case study data.
Possible directions for future research might be cross-country 
coordinated comparative research which contains secondary data and case 
studies. The basic framework of these studies might be focused on the 
relationships between changes in competitive pressure from international 
markets and strategic behaviours of wage-setting institutions. This thesis 
might be considered as an initial step in this direction by discovering one of 
the most salient factors which links changes in product market conditions, 
structure and conduct of labour market institutions, and economic 
performance. We had achieved this for the economy and company levels, 
with broad cross-country perspectives.
1 Nevertheless, as with any empirical study, results should be interpreted with a 
degree of caution. It will be recalled that competitive pressure was measured by the levels 
of, and (percentage) changes in, import penetration ratios. For a cross-country comparative 
study based on secondary data, these can be regarded as one of the best available 
indicators. However, these indicators might be too crude to grasp the true nature of 
competitive pressure.
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I. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER THREE: AN EXAMPLE OF GAME THEORETIC 
APPROACH TO LABOUR RELATIONS STRATEGIES
In order to see if there is a precondition that the workforce will behave 
cooperatively, Soskice (1990) tentatively applied a game theoretical 
framework to suggest a set of answers contingent on the external 
environment of the company. Management is assumed to have three 
alternative strategies:
(i) Hierarchic, involving appropriate production conditions and a rule- 
based culture. Specific requirements are determined and enforced 
by management for individual employees with different skills;
(ii) Co-operative, involving a degree of employee participation in 
decision-making and allowing workers some autonomous 
responsibility;
(iii) Acquiescent, in job control by the workforce.
The workforce also has three strategies:
(i) Cooperative, workforce prepared: to accept autonomous 
responsibility and management instructions; and to engage in 
teamwork;
(ii) Acquiescent, following management instructions to the extent 
that they will be sanctioned if they do not;
(iii) Non-cooperative, impinging strike or other forms of industrial 
action if management is either cooperative or hierarchic, and 
imposing job control if management is acquiescent in it.
Labour management relations can be thought to result from an interaction 
of strategies. In game theoretic terms, each strategy will have some payoffs 
(rewards) from each interaction, which can be represented by a bimatrix, 
see appendix table 3.1.
We could find a Nash equilibrium from the matrix in the table. No
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Appendix Table 3.1 A Payoff Matrix of Managements' and Workers'
Strategies
Acquiescent
Management
Cooperative Hierarchic
Workforce
Cooperative (0,0) (10,10) (0,25)
Acquiescent (0,0) ( 5, 5) (5,20)
Non-cooperative (20,0) ( x,-x) (x,-x)
Source: Soskice (1990; p. 188)
significance is attached to the size of the numbers, only to their ordering - 
independently for the two sides. Management has some preference for a 
cooperative to an acquiescent semi-skilled workforce. More importantly, the 
payoff is much higher for hierarchic as compared to cooperative 
management: this is because we assume the labour force to be relatively 
unskilled. The worst outcome for management is to have to acquiesce in job 
control.
Workers prefer cooperative to hierarchic management; and if 
management is cooperative they prefer to cooperate themselves, though 
with hierarchic management they choose acquiescence. Job control is rated 
above each of these by the workforce. The strength of this preference is 
determined, in part, by low workforce belief in employment security.
x is a measure of workforce power, so that if x is positive it can be 
interpreted as the workforce winning strikes. So if x > 0, management is 
forced to acquiesce in job control, while workers choose non-cooperation; 
this is the unique Nash equilibrium for x > 01. If x < 0, management will 
choose hierarchic organization, and workers will choose acquiescence; again 
a unique equilibrium. Thus, the co-operative/co-operative solution is not 
favoured by an external environment of unrestricted free markets, providing 
for low skills and low employment security. What is more surprising is that 
the aspects of the external environment (such as long-run finance, a low 
degree of opportunism, effective cooperative relations between companies
1 A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a vector of strategies such that no one player can improve 
his lot. For a full description of this and other game theoretical inferences see e.g., Shubik 
(1982).
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and other institutions for marketing and product innovation, which will 
produce a highly skilled workforce), do not by themselves guarantee the co- 
operative/co-operative solution, see e.g., Soskice (1990; pp. 189-190).
Further, Soskice (1990) applied a sequential game theoretical 
framework, attempting to explain why unemployment rates are different in 
different countries during the 1970s and 1980s, and also to see why that 
explanation is consistent with full employment in each of the countries in 
the 1950s and 1960s.
Brunetta and Carraro (1990) also apply game theoretic frameworks 
to show that incomes policy is a way of achieving cooperation among 
conflicting social groups. They recognize that economic agents interact and 
that a group of agents' action can negatively affect other agents' welfare 
or profit. Thus the presence of externalities thus leads the government to 
intervene in order to distribute welfare gains that can be achieved through 
harmonization of agents' behaviour. In this context, they set up a model in 
which agents' behaviour is represented as an intertemporal non-cooperative 
game, where conflict and cooperation are possible outcomes that depend 
on the agents' strategies. All agents have different objectives, and decisions 
are decentralized and sequential; workers decide first, by choosing the union 
they want to support. Then firms, unions, and the government 
simultaneously set their own decision variables, assuming the industrial 
relations system is centralized. Brunetta and Carraro simplify the model by 
assuming that unions set wages, that firms set prices and employment, and 
that the government sets monetary and fiscal policy. Finally, in the third 
stage of the game, parliament can intervene either by imposing institutional 
constraints, or by modifying or ratifying decisions taken in the previous 
stage.
All in all, studies applying game theory to the strategic interactions 
of workers and managers, and also government, seem to make a significant 
contribution to our understanding of strategic choice and the conduct of 
industrial relations. However, not only are they in their infancy, but also 
they fall short of analyzing the relationship between labour management 
relations and economic performance. This is because their primary aim of 
applying game theory is different to what we want to do here.
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II. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER FOUR: DATA SET BASED ON THE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Abbreviations
CON: Typology of the conduct
[1-4 (F-C, F-F, R-C, R-F)]
MOP: Market-openness [3-1 (H,M,L)]
CEN: Centralization in bargaining levels [3-1
(H,M,L)]
UACP: Expectedness of competitive pressures
[l:unexpected, 2:expected]
PACP: Permanency of competitive pressures
[1:permanent, 2:temporary]
IACP: Intensity of competitive pressures [3-1
(H,M,L)]
UD: Union density [3-1 (H,M, L); 4 for no role]
MP: Market power [3-1 (H,M,L); 4 for no role]
EP: Equilibrium strategies [C-C (1), C-A/A-C
(2), C-N/N-C (3), A-A (4), A-N/N-A (5), N-N 
( 6 ) ]
* A-A not actually happen in the 
interactions
CON MOP CEN UACP PACP IACP UD MP EP
1 2 2 1 1 3 3 4 1
1 2 2 1 1 3 2 4 2
2 2 2 1 1 3 1 4 4
3 2 2 1 1 2 4 3 5
3 2 2 1 1 2 4 2 5
1 2 2 1 1 2 3 1 2
2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 4
2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 4
3 2 2 1 1 1 4 3 5
4 2 2 1 1 1 4 2 6
4 2 2 1 1 1 4 1 6
1 2 2 1 2 3 3 4 1
1 2 2 1 2 3 2 3 2
1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 2
2 2 2 1 2 3 1 3 4
2 2 2 1 2 3 1 1 4
3 2 2 1 2 3 4 2 5
3 2 2 1 2 2 4 3 5
3 2 2 1 2 2 4 1 5
4 2 2 1 2 2 4 2 6
1 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 2
3 2 2 1 2 1 4 3 5
3 2 2 1 2 1 4 2 5
4 2 2 1 2 1 4 1 6
2 2 2 2 1 3 4 4 4
3 2 2 2 1 2 4 4 5
4 2 2 2 1 1 4 2 6
4 2 2 2 1 1 4 1 6
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2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
CEN UACP PACP IACP UD MP EP
1 4  3
3 4 4
2 4 4
1 4  3
1 4  2
1 4  2
3 3 4
3 2 4
3 1 4
2 3 4
2 2 1
2 4 3
2 4 2
2 1 1
1 4  4
3 3 4
3 2 4
3 1 3
3 1 1
3 2 2
3 1 2
2 3 4
2 2 4
2 4 4
1 4  4
1 3  4
3 4 4
2 4 4
1 4  4
3 4 4
2 4 4
1 4  4
3 2 4
3 1 4
3 3 4
2 4 3
2 4 2
2 4 1
1 4  4
3 2 3
3 2 1
3 1 3
3 1 1
3 4 2
3 3 3
3 3 1
2 4 3
5
4
5
5
5
6
1
1
4
1
2
5
5
4
6
1
1
4
4
5
5
1
2
5
5
2
4
5
6
4
5
5
4
4
2
5
5
4
5
4
4
4
4
5
2
2
5
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CON MOP CEN UACP PACP IACP UD MP EP
3 1 2 1 2 2 4 1 5
4 1 2 1 2 2 4 2 6
3 1 2 1 2 1 4 3 5
3 1 2 1 2 1 4 2 5
4 1 2 1 2 1 4 1 6
2 1 2 2 1 3 4 4 4
3 1 2 2 1 2 4 4 5
3 1 2 2 1 1 4 4 5
2 1 2 2 2 3 4 4 4
3 1 2 2 2 2 4 4 5
3 1 2 2 2 1 4 3 5
3 1 2 2 2 1 4 2 5
4 1 2 2 2 1 4 1 6
1 2 3 1 1 3 3 4 1
1 2 3 1 1 3 2 4 1
2 2 3 1 1 3 1 4 4
3 2 3 1 1 2 4 4 5
3 2 3 1 1 1 4 3 5
4 2 3 1 1 1 4 2 6
4 2 3 1 1 1 4 1 6
1 2 3 1 2 3 3 4 1
1 2 3 1 2 3 2 4 1
2 2 3 1 2 3 1 4 4
3 2 3 1 2 2 4 4 5
1 2 3 1 2 2 3 3 2
1 2 3 1 2 2 2 3 2
3 2 3 1 2 1 4 3 5
3 2 3 1 2 1 4 2 5
4 2 3 1 2 1 4 1 6
1 2 3 2 1 3 4 4 1
3 2 3 2 1 2 4 4 5
3 2 3 2 1 1 4 3 5
4 2 3 2 1 1 4 2 6
4 2 3 2 1 1 4 1 6
1 2 3 2 2 3 4 4 1
3 2 3 2 2 2 4 4 5
2 2 3 2 2 2 4 3 2
3 2 3 2 2 1 4 3 5
3 2 3 2 2 1 4 2 5
4 2 3 2 2 1 4 1 6
1 3 3 1 1 3 4 4 1
3 3 3 1 1 2 4 4 5
4 3 3 1 1 1 4 4 6
1 3 3 1 2 3 4 4 1
3 3 3 1 2 2 4 4 5
1 3 3 1 2 2 4 4 2
3 3 3 1 2 1 4 4 5
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CON MOP CEN UACP PACP IACP UD MP EP
4 2 1 2 3 2 2 6
4 2 1 2 3 1 2 6
3 2 1 2 3 3 2 5
3 2 1 2 2 4 3 5
3 2 1 2 2 4 1 5
4 2 1 2 2 4 2 6
1 2 1 2 2 3 3 2
3 2 1 2 1 4 3 5
3 2 1 2 1 4 2 5
4 2 1 2 1 4 1 6
2 2 2 1 3 4 4 4
3 2 2 1 2 4 4 5
3 2 2 1 1 4 3 5
4 2 2 1 1 4 2 6
4 2 2 1 1 4 1 6
2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4
3 2 2 2 2 4 4 5
3 2 2 2 1 4 3 5
3 2 2 2 1 4 2 5
4 2 2 2 1 4 1 6
1 3 1 1 3 3 4 1
1 3 1 1 3 2 4 1
2 3 1 1 3 1 4 4
1 3 1 1 2 3 4 1
3 3 1 1 2 2 3 5
3 3 1 1 2 2 2 5
3 3 1 1 2 1 3 5
3 3 1 1 2 1 2 5
2 3 1 1 2 1 1 4
1 3 1 1 2 2 1 2
3 3 1 1 1 3 4 5
1 3 1 1 1 3 4 1
4 3 1 1 1 2 4 6
4 3 1 1 1 1 4 6
1 3 1 2 3 3 4 1
1 3 1 2 3 2 4 1
2 3 1 2 3 1 3 4
2 3 1 2 3 1 1 4
3 3 1 2 3 1 2 5
1 3 1 2 2 3 4 1
1 3 1 2 2 2 4 2
3 3 1 2 2 2 4 5
3 3 1 2 2 1 4 5
1 3 1 2 1 3 4 1
3 3 1 2 1 4 4 5
2 3 2 1 3 4 4 4
3 3 2 1 2 4 4 5
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III. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER SIX: COMPETITIVE PRESSURE AND CROSS­
COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN AVERAGE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OVER 
PERIODS
When we used average data for our cross-country studies, our competitive 
pressure hypothesis could not be supported except in a few cases. This is 
largely because pressure indicators might be of little explanatory power by 
being averaged out over a period. As we studied in chapter four, the 
potential role of competitive pressure is to affect workers' as well as 
employers' choices of labour relations strategies. Hence, our hypothesis can 
be appropriately supported by studying on yearly bases as we did in the 
text.
Tables 6.11 and 6.12 summarize empirical findings using average 
data over five periods: 1961-69, 1969-73, 1973-79, 1979-89, and 1961- 
89. Only signs of correlations are reported in the tables. Each five signs are 
related with the above five periods.
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Appendix Table 6.1 Summary o f Findings fo r Average Economic Performance Over Periods (!)
Unemployment
Inflation
GDP growth rate 
Real GDP per capita 
Consumer price index 
Producer price index in 
manufacturing 
Real hourly wages in 
manufacturing 
Employment in 
manufacturing 
Real value-added in 
manufacturing 
Real value-added per 
capita! in manufacturing
Level of I PR Percentage
changes in IPR
— — — + — + + — + +
+ + - - - + - - + -
- - - - - + + - + +
- + + - - + - - - +
+ + — — — — — — + —
+ - - + - - + - - +
+ + + - + + + - - -
- + - + - - + - + +
- + - + + + + + + -
_ + + _ + + + +
Competitive Plus labour market
pressure structures
+ - — + + — — + + +
- + - - - + - + + +
+ - - - - - - + + +
+ + + - - - + - + -
— + + + — + + — + —
- + - - - - + - + -
+ + + - + - - - - +
- + - + - - + - + -
+ + - + + + + - + +
+ + + + + + + +
Appendix Table 6.2 Summary of Findings for Average Economic Performance Over Periods (II): Simple Correlations with Separate
Indicators of Labour Market Institutions
Union Density Workers' Employers
Coordinations Coordinations
Unemployment — — — + — — — — — — — — — — —
Inflation + + + + + + + + + + + + - — -
GDP growth rate — — + — — — + + + + — + — — -
Real GDP per capita — + + — + + + + + + + + + + +
Consumer price index + + + + + + + + + + +
Producer price index in
manufacturing + + + + + + “ + + + " + +
Real hourly wages in + + + + + + + + + + + + +
manufacturing
Employment in _ + _ _ _ + _ _ _ _ + _ _ _
manufacturing
Real value-added in + + — - + — + - + + — + — — +
manufacturing
Real value-added per + + + + + + + + + + + + — — +
capita! in manufacturing
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IV. DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
[NOTATIONS AND SOURCES]
C (Appendix A-B): country
C (Appendix C-D): the degree of centralization [the 
original index of Calmfors and Driffill (1988)]
CD: the revised U-curve index of Calmfors and Driffill 
[Calmfors and Driffill (1988)
Y: year
IPR: import penetration ratio [calculated from 
O.E.C.D.d 991)]
DIPR: percentage changes in import penetration ratio 
[calculated from O.E.C.D. (1991)]
CP: changes in import penetration ratio [calculated 
from O.E.C.D. (1991)]
PGDP: annual percentage changes in real GDP growth 
[calculated from O.E.C.D.d 991)]
DP: inflation rate [Layard, Nickell and Jackman 
(1991)]
U: standardized unemployment rate [Layard, Nickell and 
Jackman (1991)]
RHWM: annual percentage changes in real hourly wages 
in manufacturing [O.E.C.D. (1985, 1990)]
EMM: annual percentage changes in employment in 
manufacturing [O.E.C.D. (1985, 1990)]
RGDP: annual percentage changes in real GDP [O.E.C.D.
(1985, 1990)]
RGDPPC: annual percentage changes in real GDP per 
capita [O.E.C.D. (1985, 1990)]
RVAM: annual percentage changes in real value-added in 
manufacturing [O.E.C.D. (1985, 1990)]
RVAMPC: annual percentage changes in real value-added 
per person employed in manufacturing [O.E.C.D. 
(1985, 1990)]
CPI: annual percentage changes in consumer price index 
[O.E.C.D. (1985, 1990)]
PPIM: annual percentage changes in producer price 
index in manufacturing [O.E.C.D. (1985, 1990)]
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A. Time-series data for indicators of macroeconomic 
performance and competitive pressures: 1960-89
Al. AUSTRALIA
c Y IPR DIPR CP PGDP DP U
10 60 0.136 * * * 3.2 1.9
10 61 0.124 -8.51 -1.16 -0.37 1.2 3.5
10 62 0.125 1.020 0.127 6.377 1.2 2.8
10 63 0.128 1.658 0.208 6.600 3.7 2.7
10 64 0.141 10.87 1.393 6.281 2.7 1.7
10 65 0.150 6.199 0.880 5.558 2.9 1.5
10 66 0.137 -8.72 -1.31 2.826 3.3 1.7
10 67 0.142 3.827 0.526 6.923 3.1 1.9
10 68 0.148 3.946 0.564 5.856 3.1 1.8
10 69 0.143 -3.08 -0.45 6.059 4.9 1.8
10 70 0.141 -1.49 -0.21 6.026 4.9 1.6
10 71 0.135 -4.48 -0.63 5.928 6.3 1.9
10 72 0.120 -10.9 -1.48 3.856 9.4 2.6
10 73 0.136 12.93 1.560 5.296 14.7 2.3
10 74 0.160 17.96 2.446 1.574 18.4 2.6
10 75 0.135 -15.6 -2.50 2.787 15.1 4.8
10 76 0.145 6.985 0.946 3.419 11.1 4.7
10 77 0.144 -0.63 -0.09 1.083 7.7 5.6
10 78 0.145 1.247 0.179 2.852 7.9 6.2
10 79 0.142 -2.02 -0.29 4.723 11 6.2
10 80 0.146 2.151 0.307 2.266 10.1 6
10 81 0.153 5.403 0.789 3.123 10.2 5.7
10 82 0.161 5.051 0.777 -0.64 10.9 7.1
10 83 0.146 -9.48 -1.53 0.763 7.5 9.9
10 84 0.161 10.09 1.477 7.587 6.1 8.9
10 85 0.162 0.604 0.097 4.695 7 8.2
10 86 0.155 -3.87 -0.62 1.886 7.2 8
10 87 0.154 -0.74 -0.11 4.327 7.7 8
10 88 0.169 9.296 1.437 3.928 9.1 7.2
10 89 0.188 11.71 1.979 4.697 7 6.1
Note: C, Y, IPR, DIPR, CP, PGDP, DP, and U are for the 
centralization index, year, the level of 
import penetration ratio, percentage annual 
changes in import penetration ratio, simple 
annual changes in import penetration ratio,
GDP growth rate, inflation measured by GDP 
deflator, and standardized unemployment 
rate.
Source: (1) IPR, DIPR, and CP are calculated from
OECD, HISTORICAL STATISTICS.
(2) PGDP, DP, and U are from Layard et al
(1991).
(3) C from Calmfors and Driffill (1988) .
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A2. AUSTRIA
c Y IPR DIPR CP PGDP DP U
1 60 0.158 * * * 3.1 1.9
1 61 0.155 -1.89 -0.30 5.306 4.9 1.5
1 62 0.158 1.794 0.279 2.396 3.7 1.5
1 63 0.165 4.352 0.690 4.060 3.5 1.7
1 64 0.171 3.863 0.639 6.051 3.2 1.6
1 65 0.182 6.073 1.044 2.868 5.6 1.6
1 66 0.188 3.599 0.656 5.638 3.2 1.5
1 67 0.187 -0.53 -0.10 3.012 3.2 1.6
1 68 0.191 2.137 0.401 4.456 2.8 1.6
1 69 0.195 2.031 0.390 6.293 2.7 1.6
1 70 0.210 7.295 1.429 7.099 4.7 1.1
1 71 0.211 0.839 0.176 5.130 6.2 1
1 72 0.221 4.388 0.930 6.194 7.6 1
1 73 0.228 3.410 0.754 4.888 8 0.9
1 74 0.233 2.165 0.495 3.940 9.5 1.1
1 75 0.226 -3.30 -0.77 -0.34 6.5 1.5
1 76 0.246 9.230 2.086 4.577 5.6 1.5
1 77 0.249 1.160 0.286 4.524 5.3 1.4
1 78 0.249 0.026 0.006 0.070 5.3 1.7 ,
1 79 0.262 4.885 1.220 4.731 4.1 1.7
1 80 0.268 2.349 0.615 2.916 5.1 1.5
1 81 0.267 -0.35 -0.09 -0.27 6.3 2.1
1 82 0.258 -3.22 -0.86 1.067 6.2 3.1
1 83 0.265 2.566 0.663 1.982 3.7 3.7
1 84 0.281 6.040 1.602 1.370 5 3.8
1 85 0.288 2.593 0.729 2.452 3 3.6
1 86 0.283 -1.66 -0.48 1.181 4.1 3.1
1 87 0.289 1.881 0.533 1.971 2.6 3.8
1 88 0.301 4.287 1.239 3.866 1.5 3.6
1 89 0.312 3.620 1.091 3.980 2.7 3.2
A3!. BELGIUM
C Y IPR DIPR CP PGDP DP U
8 60 0.307 * * * 0.8 3.4
8 61 0.311 1.486 0.456 4.982 1.3 2.6
8 62 0.317 1.928 0.601 5.187 1.7 2.2
8 63 0.326 2.785 0.885 4.354 3 1.8
8 64 0.330 1.187 0.387 6.963 4.6 1.6
8 65 0.336 1.918 0.634 3.572 5.1 1.8
8 66 0.351 4.252 1.432 3.154 4.2 2
8 67 0.346 -1.43 -0.50 3.871 3.1 2.6
8 68 0.362 4.594 1.590 4.214 2.7 3.1
8 69 0.380 5.136 1.859 6.624 4 2.3
8 70 0.383 0.749 0.285 6.365 4.6 2.1
8 71 0.383 -0.02 -0.01 3.673 5.7 2.1
8 72 0.392 2.479 0.950 5.288 6.2 2.7
8 73 0.420 6.902 2.712 5.909 7.2 2.7
8 74 0.420 0.196 0.082 4.076 12.6 3
8 75 0.401 -4.58 -1.92 -1.47 12.1 5
8 76 0.416 3.698 1.485 5.562 7.5 6.4
8 77 0.426 2.455 1.022 0.472 7.5 7.4
8 78 0.426 -0.05 -0.02 2.736 4.4 7.9
8 79 0.442 3.733 1.591 2.136 4.5 8.2
8 80 0.430 -2.58 -1.14 4.318 3.8 8.8
8 81 0.426 -1.11 -0.47 -0.98 4.9 10.8
8 82 0.422 -0.77 -0.32 1.499 7.1 12.6
8 83 0.418 -0.96 -0.40 0.388 5.9 12.1
8 84 0.426 1.950 0.817 2.129 5 12.1
8 85 0.426 -0.06 -0.02 0.833 5.5 11.3
8 86 0.440 3.338 1.424 1.453 5 11.2
8 87 0.455 3.340 1.472 2.248 1.9 11
8 88 0.463 1.622 0.739 4.590 1.2 9.7
8 89 0.473 2.163 1.001 3.880 2.8 8.1
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A4. CANADA
C Y IPR DIPR CP PGDP DP U
17 60 0.129 * * * 1.2 6
17 61 0.126 -2.47 -0.32 3.152 1.8 6
17 62 0.121 -3.93 -0.49 7.102 1.7 5
17 63 0.118 -2.08 -0.25 5.193 1.7
17 64 0.125 5.279 0.626 6.673 2.9 4
17 65 0.131 4.935 0.616 6.602 3.2 3
17 66 0.138 5.588 0.732 6.804 4.6 3
17 67 0.141 1.921 0.266 2.920 3.7 3
17 68 0.146 3.617 0.510 5.356 3.3 4
17 69 0.155 6.181 0.904 5.359 4.7 4
17 70 0.149 -3.56 -0.55 2.593 4.6 5
17 71 0.151 1.126 0.168 5.757 2 6
17 72 0.161 6.416 0.971 5.718 5.5 6
17 73 0.169 5.357 0.863 7.717 9.1 5
17 74 0.178 5.268 0.894 4.388 15.3 5
17 75 0.170 -4.74 -0.84 2.585 11.4 6
17 76 0.173 1.924 0.327 6.158 8.7 7
17 77 0.170 -1.49 -0.25 3.617 7.7
17 78 0.174 2.221 0.379 4.585 6.7 8
17 79 0.185 5.899 1.031 3.880 10.6 7
17 80 0.190 2.761 0.511 1.478 11.1 7
17 81 0.197 3.745 0.712 3.684 10.4 7
17 82 0.177 -10.1 -2. 00 -3 .22 10 10
17 83 0.185 4.618 0.818 3.162 4.8 11
17 84 0.200 8.111 1.504 6.323 3.4 11
17 85 0.206 2.948 0.591 4.765 3.2 10
17 86 0.213 3.279 0.677 3.307 2.5 9
17 87 0.217 1.986 0.423 4.043 4.3 8
17 88 0.231 6.248 1.358 4.394 4.2 7
17 89 0.234 1.590 0.367 2.983 4.7 7
A5. DENMARK
C Y IPR DIPR CP PGDP DP U
4 60 0.211 * * * 1.8 2.4
4 61 0.208 -1.47 -0.31 6.373 4.3 2.1
4 62 0.220 5.714 1.190 5.670 6.6 2.1
4 63 0.217 -1.33 -0.29 0. 641 5.8 2.3
4 64 0.233 7.237 1.572 9.255 4.6 1.9
4 65 0.236 1.674 0.390 4.573 7.4 1.7
4 66 0.241 2.031 0.481 2.729 6.8 1.9
4 67 0.243 0.769 0.185 3.428 6 1.7
4 68 0.245 0.598 0.145 3.977 7.2 1.7
4 69 0.256 4.808 1.178 6.296 6.8 1.7
4 70 0.270 5.204 1.336 2.049 8.1 1.3
4 71 0.263 -2.41 -0.65 2.645 7.9 1.6
4 72 0.256 -2.68 -0.70 5.273 9 1.6
4 73 0.273 6.420 1.647 3.649 10.4 1
4 74 0.267 -2.10 -0.57 -0.94 12.8 2.3
4 75 0.259 -3.11 -0.83 -0.66 12.8 5.3
4 76 0.275 6.185 1.602 6.488 9 5.3
4 77 0.271 -1.11 -0.30 1.606 8.7 6.4
4 78 0.269 -0.98 -0.26 1.478 9.5 7.3
4 79 0.271 0.984 0.265 3.541 7.6 6.2
4 80 0.259 -4.70 -1.27 -0.43 8.2 7
4 81 0.257 -0.58 -0.15 -0.90 10.1 9.2
4 82 0.259 0.529 0.136 3.030 10.6 9.8
4 83 0.257 -0.54 -0.14 2.518 8.2 10.4
4 84 0.259 0.759 0.195 4.388 5.2 10.1
4 85 0.266 2.675 0.694 4.293 5.3 9
4 86 0.272 2.175 0.579 3.634 4.7 7.8
4 87 0.269 -1.17 -0.31 -0.58 5.1 7.8
4 88 0.271 0.983 0.264 -0.16 4.9 8.6
4 89 0.280 3.141 0.853 1.323 4 9.3
3
5
4
5
3
6
3
8
4
4
6
1
2
5
3
9
1
8
3
4
5
5
9
8
2
4
5
8
7
5
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A6. FINLAND
c Y IPR DIPR CP PGDP DP U
5 60 0.177 k * * 2.2 1.5
5 61 0.177 0.332 0.058 7.636 5.3 1.2
5 62 0.181 2.096 0.373 2.963 4 1.3
5 63 0.172 -4.82 -0.87 3.270 5.1 1.5
5 64 0.193 11.74 2.030 5.278 7.2 1.5
5 65 0.197 2.220 0.428 5.294 5 1.4
5 66 0.199 0.937 0.185 2.361 4.7 1.5
5 67 0.195 -1.93 -0.38 2.158 7.4 2.9
5 68 0.185 -4.95 -0.96 2.331 12.1 3.8
5 69 0.203 9.260 1.720 9.576 4.2 2.8
5 70 0.221 9.273 1.882 1 .M2 3.8 1.9
5 71 0.217 -2.08 -0.46 2.085 7.6 2.2
5 72 0.211 -2.54 -0.55 7.639 8.4 2.5
5 73 0.221 4.670 0.988 6.712 14.1 2.3
5 74 0.227 2.696 0.597 3.016 22.5 1.7
5 75 0.226 -0.42 -0.09 1.151 14.5 2.2
5 76 0.222 -1.71 -0.38 0.272 12.5 3.8
5 77 0.219 -1.30 -0.29 0.123 10.1 5.8
5 78 0.209 -4.51 -0.99 2.168 7.7 7.2
5 79 0.226 7.994 1.677 7.260 8.4 5.9
5 80 0.231 2.159 0.489 5.329 9.3 4.6
5 81 0.220 -4.80 -1.11 1.579 11.4 4.8
5 82 0.218 -0.84 -0.18 3.572 8.7 5.3
5 83 0.218 -0.00 -0.00 2.982 8.6 5.4
5 84 0.215 -1.53 -0.33 3.073 8.9 5.2
5 85 0.220 2.592 0.557 3.326 5.1 5
5 86 0.222 0.745 0.164 2.090 4.6 5.3
5 87 0.230 3.661 0.814 3.986 5.2 5
5 88 0.239 4.089 0.942 5.437 6.3 4.5
5 89 0.245 2.372 0.569 5.173 5.8 3.4
A7. FRANCE
C Y IPR DIPR CP PGDP DP U
11 60 0.110 * * * 3.5 1.8
11 61 0.111 1.209 0.133 5.506 3.4 1.5
11 62 0.111 0.032 0.003 6.674 4.7 1.4
11 63 0.120 7.277 0.814 5.347 6.4 1.3
11 64 0.128 7.045 0.845 6.518 4.1 1.4
11 65 0.125 -2.10 -0.27 4.776 2.7 1.5
11 66 0.131 4.424 0.556 5.214 2.9 1.8
11 67 0.135 2.956 0.388 4.686 3.2 1.9
11 68 0.144 7.083 0.957 4.259 4.2 2.6
11 69 0.159 9.855 1.426 6.990 6.6 2.3
11 70 0.159 0.433 0.068 5.730 5.6 2.5
11 71 0.162 1.538 0.245 4.756 5.8 2.7
11 72 0.174 7.651 1.241 4.078 6.2 2.8
11 73 0.185 6.409 1.119 5.418 7.8 2.7
11 74 0.182 -1.52 -0.28 2.715 11.1 2.8
11 75 0.168 -7.68 -1.40 -0.32 13.4 4
11 76 0.186 10.28 1.736 4.401 9.9 4.4
11 77 0.182 -2.16 -0.40 3.535 9 4.9
11 78 0.182 0.086 0.015 3.381 9.5 5.2
11 79 0.192 5.690 1.037 3.173 10.4 5.9
11 80 0.194 0.691 0.133 1.387 12.2 6.3
11 81 0.188 -2.78 -0.54 1.195 11.8 7.3
11 82 0.188 0.011 0.002 2.297 12.6 8.1
11 83 0.183 -2.81 -0.53 0.792 9.5 8.3
11 84 0.185 0.927 0.170 1.483 7.2 9.7
11 85 0.188 1.893 0.350 1.814 5.9 10.2
11 86 0.194 3.362 0.634 2.408 5.1 10.4
11 87 0.203 4.434 0.864 1.961 2.9 10.5
11 88 0.211 3.674 0.748 3.590 3.2 10
11 89 0.218 3.664 0.773 3.638 3.2 9.4
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JAPAN
IPR DIPR CP PGDP DP U
0.077 * * * 6 1.7
0.086 11.71 0.906 12.04 7.9 1.5
0.079 -8.49 -0.73 8.909 3.6 1.3
0.086 9.316 0.737 8.476 4.5 1.3
0.087 1.661 0.143 11.67 4.4 1.2
0.087 -0.21 -0.01 5.819 5.1 1.3
0.088 1.304 0.114 10.63 5 1.4
0.097 9.444 0.839 11.08 5.8 1.3
0.096 -0.59 -0.05 12.88 5.2 1.2
0.097 0.984 0.095 12,47 4.8 1.1
0.107 9.794 0.956 10.70 7.3 1.1
0.108 1.193 0.127 4.293 5.2 1.2
0.110 1.558 0.169 8.381 5.2 1.4
0.124 13.33 1.469 7.875 11.9 1.3
0.131 5.084 0.634 -1.21 20.6 1.4
0.117 -10.7 -1.41 2.599 7.8 1.9
0.118 1.027 0.120 4.783 6.4 2
0.116 -1.12 -0.13 5.288 5.7 2
0.117 0.485 0.056 5.102 4.6 2.2
0.124 5.660 0.665 5.188 2.6 2.1
0.110 -11.1 -1.38 4.443 2.8 2
0.108 -1.83 -0.20 3.860 2.7 2.2
0.106 -2.07 -0.22 2.837 1.8 2.4
0.100 -5.14 -0.54 3.151 0.4 2.6
0.105 5.013 0.504 5.015 1.2 2.7
0.100 -4.38 -0.46 4.714 1.5 2.6
0.102 1.848 0.186 2.460 1.8 2.8
0.104 1.555 0.160 4.406 -0.2 2.8
0.115 10.64 1.111 5.711 0.4 2.5
0.131 13.77 1.591 4.915 1.5 2.3
NETHERLANDS
IPR DIPR CP PGDP DP U
0.242 * * * 2.7 1.2
0.253 4.520 1.095 0.309 2.4 0.9
0.252 -0.24 -0.06 6.827 3.5 0.8
0.263 4.384 1.107 3.637 4.7 0.8
0.275 4.401 1.160 8.266 8.7 0.7
0.276 0.608 0.167 5.256 6.1 0.8
0.285 2.986 0.827 2.734 6 1.1
0.287 0.726 0.207 5.281 4.2 2.1
0.299 4.339 1.246 6.413 4.2 2
0.314 4.966 1.488 6.427 6.4 1.3
0.332 5.679 1.786 5.698 5.6 1.3
0.336 1.203 0.400 4.224 8.5 1.7
0.339 0.938 0.315 3.306 9.4 2.9
0.352 3.914 1.329 4.687 8.4 2.9
0.342 -3.05 -1.07 3.974 9.3 3.6
0.333 -2.65 -0.90 -0.09 11.2 5.2
0.343 3.119 1.039 5.117 8.9 5.5
0.344 0.370 0.127 2.321 6.3 5.3
0.353 2.422 0.835 2.453 5.2 5.3
0.361 2.274 0.803 2.369 4.2 5.4
0.358 -0.82 -0.29 0.866 5.7 6
0.346 -3.39 -1.21 -0.64 5.5 8.5
0.351 1.633 0.565 -1.43 6 11.4
0.357 1.575 0.553 1.380 1.8 12
0.361 1.130 0.403 3.134 1.8 11.8
0.369 2.399 0.866 2.591 1.7 10.6
0.373 0.984 0.364 2.009 0.7 9.9
0.383 2.537 0.947 0.778 -1 9.6
0.392 2.427 0.929 2.680 1.6 9.2
0.396 1.121 0.439 4.010 1.3 8.3
232
A12. NORWAY
c Y IPR DIPR CP PGDP DP U
2 60 0.240 * * * 1 2.4
2 61 0.247 2.726 0.655 6.259 2.6 1.8
2 62 0.251 1.786 0.441 2.831 4.8 2.1
2 63 0.255 1.651 0.415 3.774 3.4 2.5
2 64 0.259 1.475 0.377 5.006 4.7 2.2
2 65 0.266 2.628 0.682 5.297 4.8 1.8
2 66 0.273 2.791 0.743 3.792 4 1.6
2 67 0.283 3.644 0.997 6.263 3 1.5
2 68 0.283 -0.02 -0.00 2.245 4.4 2.1
2 69 0.278 -1.84 -0.52 4.495 4.2 2
2 70 0.300 7.963 2.217 2.003 12.8 1.6
2 71 0.304 1.194 0.359 4.571 6.7 1.5
2 72 0.291 -4.14 -1.26 5.172 5 1.7
2 73 0.311 6.817 1.987 4.127 9.2 1.5
2 74 0.310 -0.29 -0.09 5.172 10.3 1.5
2 75 0.316 1.820 0.565 4.170 10 2.3
2 76 0.327 3.460 1.094 6.825 7.5 1.8
2 77 0.326 -0.11 -0.03 3.579 8.3 1.5
2 78 0.286 -12.3 -4.02 4.545 6.4 1.8
2 79 0.275 -3.98 -1.14 5.057 6.6 2
2 80 0.273 -0.64 -0.17 4.201 14.6 1.6
2 81 0.274 0.419 0.114 0.871 14 2
2 82 0.280 2.381 0.653 0.341 10.2 2.6
2 83 0.271 -3.21 -0.90 4.624 6.1 3.4
2 84 0.278 2.569 0.698 5.759 6.4 3.1
2 85 0.280 0.429 0.119 5.265 5.2 2.6
2 86 0.291 3.890 1.089 4.176 -1.4 2
2 87 0.271 -6.59 -1.91 1.996 6 2.1
2 88 0.268 -1.31 -0.35 0.113 2.9 3.2
2 89 0.267 -0.20 -0. 05 1.211 2 4.9
A13. NEW ZEALAND
C Y IPR DIPR CP PGDP DP U
9 60 0.212 * * * 2.1 0.1
9 61 0.204 -3.80 -0.80 5.699 0.4 0
9 62 0.197 -3.42 -0.69 2.124 3.6 0.1
9 63 0.209 6.263 1.234 6.24 3.6 0.1
9 64 0.209 0.108 0.022 4.969 4.3 0.1
9 65 0.225 7.357 1.543 6.384 3.6 0.1
9 66 0.224 -0.17 -0.03 6.271 0.7 0
9 67 0.198 -11.7 -2.63 -4.63 4.4 0.4
9 68 0.197 -0.21 -0.04 0 4.9 0.7
9 69 0.199 0.633 0.125 10.17 2.7 0.3
9 70 0.232 16.45 3.277 -1.44 10.2 0.1
9 71 0.219 -5.21 -1.20 5.208 13.5 0.3
9 72 0.228 3.691 0.811 4.309 10.5 0.5
9 73 0.250 9.983 2.276 7.091 7.8 0.2
9 74 0.263 5.072 1.272 5.943 3.1 0.1
9 75 0.221 -16.1 -4.24 -1.13 16.6 0.3
9 76 0.214 -3.08 -0.68 2.439 17.4 0.4
9 77 0.224 5.016 1.074 -4.90 15.1 0.6
9 78 0.230 2.600 0.584 -1.73 14.2 1.7
9 79 0.253 9.839 2.271 -0.46 19.6 1.9
9 80 0.237 -6.44 -1.63 1.671 13.7 2.7
9 81 0.250 5.531 1.311 3.288 15.6 3.5
9 82 0.252 0.885 0.221 0.597 10.9 3.7
9 83 0.246 -2.24 -0.56 2.917 1.5 5.4
9 84 0.261 6.109 1.507 4.949 8.2 4.6
9 85 0.262 0.166 0.043 1.190 15.2 3.6
9 86 0.261 -0.41 -0.10 2.488 17 4
9 87 0.283 8.692 2.270 0.529 15.4 4.1
9 88 0.283 -0.07 -0.02 -1.22 7.9 5.6
9 89 0.311 9.656 2.740 1.289 5 6.8
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SWEDEN
IPR DIPR CP PGDP DP U
0.199 * * * 4.9 1
0.191 -4.21 -0.84 5.672 2.9 1
0.193 1.140 0.217 4.266 4 1
0.195 1.331 0.257 5.336 1.9 1
0.200 2.155 0.422 6.820 4.4 1
0.211 5.644 1.129 3.821 6
0.214 1.685 0.356 2.082 6.6 1
0.213 -0.67 -0.14 3.368 5 1
0.220 3.488 0.744 3.640 2.4 1
0.233 5.764 1.273 5.003 3.4 1
0.240 2.741 0.640 6.480 6 1
0.232 -3.22 -0.77 0.937 7.1 2
0.235 1.259 0.292 2.288 7 2
0.240 2.163 0.509 3.976 7
0.252 4.890 1.175 3.197 9.5 1
0.240 -4.47 -1.12 2.550 14.5 1
0.255 5.860 1.411 1.057 11.9 1
0.250 -1.62 -0.41 -1.59 10.5 1
0.237 -5.42 -1.35 1.752 9.6 1
0.250 5.614 1.332 3.847 7.9 1
0.248 -0.90 -0.22 1.658 11.7 1
0.237 -4.46 -1.10 0.032 9.5 2
0.241 1.730 0.410 1.120 8.7 2
0.239 -0.76 -0.18 1.806 9.7 2
0.241 0.985 0.235 3.982 7.7 2
0.251 4.059 0.981 2.224 6.8 2
0.256 1.791 0.450 2.265 7.1 2
0.263 3.026 0.775 2.934 5.3 1
0.270 2.423 0. 639 2.341 6.6 1
0.279 3.313 0.895 2.103 8 1
SWITZERLAND
IPR DIPR CP PGDP DP U
0.153 * * * 2.8 0
0.167 9.101 1.400 8.127 4.1 0
0.175 4.471 0.750 4.774 5.8 0
0.175 -0.05 -0. 00 4.886 4.8 0
0.179 2.688 0.471 5.252 5.3
0.175 -2.54 -0.45 3.183 3.8
0.176 0.876 0.153 2.458 4.8
0.178 0.760 0.134 3.057 4.4
0.184 3.740 0.666 3.590 3.1
0.195 5.564 1.029 5.640 2.6
0.206 5.597 1.092 6.368 4.7
0.209 1.642 0.338 4.078 9.2
0.216 3.072 0.643 3.202 9.8
0.221 2.606 0.563 3.042 8.1
0.217 -1.85 -0.41 1.452 6.9
0.202 -6.96 -1.51 -7.27 7.1 0
0.225 11.36 2.300 -1.40 2.7 1
0.236 5.100 1.149 2.432 0.3 1
0.255 7.774 1.841 0.410 3.6 0
0.263 3.143 0.802 2.488 2 0
0.268 1.816 0.478 4.602 2.7 0
0.262 -1.98 -0.53 1.443 6.9 0
0.259 -1.25 -0.33 -0.93 7.3 1
0.265 2.482 0.644 1.011 3.3 2
0.276 3.817 1.015 1.763 2.8
0.278 0.946 0.261 3.711 2.7 2
0.286 2.906 0.809 2.867 3.8 2
0.293 2.399 0.688 2.032 2.5 1
0.298 1.613 0.473 2.896 3 2
0.302 1.324 0.395 3.503 3.3 1
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B. Time-series data for indicators of manufacturing economic 
performance, alternative macro-indicators, and competitive 
pressures: 1973-89
Bl. AUSTRALIA
c Y IPR DIPR CP RHWM EMM RGDPPC RVAM RVAMPC CPI PPIM
10 73 0.136 12.93 1.560 * 3.7 3.9 6.8 2.9 9.5 8.7
10 74 0.160 17.96 2.446 * -0.2 0.2 -4.1 -3.9 15.1 15.2
10 75 0.135 -15.6 -2.50 * -7.4 1.6 -1.1 6.8 15.1 15.1
10 76 0.145 6.985 0.946 * 1.2 2.4 2.5 1.3 13.5 11.3
10 77 0.144 -0.63 -0.09 * -0.1 0 -0.4 -0.3 12.3 10.2
10 78 0.145 1.247 0.179 * -6 1.7 4.1 10.8 7.9 8.2
10 79 0.142 -2.02 -0.29 * 3 3.6 4.3 1.3 9.1 14.8
10 80 0.146 2.151 0.307 * 1.7 1 2.1 0.3 10.2 14
10 81 0.153 5.403 0.789 * -0.1 1.5 2.5 2.6 9.7 8.4
10 82 0.161 5.051 0.777 * -2.6 -2.4 -8.2 -5.7 11.1 8.9
10 83 0.146 -9.48 -1.53 * -4.3 -0.6 1.5 6.1 10.1 8.1
10 84 0.161 10.09 1.477 * 1.7 6.3 5.1 3.3 3.9 5.4
10 85 0.162 0.604 0.097 * -2.9 3.3 2.5 5.6 6.8 6.6
10 86 0.155 -3.87 -0.62 * * 0.4 1.5 * 9.1 5.6
10 87 0.154 -0.74 -0.11 * 0.4 2.7 6 5.6 8.5 7.3
10 88 0.169 9.296 1.437 * 3.5 2.2 5.6 2 7.2 7.4
10 89 0.188 11.71 1.979 * 2.4 3 * * 7.6 6.7
Notes: (1) C, Y, IPR, DIPR, and CP have same meaning as Al
(2) RHWM, EMM, RGDPPC , RVAM, RVAMPC, CPI, and PPIM are for
annual percentage changes in real hourly wages in
manufacturing, employment in manufacturing , real GDP
per capita, real value-added, real value-■added per
person employed in manufacturing, consumer price
index and producer price index in manufacturing .
Source : OECD
B2. AUSTRIA
C Y IPR DIPR CP RHWM EMM RGDPPC RVAM RVAMPC CPI PPIM
1 73 0.228 3.410 0.754 * 2.3 4.3 5.2 2.8 7.6 1.3
1 74 0.233 2.165 0.495 * -0.1 3.8 3.4 3.5 9.5 15.1
1 75 0.226 -3.30 -0.77 * -3.6 -0.1 -6 -2.5 8.4 6.4
1 76 0.246 9.230 2.086 * -1.6 4.8 6.3 8 7.3 5.9
1 77 0.249 1.160 0.286 * 2.1 4.5 5 2.9 5.5 3
1 78 0.249 0.026 0.006 * 0.4 0.1 1 0.5 3.6 1
1 79 0.262 4.885 1.220 * 0.6 4.9 6.4 5.8 3.7 4.2
1 80 0.268 2.349 0.615 * 0.8 2.9 2.4 1.6 6.4 8.6
1 81 0.267 -0.35 -0.09 * 1.2 -0.5 -1.3 -2.5 6.8 8.1
1 82 0.258 -3.22 -0.86 * 3.1 1 0.4 -2.6 5.4 3.1
1 83 0.265 2.566 0.663 * -5.4 2.3 1.6 7.4 3.3 0.6
1 84 0.281 6.040 1.602 * 2.9 1.3 2.9 0 5.6 3.8
1 85 0.288 2.593 0.729 * -1.1 2.4 3.8 5 3.2 2.6
1 86 0.283 -1.66 -0.48 * 1.5 1.1 0.5 -1 1.7 -5.3
1 87 0.289 1.881 0.533 * 0.8 1.8 0.7 -0.1 1.4 -2
1 88 0.301 4.287 1.239 * -1.8 3.6 5.6 7.6 2 -0.2
1 89 0.312 3.620 1.091 * -0.5 3.7 5.9 6.5 2.5 1.7
236
B3. BELGIUM
C Y IPR DIPR CP RHWM EMM RGDPPC RVAM RVAMPC CPI PPIM
8 73 0.420 6.902 2.712 9.2 1.3 5.6 8.9 7.5 7 3.4
8 74 0.420 0.196 0.082 7.5 1.1 3.8 3.7 2.6 12.7 17.3
8 75 0.401 -4.58 -1.92 5 -6.1 -1.8 -6.5 -0.4 12.8 6.9
8 76 0.416 3.698 1.485 3.1 -3.9 5.4 7.5 11.9 9.2 3.8
8 77 0.426 2.455 1.022 2.1 -3.8 0.4 0.6 4.6 7.1 3.1
8 78 0.426 -0.05 -0.02 1.2 -4 2.7 1.6 5.8 4.5 0.9
8 79 0.442 3.733 1.591 1.8 -2.7 2.1 2.7 5.5 4.5 4.4
8 80 0.430 -2.58 -1.14 2-2.1 4.2 2.5 4.7 6.6 5.3
8 81 0.426 -1.11 -0.47 1.1 -5.1 -1 -0.4 4.9 7.6 10.4
8 82 0.422 -0.77 -0.32 -0.6 -3.7 1.5 4 8 8.2 12.3
8 83 0.418 -0.96 -0.40 -1.6 -2.1 0.4 4.6 6.9 7.7 4.9
8 84 0.426 1.950 0.817 -1 -1.1 2.1 2 3.1 6.3 6.2
8 85 0.426 -0.06 -0.02 -1.9 -1.5 0.8 1 2.5 4.9 3.1
8 86 0.440 3.338 1.424 -0.1 -1.6 1.4 -0.7 1 1.3 -9.4
8 87 0.455 3.340 1.472 -0.5 -2.4 2.2 1.5 4 1.6 -2.9
8 88 0.463 1.622 0.739 1.7 -0.6 4.4 5.1 5.8 1.2 1.6
8 89 0.473 2.163 1.001 1.1 1.7 3.3 * * 3.1 6.7
B4. CANADA
C Y IPR DIPR CP RHWM EMM RGDPPC RVAM RVAMPC CPI PPIM
17 73 0.169 5.357 0.863 1.2 5.2 6.5 10.7 5.2 7.6 11.3
17 74 0.178 5.268 0.894 2.3 2.7 2.9 3 0.3 10.9 18.9
17 75 0.170 -4.74 -0.84 4.4 -4.4 1.1 -6.7 -2.4 10.8 11.3
17 76 0.173 1.924 0.327 5.8 2.7 4.8 7.3 4.5 7.5 5.2
17 77 0.170 -1.49 -0.25 2.7 -1.7 2.4 3.6 5.4 8 7.8
17 78 0.174 2.221 0.379 -1.6 3.6 3.5 4.6 0.9 8.9 9.2
17 79 0.185 5.899 1.031 -0.3 5.9 2.8 3.7 -2 9.1 14.5
17 80 0.190 2.761 0.511 -0.1 1.9 0.3 -4.5 -6.3 10.2 13.4
17 81 0.197 3.745 0.712 -0.6 0.6 2.4 3.7 3 12.4 10.2
17 82 0.177 -10.1 -2.00 1.1 -9.2 -4.1 -12.9 -4 10.8 6.7
17 83 0.185 4.618 0.818 -2.2 -2.5 2.4 6.5 9.2 5.8 3.5
17 84 0.200 8.111 1.504 0.8 4 5.6 12.9 8.6 4.3 4.5
17 85 0.206 2.948 0.591 -0.1 0.3 4 5.6 5.3 4 2.8
17 86 0.213 3.279 0.677 -1 1.5 2.5 0.7 -0.7 4.2 0.9
17 87 0.217 1.986 0.423 -1.9 1.5 2.9 4 2.5 4.4 2.8
17 88 0.231 6.248 1.358 0.8 4.3 3.2 4.9 0.6 4 4.3
17 89 0.234 1.590 0.367 0.5 1 1.8 0.4 -0.6 5 2
B5. DENMARK
C Y IPR DIPR CP RHWM EMM RGDPPC RVAM RVAMPC! CPI PPIM
4 73 0.273 6.420 1.647 8.6 3.4 3 5.5 2.1 9.3 14.8
4 74 0.267 -2.10 -0.57 5.4 -2.8 -1.4 1.6 4.5 15.3 22.1
4 75 0.259 -3.11 -0.83 8.7 -9.2 -1 -2.4 7.5 9.6 5.8 ’
4 76 0.275 6.185 1.602 3.5 0.3 6.2 4.8 4.5 9 7.7
4 77 0.271 -1.11 -0.30 -0.8 2.7 1.3 0.4 -2.2 11.1 8.2
4 78 0.269 -0.98 -0.26 0.4 -0.5 1.2 -0.3 0.2 10 4.3
4 79 0.271 0.984 0.265 1.5 1.3 3.3 5.7 4.3 9.6 9.1
4 80 0.259 -4.70 -1.27 -1 -2.1 -0.6 4.5 6.7 12.3 16.7
4 81 0.257 -0.58 -0.15 -2 -4.7 -0.8 -3.2 1.6 11.7 16
4 82 0.259 0.529 0.136 -0.2 -0.6 3.1 1.6 2.2 10.1 10.5
4 83 0.257 -0.54 -0.14 -0.3 * 2.6 6.7 * 6.9 5
4 84 0.259 0.759 0.195 -1.5 -2.4 4.4 4.7 7.2 6.3 7.1
4 85 0.266 2.675 0.694 0.2 7.1 4.2 3.2 -3.6 4.7 2.6
4 86 0.272 2.175 0.579 1.1 3.7 3.5 0 -3.6 3.6 -6.8
4 87 0.269 -1.17 -0.31 5.1 -2.4 0.2 -4.1 -1.8 4 0
4 88 0.271 0.983 0.264 1.9 1 0.5 0.4 -0.6 4.6 3.6
4 89 0.280 3.141 0.853 0.3 -2.6 1.1 1.2 4 4.8 6.3
237
B6. FINLAND
c Y IPR DIPR CP RHWM EMM RGDPPC RVAM RVAMPC CPI PPIM
5 73 0.221 4.670 0.988 * 4.1 6.1 6.5 2.3 10.7 21.1
5 74 0.227 2.696 0.597 * 3.3 2.5 4.5 1.1 16.9 25.7
5 75 0.226 -0.42 -0.09 * -1.3 0.7 -5.1 -3.8 17.9 14.8
5 76 0.222 -1.71 -0.38 * -0.4 0 2.2 2.6 14.4 6.8
5 77 0.219 -1.30 -0.29 * -2.7 -0.2 -1.6 1.2 12.6 9.2
5 78 0.209 -4.51 -0.99 * -2.8 1.9 4.2 7.2 7.8 4.7
5 79 0.226 7.994 1.677 * 3.5 7 10.8 7.1 7.5 9.7
5 80 0.231 2.159 0.489 * 5.3 5 8.3 2.8 11.6 15.9
5 81 0.220 -4.80 -1.11 * -0.6 1.2 3.3 3.9 12 11.9
5 82 0.218 -0.84 -0.18 * -1.9 3 1.4 3.3 9.6 7.1
5 83 0.218 -0.00 -0.00 * -2.1 2.4 3.2 5.4 8.3 5
5 84 0.215 -1.53 -0.33 ★ -1.2 2.5 4 5.3 7.1 5.7
5 85 0.220 2.592 0.557 * -1.4 2.9 3.9 5.4 5.9 4.1
5 86 0.222 0.745 0.164 * -4.2 1.8 1.3 5.8 2.9 -4.3
5 87 0.230 3.661 0.814 * -1.9 3.7 5 7 4.1 0.8
5 88 0.239 4.089 0.942 * -2.8 5.1 3.9 6.9 5.1 5.3
5 89 0.245 2.372 0.569 * 0.4 4.9 3.1 2.7 6.6 6
B7. FRANCE
C Y IPR DIPR CP RHWM EMM RGDPPC RVAM RVAMPC' CPI PPIM
11 73 0.185 6.409 1.119 6.7 2.3 4.5 7 4.5 7.3 14.7
11 74 0.182 -1.52 -0.28 4.9 1.2 2.6 3.2 2 13.7 29.1
11 75 0.168 -7.68 -1.40 4.9 -2.6 -0.3 -2.1 0.6 11.8 -5.7
11 76 0.186 10.28 1.736 4.1 -0.9 4 7.1 8 9.6 7.4
11 77 0.182 -2.16 -0.40 3 -0.4 3.1 3.7 4.2 9.4 6.6
11 78 0.182 0.086 0.015 3.6 -1.4 2.9 2.2 3.6 9.1 4.4
11 79 0.192 5.690 1.037 2.1 -1.5 2.7 2.4 4 10.8 13.2
11 80 0.194 0.691 0.133 1.3 -1.1 0.9 -0.7 0.4 13.6 9.3
11 81 0.188 -2.78 -0.54 0.9 -3.2 0.6 -0.7 2.6 13.4 11.7
11 82 0.188 0.011 0.002 3.1 -1.4 1.7 0.9 2.3 11.8 10.7
11 83 0.183 -2.81 -0.53 1.4 -2.2 0.3 0.4 2.6 9.6 8.8
11 84 0.185 0.927 0.170 0.3 -2.7 1.1 -1.8 0.9 7.4 9.2
11 85 0.188 1.893 0.350 -0.1 -2.9 1.4 -0.4 2.5 5.8 4.4
11 86 0.194 3.362 0.634 1.2 -2.2 2 -0.2 2 2.7 -2.8
11 87 0.203 4.434 0.864 0-2.3 1.5 -0.3 2.1 3.1 0.6
11 88 0.211 3.674 0.748 0.4 -1.5 3.1 3.3 4.8 2.7 5.2
11 89 0.218 3.664 0.773 0.2 0.3 3.1 3.7 3.4 3.6 5.4
B8. GERMANY
C Y IPR DIPR CP RHWM EMM RGDPPC RVAM RVAMPC: CPI PPIM
6 73 0.191 -0.26 -0.05 2.6 -0.1 4.2 6.4 6.5 6.9 6.8
6 74 0.192 0.921 0.176 4.7 -1.4 0.1 -0.7 0.7 7 13.3
6 75 0.195 1.583 0.305 2.9 -5.5 -1.2 -4.7 0.9 6 3.3
6 76 0.204 4.265 0.835 1 -0.9 5.9 7.7 8.7 4.5 3.5
6 77 0.204 -0.00 -0.00 3.7 -0.4 3.2 2.1 2.5 3.7 2.8
6 78 0.209 2.626 0.536 1.8 -0.2 3 1.8 2 2.7 0.8
6 79 0.218 4.235 0.887 1.1 0.5 4.1 4.6 4.1 4.1 5.1
6 80 0.222 1.875 0.409 0.5 * 1 0 * 5.5 7.1
6 81 0.217 -2.39 -0.53 -0.8 -1.8 0 -1.5 0.3 6.3 6
6 82 0.215 -0.63 -0.13 -0.7 -3.1 -0.6 -2.4 0.7 5.3 4.8
6 83 0.216 0.246 0.053 0 -3 1.9 1.1 4.3 3.3 1.5
6 84 0.221 2.159 0.467 0.3 -0.5 3.2 2.7 3.3 2.4 2.8
6 85 0.223 1.100 0.243 2.9 0.2 2.2 3.4 3.2 2.2 2
6 86 0.224 0.588 0.131 3.8 0.8 2.3 0 -0.8 -0.1 -2.4
6 87 0.228 1.809 0.406 4.1 -0.2 1.7 -2.9 -2.7 0.2 -0.4
6 88 0.232 1.556 0.356 2.5 -0.3 3.1 2.9 3.3 1.3 1.6
6 89 0.241 3.949 0.918 0.9 1.4 2.4 4.7 3.2 2.8 3.4
238
B9. ITALY
c Y IPR DIPR CP RHWM EMM RGDPPC RVAM RVAMPC CPI PPIM
13 73 0.193 1.679 0.320 12.1 -0.2 6.3 10.8 11 10.8 18.5
13 74 0.187 -3.10 -0.60 2.8 2.1 3.5 6.4 4.1 19.1 33.4
13 75 0.171 -8.39 -1.57 8.3 0.3 -4.2 -9.7 -10 17 9.3
13 76 0.181 5.253 0.903 3.5 -1.4 6.1 14.8 16.4 16.8 20.8
13 77 0.178 -1.17 -0.21 9.3 1.2 3.3 3.6 2.3 17 19
13 78 0.180 0.991 0.177 3.6 -1 2.9 4.7 5.8 12.1 10.4
13 79 0.188 4.239 0.765 3.7 -0.3 5.7 10 10.3 14.8 11.9
13 80 0.186 -0.85 -0.16 -2.2 1.2 4 5.3 4 21.2 17.3
13 81 0.179 -3.97 -0.74 4.5 -1.9 0.8 -1.7 0.2 17.8 15.8
13 82 0.177 -0.82 -0.14 0.4 -1.9 0.1 -0.7 1.2 16.6 14.8
13 83 0.173 -2.34 -0.41 0.1 -2.9 0.8 0.8 3.8 14.6 11.6
13 84 0.185 6.583 1.143 0.7 -3.9 2.7 4.5 8.7 10.8 9.8
13 85 0.188 1.632 0.302 1.9 -2.4 2.4 3 5.5 9.2 8.3
13 86 0.191 1.936 0.364 -0.9 -1 2.4 2.3 3.3 5.8 3.6
13 87 0.202 5.859 1.123 1.6 -1.7 2.8 3.9 5.7 4.7 4
13 88 0.207 2.436 0.494 1 1.8 4 7.5 5.6 5.1 4.8
13 89 0.218 5.107 1.062 -0.2 0.1 3 3 2.8 6.3 6.6
BIO . JAPAN
C Y IPR DIPR CP RHWM EMM RGDPPC RVAM RVAMPC! CPI PPIM
14 73 0.124 13.33 1.469 10.6 3.7 6.4 13.7 9 11.7 7.7
14 74 0.131 5.084 0.634 1.4 -1.1 -2.6 -0.2 0.9 24.5 27
14 75 0.117 -10.7 -1.41 -0.2 -5.7 1.3 -6.1 -0.4 11.8 8.9
14 76 0.118 1.027 0.120 2.7 -0.1 3.6 10.1 10.1 9.4 5.3
14 77 0.116 -1.12 -0.13 0.5 -0.4 4.3 5.5 5.9 8.2 2.8
14 78 0.117 0.485 0.056 2 -1 4.2 6.7 7.9 4.2 -0.8
14 79 0.124 5.660 0.665 3.5 0.5 4.3 6.7 6.2 3.7 5
14 80 0.110 -11.1 -1.38 -0.6 2.6 3.6 9 6.3 7.7 14.7
14 81 0.108 -1.83 -0.20 0.7 1.3 3.1 4.5 3.2 4.9 1.1
14 82 0.106 -2.07 -0.22 1.9 -0.4 2.1 5.8 6.2 2.7 0.5
14 83 0.100 -5.14 -0.54 1.2 1.9 2.5 8 6 1.9 -0.7
14 84 0.105 5.013 0.504 1.5 2.3 4.3 11.6 9.1 2.3 0
14 85 0.100 -4.38 -0.46 1.1 1 4.1 7 5.9 2 -0.8
14 86 0.102 1.848 0.186 1 -0.6 1.8 0.5 1.1 0.6 -4.7
14 87 0.104 1.555 0.160 1.9 -1.3 3.9 7.2 8.6 0.1 -2.9
14 88 0.115 10.64 1.111 4 2 5.3 8 5.9 0.7 -0.3
14 89 0.131 13.77 1.591 3.4 2.1 4.5 * * 2.3 2.1
Bll . NETHERLANDS
C Y IPR DIPR CP RHWM EMM RGDPPC RVAM RVAMPC CPI PPIM
7 73 0.352 3.914 1.329 4.6 -1.6 3.8 8.5 10.3 8 6.7
7 74 0.342 -3.05 -1.07 7.4 -0.2 3.2 5.2 5.4 9.6 9.8
7 75 0.333 -2.65 -0.90 3 -3.6 -1 -3.1 0.5 10.2 6.8
7 76 0.343 3.119 1.039 -0.2 -4.5 4.3 6.7 11.7 8.8 7.8
7 77 0.344 0.370 0.127 0.9 -1.4 1.7 0 1.4 6.4 5.9
7 78 0.353 2.422 0.835 1.5 0 1.8 0.3 0.3 4.1 1.3
7 79 0.361 2.274 0.803 0.1 -1.6 1.7 2.7 4.5 4.2 2.7
7 80 0.358 -0.82 -0.29 -1.8 -0.7 0.1 -1.2 -0.6 6.5 8.2
7 81 0.346 -3.39 -1.21 -3.2 * -1.3 -1.9 * 6.7 11
7 82 0.351 1.633 0.565 0.8 -3.1 -1.9 -4.8 -1.8 5.9 3
7 83 0.357 1.575 0.553 -0.2 -7 1 3.7 11.5 2.7 0.5
7 84 0.361 1.130 0.403 -2.1 1.9 2.7 3.8 1.8 3.3 5.6
7 85 0.369 2.399 0.866 2.6 0.9 2.1 3.8 2.9 2.3 1
7 86 0.373 0.984 0.364 1.5 0.9 1.4 0.4 -0.5 0.1 -10.
7 87 0.383 2.537 0.947 2.1 * 0.1 -0.5 * -0.7 -2.6
7 88 0.392 2.427 0.929 0.5 0.3 2 2.4 2.1 0.7 1.4
7 89 0.396 1.121 0.439 0.3 3.9 3.4 5.8 1.9 1.1 4.8
239
B12. NORWAY
c Y IPR DIPR CP RHWM EMM RGDPPC RVAM RVAMPC: cpi PPIM
2 73 0.311 6.817 1.987 2.9 -0.8 3.4 5.7 6.5 7.5 8
2 74 0.310 -0.29 -0.09 7.2 0.8 4.6 5 4.2 9.4 18.2
2 75 0.316 1.820 0.565 7.2 4.8 3.6 -2.2 -6.7 11.7 9.7
2 76 0.327 3.460 1.094 7.2 1 6.3 0.2 -0.7 9.1 7.8
2 77 0.326 -0.11 -0.03 1.7 -1.4 3.1 -2.1 -0.6 9.1 6.3
2 78 0.286 -12.3 -4.02 -0.1 -3.4 4.1 -2.5 1 8.1 4.8
2 79 0.275 -3.98 -1.14 -1.8 -2.8 4.7 3.2 6.2 4.8 8.6
2 80 0.273 -0.64 -0.17 -1 * 3.8 -1.1 * 10.9 14.7
2 81 0.274 0.419 0.114 -2.9 -1.6 0.6 -1 0.6 13.7 11.3
2 82 0.280 2.381 0.653 -0.1 -3.2 -0.1 -0.7 2.6 11.3 6.4
2 83 0.271 -3.21 -0.90 -0.6 -7.4 4.3 -0.7 7.2 8.4 5.8
2 84 0.278 2.569 0.698 1.9 2.1 5.4 5.7 3.6 6.3 6.3
2 85 0.280 0.429 0.119 1.9 0.9 5 3.7 2.8 5.7 5.1
2 86 0.291 3.890 1.089 2.9 2.9 3.8 0 -2.8 7.2 2.7
2 87 0.271 -6.59 -1.91 6.8 -1.7 1.6 1.9 3.7 8.7 6
2 88 0.268 -1.31 -0.35 -0.9 -4.3 -0.5 -3 1.3 6.7 5.3
2 89 0.267 -0.20 -0.05 0.8 -9.2 0.8 0.3 10.4 4.6 5.5
B13 . NEW :ZEALAND
C Y IPR DIPR CP RHWM EMM RGDPPC RVAM RVAMPC CPI PPIM
9 73 0.250 9.983 2.276 * 4.6 5.8 * * 8.2 *
9 74 0.263 5.072 1.272 * 4.4 4.4 * * 11.1 *
9 75 0.221 -16.1 -4.24 * -1 -3.1 * * 14.7 *
9 76 0.214 -3.08 -0.68 * 1.7 1.5 * * 16.9 *
9 77 0.224 5.016 1.074 * 3.6 -5.2 * * 14.4 *
9 78 0.230 2.600 0.584 * -6.3 0.4 -0.2 6.5 12 *
9 79 0.253 9.839 2.271 * 2 1.7 4.7 2.6 13.7 *
9 80 0.237 -6.44 -1.63 * 4.3 0.5 -1.5 -5.5 17.2 *
9 81 0.250 5.531 1.311 * -3.5 4.4 8.6 12.5 15.4 *
9 82 0.252 0.885 0.221 * 2 -0.4 0.7 -1.2 16.2 *
9 83 0.246 -2.24 -0.56 * -3.5 1.5 2.8 6.5 7.3 *
9 84 0.261 6.109 1.507 * 0 4 10.6 10.6 6.2 *
9 85 0.262 0.166 0.043 * 5.3 0.7 -4.4 -9.2 15.4 *
9 86 0.261 -0.41 -0.10 * * 2.3 2.3 * 13.2 *
9 87 0.283 8.692 2.270 * -5.3 -0.4 -4.2 1.2 15.8 *
9 88 0.283 -0.07 -0.02 * - 9 -1.9 -2.9 6.7 6.4 *
9 89 0.311 9.656 2.740 * -5.8 0.8 1.8 8.1 5.7 *
B14. SWEDEN
C Y IPR DIPR CP RHWM EMM RGDPPC RVAM RVAMPC! CPI PPIM
13 73 0.240 2.163 0.509 1.4 1.9 3.8 7.1 5.1 6.7 11
13 74 0.252 4.890 1.175 1 5.1 2.9 5.4 0.3 9.9 23.3
13 75 0.240 -4.47 -1.12 4.6 1.6 2.2 0.3 -1.3 9.8 6.1
13 76 0.255 5.860 1.411 6.9 -3.3 0.7 0 3.5 10.3 8.6
13 77 0.250 -1.62 -0.41 -4.3 -3.6 -1.9 -5.7 -2.2 11.4 9.5
13 78 0.237 -5.42 -1.35 -1.1 -3.5 1.5 -2.7 0.8 10 8.2
13 79 0.250 5.614 1.332 0.5 0.3 3.6 6.4 6.1 7.2 11.6
13 80 0.248 -0.90 -0.22 -4.3 0 1.5 0.4 0.4 13.7 13.2
13 81 0.237 -4.46 -1.10 -1.4 -4.1 -0.1 -3 1.1 12.1 10.5
13 82 0.241 1.730 0.410 0.1 -3.9 1.1 0.2 4.2 8.6 12.7
13 83 0.239 -0.76 -0.18 -1.7 -0.5 1.8 6 6.6 8.9 11.5
13 84 0.241 0.985 0.235 1.4 1.3 3.9 7.6 6.2 8 8
13 85 0.251 4.059 0.981 0.2 1.6 2.1 2.1 0.5 7.4 5.5
13 86 0.256 1.791 0.450 3 0.8 2 0.7 -0.1 4.3 0.2
13 87 0.263 3.026 0.775 2.2 -1.6 2.5 2.7 4.4 4.2 2.7
13 88 0.270 2.423 0.639 2 0.6 1.8 2.4 1.8 5.8 6
13 89 0.279 3.313 0.895 3.3 1.2 1.4 1.2 -0.1 6.4 7.1
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B15. SWITZERLAND
c Y IPR DIPR CP RHWM EMM RGDPPC RVAM RVAMPC! CPI PPIM
15 73 0.221 2.606 0.563 * -0.3 2.1 * * 8.7 10.7
15 74 0.217 -1.85 -0.41 * -0.7 1.2 * * 9.8 16.1
15 75 0.202 -6.96 -1.51 * -8 -6.5 * * 6.7 -2.2
15 76 0.225 11.36 2.300 * -6 -0.3 * * 1.7 -0.7
15 77 0.236 5.100 1.149 * -0.6 2.7 * * 1.3 0.3
15 78 0.255 7.774 1.841 * 0.6 0.1 * * 1.1 -3.4
15 79 0.263 3.143 0.802 * -0.3 2.2 * * 3.6 3.8
15 80 0.268 1.816 0.478 * * 4 * * 4 5.1
15 81 0.262 -1.98 -0.53 * 0.5 0.7 * * 6.5 5.8
15 82 0.259 -1.25 -0.33 * -3.3 -1.5 * * 5.6 2.5
15 83 0.265 2.482 0.644 * -3.6 0.8 * * 3 0.5
15 84 0.276 3.817 1.015 * -1 1.4 * * 2.9 3.2
15 85 0.278 0.946 0.261 * * 3.3 * * 3.4 2.3
15 86 0.286 2.906 0.809 * 1.8 2.2 * * 0.8 -4
15 87 0.293 2.399 0.688 * -0.1 1.3 * * 1.4 -2
15 88 0.298 1.613 0.473 * 0 2.1 * * 1.9 2.3
15 89 0.302 1.324 0.395 * 1 2.7 * * 3.2 4.3
B16. U.K.
C Y IPR DIPR CP RHWM EMM RGDPPC RVAM RVAMPC• CPI PPIM
12 73 0.197 3.191 0.611 3.2 0.7 7.4 9.2 8.5 9.2 7.3
12 74 0.201 2.049 0.404 0.9 0.6 -1 -1.2 -1.8 16 27.8
12 75 0.191 -5.02 -1.01 1.7 -4.8 -0.6 -6.9 -2.2 24.2 23.1
12 76 0.194 1.603 0.307 0.2 -3.2 2.7 1.8 5.2 16.5 16.2
12 77 0.193 -0.68 -0.13 -4.8 0.7 2.4 2 1.3 15.8 18.2
12 78 0.193 0.087 0.016 5.7 -0.5 3.7 0.6 1.1 8.3 9.9
12 79 0.203 5.280 1.021 1.9 -0.4 2.7 -0.2 0.2 13.4 10.9
12 80 0.201 -1.05 -0.21 -0.1 -4.4 -2.3 -8.7 -4.5 18 14
12 81 0.198 -1.24 -0.25 1 -10. -1.4 - 6 4.9 11.9 9.6
12 82 0.204 2.542 0.506 2.4 -5.8 1.8 0.2 6.4 8.6 7 . 7
12 83 0.208 1.964 0.400 4.2 -5.9 3.7 2.9 9.3 4.6 5 . 5
12 84 0.220 5.949 1.237 3.6 -2.1 1.9 4 6.2 5 6.1
12 85 0.218 -0.82 -0.18 2.9 -0.8 3 . 3 3 3.8 6.1 5.6
12 86 0.223 2.220 0.485 4.1 -2.5 3.6 0.9 3.4 3.4 4.3
12 87 0.228 2.381 0.532 3.7 -1.4 4 . 4 * * 4.1 3.9
12 88 0.242 5.956 1.362 3.4 1.3 4 . 4 * * 4.9 4.5
12 89 0.250 3.497 0.847 0.9 0.2 1.9 * * 7.8 5.1
B17 . U.S.
C Y IPR DIPR CP RHWM EMM RGDPPC RVAM RVAMPC! CPI PPIM
16 73 0.075 4.984 0.358 0.8 5.6 3.8 10.9 5.1 6.2 9.1
16 74 0.073 -2.93 -0.22 -2.5 -0.1 -1.6 -4.7 -4.5 11.1 15.3
16 75 0.066 -8.97 -0.65 -0.1 -7.5 -2 -7.7 -0.3 9.1 10.8
16 76 0.075 12.82 0.854 2.2 4.1 3.9 9.7 5.3 5.7 4.4
16 77 0.080 6.625 0.498 2.1 3.1 3.4 7.3 4.1 6.5 6.5
16 78 0.080 0.645 0.051 1 4.3 4 6.1 1.7 7.6 7.9
16 79 0.080 -0.63 -0.05 -2.5 3.1 0.9 2.2 -0.8 11.3 11.1
16 80 0.074 -7.49 -0.60 -4.3 -2.3 -1.3 -4.4 -2.1 13.5 13.5
16 81 0.074 0.136 0.010 -0.5 -0.6 1.2 1.9 2.5 10.3 9.3
16 82 0.074 0.358 0.026 0.2 -7 -3.6 -6.2 0.9 6.1 4
16 83 0.079 7.313 0.544 0.6 -1.7 2.9 6.1 7.9 3.2 1.6
16 84 0.090 13.47 1.077 -0.2 5.3 6.2 12.2 6.6 4.3 2.1
16 85 0.091 1.039 0.094 0.3 -0.6 2.8 4 4.6 3.5 0.9
16 86 0.097 6.719 0.616 0.2 0.4 2.2 2.3 1.9 1.9 -1.4
16 87 0.102 4.538 0.444 -1.8 -0.1 2.5 4.5 4.6 3.7 2.1
16 88 0.103 0.933 0.095 -1.2 1.8 3.5 * * 4.1 2.5
16 89 0.106 3.341 0.345 -1.8 1.6 1.8 * * 4.8 5.1
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C. Cross-country rank correlations between competitive 
pressures, labour market institutions and economic 
performance
Cl. UNEMPLOYMENT
IPR(-) DIPR(-) CP(-) c(+) CD ( + )
1961 — — — + —
1962 - + + + -
1963 - . -(*) - + -
1964 - - - + -
1965 - - - + -
1966 - + (**) + + -
1967 - + + + +
1968 - + - + -
1969 - + + + -
1970 - “ ( * ) - ( * ) + ( * ) +
1971 - + + + +
1972 - + + + ( * ) +
1973 - - - + ( * ) +
1974 - - - +(*) +
1975 - + + + +
1976 - + - +(*) +
1977 - - - + +
1978 - - - + +
1979 - - - + +
1980 - - - + +
1981 - 0 - + + (*)
1982 - + + + +
1983 - + + + +
1984 + + + + + ( * )
1985 + 0 - + + ( * )
1986 - + + + + ( * )
1987 - + + + + ( * )
1988 + + + + + ( * )
1989 + - - + + ( * )
FREQUENCY 25 12 16 29 21
SIG 0 2 1 5 7
OPP 0 1 0 0 0
NOTES:
(1) Based on more conservative Kendall-Tau B rank 
coefficients.
(2) (*) for the statistical significance of less than 
10 percent, and (**) for less than 1 percent.
(3) IPR, DIPR, CP, C, and CD are for the level, 
percentage changes and changes of import penetrations, 
index of centralization, and Calmfors-Driffill U-curve 
index, respectively.
(4) 'Frequency' means the number of expected signs.
(5) 'SIG' and 'OPP' means the number of expected and 
unexpected signs with significance level of less than 
10 percent.
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C2. INFLATION
IPR(-) DIPR(-) CP(-) C( + ) CD ( + )
1961 _ + + _ _
1962 + + {*) + (**) — —1963 + + (*) + — +1964 + (*) + — 0
1965 + (**) — + "(*) —1966 + — + —
1967 + — — — —
1968 — — -(*) + +1969 — — + +
1970 + + (*) + (*) — —1971 + (*) + — +
1972 + — — — +
1973 — + (*) + (*) + +1974 — + + + +
1975 — — -(*) + + (*)1976 — + + (*)1977 0 “(*) =  (*) — +1978 — — +
1979 — + + + +
1980 — — — + 0
1981 — + + + +
1982 — + + + +
1983 — — — — —
1984 — — — — +
1985 — — — 0 +
1986 — — — — +(*)
1987 — + — —
1988 — + + + +
1989 — + + + +
FREQUENCY 19 18 14 12 19
SIG 0 2 3 0 3
OPP 3 4 3 1 0
C3. (GDP GROWTH RATE
IPR(+) DIPR(+) CP( + ) c(-) CD(-)
1961 + + (*) + _ _
1962 — — + (*) +1963 — + (*) + (*) + (*) +1964 — + + +
1965 — + (*) + + +
1966 — + (*) + + +1967 — + (**) + (**) + +
1968 "(*) + + + +1969 + + + — + (*)
1970 + + — — +
1971 — — — + +
1972 — — — — —
1973 — + + + (*) +1974 + (*) 0 + —
1975 + + — —
1976 + + + — —
1977 + + + —
1978 -(*) 0 — + (**) +1979 + — — —
1980 + + + 0 —
1981 -(*) + + + (*) +1982 + + — +
1983 — + + + :(*)1984 — + + +
1985 — — — +
1986 — +(*) + (*) + (*)1987 “ (*) + (*) +1988 “ (*) + (*) + (*) + (*) +1989 + + + +
FREQUENCY 7 22 21 10 12
SIG 1 7 4 0 2
OPP 6 0 0 8 1
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C4. PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF REAL HOURLY WAGES IN
MANUFACTURING
IPR(-) DIPR(-) CP(-) C( + ) CD ( + )
1973 + + + + + (*)1974 + (**) + (*)
— — : ( * )1975 + — —
1976 + + —
1977 — + + +
1978 — + + + +
1979 — + + + + ’ *
1980 + + + + + *
1981 :(*) — — + + *1982 — — + +
1983 j j (*) — — + + f*)1984 + + + —
1985 + — — — +
1986 + — — - ( * ) 01987 + - ( * ) ;(*> - ( * * ) —1988 + + +
1989 + + + — —
FREQUENCY 7 7 8 9 n
SIG 2 1 1 0 6
OPP 2 0 0 3 1
C5. PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF EMPLOYMENT IN
MANUFACTURING
IPR(+) DIPR(+) CP( + ) c(- ) CD (--)
1973 ; ( * ) + (*) + + +1974 + + 0
1975 + + + — —
1976 - ( * ) — ; ( * ) + —1977 + + +
1978 — + + + : ( * )1979 :(*) + 0 +1980 + + — 0
1981 — + + + —
1982 + — — — +
1983 : ( * ) — — + —1984 + (*) + + : ( * )1985 + + + —
1986 + — + — - i [*]1987 — — ; ( * ) + -1988 - ( * ) + (*) + (*)
1989 + + + +
FREQUENCY 5 12 12 5 i i
SIG 0 3 0 0 4
OPP 5 0 2 1 0
I 
I
1 O 
1 
I cr>
 
I
l • 
l 
I 
I
PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF REAL GDP PER CAPITA
IPR(+) DIPR(+) CP(+) c(-) CD (-->
1973 _ + + +
1974 + (*) 0 + — —1975 + + _(*) —
1976 + + + —
1977 — + + + —
1978 : ( * ) — — + (*> —1979 + — —
1980 + + + — —
1981 -(*) + + (*) + (*) —1982 + — +
1983 — + + — -(*)1984 — + + +
1985 — — — + :(*)1986 + + (*) + (*) +1987 :(*> + —1988 + (*) + (*) + +1989 — + — +
FREQUENCY 5 12 11 8 13
SIG 1 2 3 1
OPP 3 0 0 2 0
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Cl. PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF REAL VALUE-ADDED IN
MANUFACTURING
IPR(+) DIPR(+) CP( + ) c(- ) CD(-)
1973 _ + — + (**) +1974 + (*) — — —
1975 + + + “ (*) +1976 — + — + (*) +1977 - [*] + + + (*} —1978 ’*■ + + + (**) +
1979 — + + — —
1980 + + + — 0
1981 — + (*) + (*) + +1982 + — +
1983 — + + + —
1984 — + (*) + + —1985 — “ (*) + +1986 — — -(*) + +1987 — — + +
1988 — + (**) 
+
+ (**)
+ +<*>
+
1989 + +
FREQUENCY 5 12 10 5 5
SIG 1 3 2 1 0
OPP 7 0 2 5 0II1 
00
1 
u
1
PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF REAL VALUE-ADDED PER
CAPITA IN MANUFACTURING
IPR(+) DIPR(+) CP( + ) c(-) CD(-)
1973 + _ + +
1974 + (**) -(*) -  (**) “ (*) —1975 — — 0 + (*)1976 + + + +
1977 — + + + (*)
T
+
1978 - r * ) + + + (*)1979 + + + “ (*)1980 + — — —
1981 — + + + + (*)1982 + + — —
1983 + + (*) + (*) — —
1984 — + + + —
1985 - * + — + (*) + (*)1986 -i * + + + (*)1987 -i * + + +1988 + + + + +
1989 + + + — —
FREQUENCY 9 13 11 6 6
SIG 1 1 1 2 0
OPP 4 1 1 2 5
1 o
 
1 v
o 
1 • 1PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF CONSUMER PRICE INDEX
IPR(-) DIPR(-) CP(-) C( + ) CD ( + )
1973 _ + + + +
1974 — + + + + (*)
1975 — — — + + (*}
1976 — -(*) “ (*) + + (*)1977 — -(*) -(*) + + v 11978 — + +
1979 — + + + +
1980 — — — + +
1981 — + + 0 —
1982 — + + + +
1983 — :(*) :(*) — +1984 + — —
1985 — 0 — +
1986 — — — — —
1987 — + — — —
1988 — — — — —
1989 — + — + +
FREQUENCY 16 9 12 10 12
SIG 0 3 3 0 3
OPP 0 0 0 0 0
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CIO. PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF PRODUCER PRICE INDEX
IN MANUFACTURING
IPR(-) DIPR(-) CP(-) C(+) CD ( + )
1973 _ _ — + _
1974 — + — + +
1975 — — 0 + +
1976 + — — — +
1977 — -(*) “ (*) + +1978 — + +
1979 "(**) + — + +1980 -(*) — — — 01981 + — — — +
1982 — + + — +
1983 — "(*) -(*) — +1984 + — +
1985 — + — — +
1986 “ (*) + — + +1987 “ (*) — — 0 —1988 — 0 — +
1989 + 0 + — +
FREQUENCY 13 11 13 7 14
SIG 4 2 2 0 0
OPP 0 0 0 0 0
Cll. AVERAGE UNEMPLOYMENT RATES OVER PERIODS
IPR(-) DIPR(-) CP(-) C( + ) CD ( + )
1961-69 _ 0 _ +
1969-73 — + — + (*) +
1973-79 — — — +
1979-89 — + + + + (*)1960-89 — + + + (*) +
1983-88 0 + + + 7 + (*)
C12. AVERAGE INFLATION RATES OVER PERIODS
IPR(-) DIPR(-) CP(-) C( + ) CD ( + )
1961-69 + + + _ _
1969-73 + — — — +
1973-79 — -(*) + + (*)1979-89 — + (*} + + +
1960-89 + “ (*) -(*) — +1983-88 — + v ' — +
C13. AVERAGE GDP GROWTH RATES OVER PERIODS
IPR(+) DIPR(+) CP( + ) c(-) CD(-)
1961-69 _ + (*) + (*) + (*) +
1969-73 — 0 + + v +
1973-79 — — — + —
1979-89 + — + —
1960-89 — — + +
1983-88 - (*fr) + — + —
C14. AVERAGE PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF REAL HOURLY
WAGES IN MANUFACTURING OVER PERIODS
IPR(-) DIPR(-) CP(-) C( + ) CD ( + )
1961-69 + + + _ +
1969-73 + + + + +
1973-79 + — + — +
1979-89 — — — — +
1960-89 0 — + + +
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C15• AVERAGE PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF EMPLOYMENT IN
MANUFACTURING OVER PERIODS
IPR(+) DIPR(+) CP(+) c(-) CD(-)
1961-69 _ + + (**) +
1969-73 — + — +
1973-79 -(*) “ (*) + —1979-89 + - + —
1960-89 -(*) + “ (*) + —
C16. AVERAGE
CAPITA
PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF 
OVER PERIODS
REAL GDP PER
IPR(+) DIPR(+) CP(+) C(-) CD ( —)
1961-69 _ +(*) + (*> — _1969-73 + — —
1973-79 + — — — —
1979-89 — — — + —
1960-89 — — — — —
C17. AVERAGE PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF REAL VALUE
-ADDED IN MANUFACTURING OVER PERIODS
IPR(+) DIPR(+) CP( + ) c(-) CD(-)
1961-69 _ + (*) +
+ +(*)
+ (*) +
1969-73 + +
1973-79 — + +
1979-89 — + + — —
1960-89 — + + + +
C18. AVERAGE PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF REAL VALUE
-ADDED
PERIODS
PER CAPITA IN MANUFACTURING OVER
IPR(+) DIPR(+) CP(+) C(-) CD(-)
1961-69 _ + (*) + + +1969-73 + +(*) +(*) + +1973-79 + + + (*)1979-89 — :(*) ; ( * ) —1960-89 + — +
C19. AVERAGE PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF < 
INDEX OVER PERIODS
CONSUMER PRICE
IPR(-) DIPR(-) CP(-) C( + ) CD ( + )
1961-69 + + + _ —
1969-73 + — + — +
1973-79 — ;(*) ;(*) + + (*)1979-89 — —
1960-89 + -(*) + +
C20. AVERAGE PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF :PRODUCER PRICE
INDEX IN MANUFACTURING OVER PERIODS
IPR(-) DIPR(-) CP(-) C( + ) CD ( + )
1961-69 + -(**) - _ _
1969-73 + — +
1973-79 — -  - ( * ) + +
1979-89 — — +
1960-89 — — — 0 +
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D. Rank correlations of time-s§nes variations within 
an econpmy Ipetwpen competitive, pressures, labour 
market institutions ana economic performance (1961 
-89)
Dl. UNEMPLOYMENT
IPR DIPR CP
AU + |[**] +NW ** - —
SW
DK + 1 + *)
FN + (*) — —
GE + **] -(*) _
NT + ** —
BE + ** — —
NZ + ** + +
AL + [*) — —
FR + [**] _UK + ** + +
IT
JA
++ ** -
—
SZ + **V i +US + —
CA + 1[*) — +
D2. INFLATION
IPR DIPR CP
AU _ _
NW + (**) — —
SW + (**) — —DK + -(*) -(*)FN + (*)
GE + +
NT “ (*) — —BE + — —
NZ + (*) + +
AL + + +
FR + (**) -(*) —UK + (*) —
IT + ( **) -(*) -(*)JA + + +
SZ — -(*) -  (**)US + (*) —
CA + (*) + +
D3. GDP GROWTH
IPR DIPR CP
AU
NW
SW
DK
FN
GE
NT
BE
NZ
AL
FR
UK
IT
JA
SZ
US
CA
-(*)
- ( * )
; ( * * )
\m
- ( * >
+ ( * )
+(**)
+(**)
| | s )
+
+ (**) 
+  r * ‘
+ r *
+ r *
+
+ (**) 
+ (**)
+ (*)
+
+ (**) 
+ (**)
+ (**)ft:)
+
+ (*
+ (*
+ (*
+
+
+ (**) 
+ (*)
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D4. PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF REAL HOURLY WAGES IN
MANUFACTURING
IPR DIPR CP
AU
NW
SW
DK
FN m + [*! J|S)
GE
NT
BE
NZ
AL
-
+++ ++
FR
UK
IT
JA
SZ
US
CA
-(**)
+
: (*)
+
+ (*) 
+ (*)
+
+(*)
+(*)
D5. PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF 
MANUFACTURING
EMPLOYMENT IN
IPR DIPR CP
AU
NW
SW
DK
FN
+ (**) ++ (*>
+ (*) 
+ (*)
+ (*) 
+ (*)
GE
NT
BE
NZ
AL
+ (*i) +
+
+
+
+ (*)
+ (*) 
+
+ (*)
FR
UK
IT
JA
SZ
US
CA
++
+ (*>+
++ (*)+
i [ t t )
+ (*)+
D6. PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF 
MANUFACTURING
REAL VALUE-ADDED IN
IPR DIPR CP
AU
NW
SW
DK
FN
+
++++
+ (**) +
W)+(*)
+ (**) +
+\j)
GE
NT
BE
NZ
AL
++ +++++
f ( 2 )++
FR
UK
IT
JA
SZ
US
CA
+
+ (*>
+ (*)
+(*)
+(*)
+ (*) 
+ (*)
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D7. PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF REAL VALUE-ADDED PER 
PERSON EMPLOYED IN MANUFACTURING
IPR DIPR CP
AU + + (**) + (**)NW -(*) —SW + +
DK — — —
FN — + +
GE + +
NT — + + (*)BE — + +
NZ + + +
AL — — —
FR + + (*) + (*)UK + + +
IT + + (**) + (**)JA
SZ
+ + +
US + (*) + (**) + (**)CA + +
D8. PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF PRODUCER PRICES IN 
MANUFACTURING
IPR DIPR CP
AU ;(*) + +NW + +
SW — — —
DK — — —
FN + + +
GE
NT
BE “ (*) -(*NZ
AL “ (**)
FR _ —
UK “ (**) “ (*) -(*IT -(*
JA + (**) — +SZ — -(*
US “ (**) -  (**) +
- (*
CA “ (** + V
D9. PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF REAL GDP PER CAPITA
IPR DIPR CP
AU + + (**) + (**)
NW + + +
SW 0 + +
DK + + (**) 
+ (**)
+ (**)
FN + (*) + (**)
GE 0 + +
NT + + (*) + (*)
BE + + (*) + (*)NZ + + +
AL — + +
FR + + (**) 
+ (*)
+ (**) 
+ (*)UK +IT +(*)JA + (*) + (*)
SZ + (*) + +US + (*) + (**) 
+ (*)
+ (**) 
+ (*)CA
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DIO. PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF CONSUMER PRICES INDEX 
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